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The literature on changing varieties of capitalism concentrates on the big 
economies, particularly the US, Germany and Japan. The Changing Political 
Economies of Small West European Countries sheds light on the group of 
smaller European countries that share a high degree of corporatism – 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. Most of them have recently been praised as alternative models 
to the liberal route as exemplified by the US. The authors put the small 
countries’ political economies in comparative perspective and investigate the 
trajectories of their welfare systems, corporate governance, labour markets 
as well as industrial relations from about 1990 until the economic crisis in 
2008. This volume also discusses typological questions, tracks the position 
of the small countries in the processes of European integration and asks 
whether their particular brands of capitalism might be a viable candidate 
for the European socio-economic model.
Uwe Becker is associate professor of Political Science at the University of 
Amsterdam. Previous publications include Employment Miracles 
(Amsterdam University Press 2005; ed. together with Herman Schwartz), 
Politicologie. Basisthema’s & Nederlandse politiek (Het Spinhuis 2006; ed. 
together with P. van Praag), Open Varieties of Capitalism (Palgrave-
Macmillan 2009) and Het Obama Experiment (Het Spinhuis 2010).
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Advanced welfare states seem remarkably stable at ﬁ rst glance. Although 
most member states of the European Union (EU) have undertaken com-
prehensive welfare reform, especially since the 1990s, much comparative 
welfare state analysis portrays a ‘frozen welfare landscape’. Social spending 
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ment, income equality and poverty, gender relations, human capital forma-
tion, and ﬁ scal sustainability? What is the role of the EU in shaping national 
welfare state reform? Are advanced welfare states moving in a similar or 
even convergent direction, or are they embarking on ever more divergent 
trajectories of change? Th ese issues raise fundamental questions about the 
politics of reform. If policymakers do engage in major reforms (despite the 
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 Preface and Acknowledgements
The intention of this volume is to contribute to the discussion on chang-
ing capitalist political economies and to enhance the empirical knowl-
edge of institutional continuity and change in the small, highly corporatist 
political economies in the Alps, the Benelux countries and Scandinavia. 
Almost all of these political economies have often been in the spotlight. 
Many observers consider them as alternative models for socio-economic 
development since they combine competitiveness and a highly developed 
welfare system. Remarkably, these small political economies are largely 
absent from the literature on capitalist varieties that empirically still fo-
cuses on the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan. This is an empirical 
omission, but also a missed chance for a critical review of the theory of 
varieties of capitalism. The character and development of the small coun-
tries’ political economies qualifies very well for this matter.
 The volume’s origins can be traced back to the editor’s involvement in 
an international 5th Framework research project on The Consensual Politi-
cal Cultures of the Small West European States (2003-2006), his co-edi-
torship (with Herman Schwartz) of the book on Employment “Miracles” in 
a few small European countries (Amsterdam University Press 2005) and 
his recent participation in the discussion on capitalist varieties as exem-
plified in his book on Open Varieties of Capitalism (Palgrave-Macmillan 
2009). The starting shot for the volume was the organization of a work-
shop in Amsterdam in June 2008 and subsequently of a panel at the SASE 
conference in San Jose, Costa Rica on “Institutional change and continuity 
in the small countries’ political economies”. The locations of these meet-
ings once more illustrated what a privilege it is to have a job in academia. 
Discussants and complimentary paper presenters in Amsterdam were 
Jean Claude Barbier, Frans Becker, Brian Burgoon, Jeannette Mak, Daniel 
Mügge, Arne Niemann, Otto Penz, Els Sol, Jeroen Towen, Barbara Vis, 
Jaap Woldendorp and Adrian Zimmermann. Gregory Jackson chaired the 
SASE-panel in San Jose. The authors of the volume are indebted to all of 
them for their suggestions and criticisms. They have also to thank the two 
 THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF SMALL WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
reviewers and the editorial staﬀ  of the Amsterdam University Press as well 
as Evelien van der Molen and Lea Klarenbeek for their assistance in the 
preparation of the bibliography and the index as well as in proofreading.
Uwe Becker
Amsterdam, May 2011
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1 Introduction
 Uwe Becker
Changing capitalism is a topic that has been discussed, with increasing 
intensity, in the context of the debate following the publication of Peter 
Hall’s and David Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism (2001). Empirically, this 
discussion and related comparative research have concentrated on the 
bigger political economies of the United States, Japan and Germany, with 
some attention for Britain, France and Italy. Smaller countries have largely 
been ignored. This volume would like to shed some light on a group of 
smaller European countries, all of which reveal a high degree (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Switzerland) or even a very high degree (Austria, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) of corporatism, as is shown in Table 
1.1. From here on, I will call them the sample countries.
Table 1.1 Siaroff ’s corporatism index (based on the diff erent indices of 13 other authors)
Average Corporatism Score (scale 1 to 5; mid-1990s)
Australia 1,688 Japan 2,912
Austria 5,000 Netherlands 4,000
Belgium 2,840 New Zealand 1,955
Canada 1,150 Norway 4,864
Denmark 3,545 Spain 1,250
Finland 3,295 Sweden 4,674
France 1,674 Switzerland 3,375
Germany 3,543 UK 1,652
Ireland 2,000 US 1,150
Italy 1,477
Source: Siaroff  1999: 185
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These countries are of special interest because most of them have been 
praised as models in recent years – as an alternative to the strongly liberal 
route as exemplified by the US. It is intriguing, therefore, to learn what 
politico-economic change has meant to these countries. Have they moved 
in the liberal direction and if so, to what extent? Or have divergent devel-
opments occurred? What happened with their welfare systems, corporate 
governance, labour market legislation and industrial relations in the one 
and a half decades preceding the sharp downturn of the world economy 
in 2008? Subsequent chapters will investigate these questions and also 
pay separate attention to how they have reacted to the process of Europe-
anisation. The concluding chapter delves into the question whether cor-
poratist capitalism is a viable candidate for a European socio-economic 
model, with the sample countries (or at least some of them) as examples.
 This introductory chapter provides an overview of the institutional 
changes that have taken place since the early 1990s. It puts the sample 
countries into broader comparative perspective (with attention for the 
bigger EU countries, the Anglo-Saxon world outside Europe, and Japan) 
and identifies a number of forces that triggered the recent changes. It is 
also, however, a contribution to the discussion on the appropriate map-
ping of capitalist varieties. This is important because we need a kind of 
typology that is suitable for the analysis of institutional change and for 
specifying the identification of the direction of change. From where to 
where do empirical varieties move? I will propose a typology of five types 
(liberal, corporatist, statist, meso-communitarian and patrimonial), of 
which three are relevant in this volume, and throughout the text I will 
strictly distinguish ideal types and empirical cases.1 Ideal types are ide-
alised and simpliﬁ ed – but not ﬁ ctitious – constructions of reality. Ideal 
types are no ideal performers, and they are not ideal in a normative sense. 
Complex, historically grown cases such as political economies or democra-
cies never represent ideal types; they approximate them.2 Ideal types are 
ﬁ xed constructions, while cases are historical entities and change their lo-
cation on the axes and in the space between the types. In short: ideal types 
are ﬁ xed, empirical cases are moving.
 The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) perspective analytically tries to cap-
ture the ways to economic performance. It conceives ‘liberal’ and ‘coor-
dinated’ routes to international competitiveness. We will have to discuss 
whether this dichotomy is much too simplifying. At the outset I would 
like to say that, when using a dichotomy, I prefer to talk of liberal versus 
embedded liberal capitalism because at the ideal-typical level, (complete) 
coordination and market are diametrically opposed and exclude each 
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other. The concept of embedded liberalism/capitalism, coined by Polanyi 
(1957), was much in use in the 1990s (see e.g. Crouch & Streeck 1997).
 Empirically diverse capitalism and ideal-typical coordinates
From where to where do capitalism varieties change? Do they only move 
from embedded to liberal capitalism and vice versa? For much of this 
volume, this simple dichotomous distinction is largely sufficient because 
corporatism (regularly combined with a considerable level of statism) is 
a form of embeddedness, and the recent institutional change of the high-
ly corporatist political economies was mainly in a liberal direction. The 
country chapters focus on this development. Distinguishing ideal types 
and cases, Figure 1.1 illustrates the movement of two highly embedded 
(corporatist) cases in a liberal direction, where the change that Y under-
goes is more marked than that of X.
Figure 1.1 Illustration of the change of two imaginary capitalisms (X and Y) from T1 to T2 
on the axis between the ideal types of embedded and liberal capitalism
 Xt1   Yt1    Xt2    Yt2
Embedded Capitalism  |                   |    Liberal Capitalism
The dichotomous distinction is largely but not completely sufficient! For 
this reason, attention will be given to the question what a more differenti-
ated typology should look like. There are considerable regional and na-
tional differences in capitalism with sometimes a strong role of the state, 
sometimes corporatist cooperation or clientelist infiltration and some-
times fragmentation of the economy into large business groups. Some-
times capitalism combines with a social-democratic environment, some-
times with a conservative one and sometimes with authoritarian regimes. 
Understandably, many critics have argued that the category of coordi-
nated/embedded capitalism is too broad and that it has to be subdivided. 
This criticism is justified. Typologies have to simplify empirical reality, 
but they also have to reflect fundamental differences.
 What are the criteria on which a typology of capitalist varieties should 
be based? Not much has been written about this, but they have to be cho-
sen pragmatically because objective meta criteria for selecting the most 
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appropriate criteria do not exist. Those of Hall and Soskice (2001: 6) ap-
pear to be identical with the seven institutional components they identify 
in capitalism: industrial relations, corporate governance, inter-firm rela-
tions, employer-employee relations within firms, training and education 
systems, the level of social protection, and product market regulation. 
Amable’s list (2003: 173ff; more limited) as well as those of Boyer and 
Hollingsworth (1997: 2; broader, also includes ‘conceptions of fairness 
and justice’) and Schmidt (2002: 107f ) are similar, with the latter offering 
three simple yet comprehensive criteria: 1) the structure of business rela-
tions, 2) the relations between government, firms and labour, and 3) the 
relations between capital and labour.
 Since a typology must simplify diversity, the number of criteria should 
be limited. Resembling Schmidt’s criteria, I propose to choose a few core 
criteria that point to fundamental and overarching features of capitalism 
and distinguish it from other politico-economic formations like feudalism 
or state socialism. Such criteria are:
I The relationship between capital and labour. This involves the rela-
tionship between unions and employers as well as that between man-
agement and employees. Corporate governance is related to it, and it 
is connected to the firm-investor and stakeholder-shareholder rela-
tions.
II The relation between politics and economy. This includes the welfare 
system dimension, employment protection, product-market regula-
tion, privatisation/nationalisation of companies and business sectors, 
the partial regulation of wages and profits, supply and demand and, 
related to these aspects, the scope and character of economic policy.
In case they add substantial features to capital-labour and state-market 
relations, culture and ideology (such as conceptions of fairness and jus-
tice) should be given the status of a separate, third criterion. Sometimes 
they do, sometimes they do not.3 For this reason, and because the maxim 
of simplicity could become threatened by adding this criterion, we should 
only use it for constructing idea-typical sub-varieties of capitalism and 
circumscribe it as the normative orientation of a political economy that is 
about ‘core’ norms – what is considered ‘normal’ in a political economy – 
and basic ideological principles.
 A number of proposals for non-dichotomous typologies have been 
made (for a more extensive discussion of what follows, see Becker 2009: 
chapter 3). In a context of analysing change, these typologies only make 
sense when:
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– they at least implicitly reflect criteria like those just mentioned;
– they are not static by deﬁ nition, which is the case in geographically 
termed typologies (could a Nordic4 political economy move in a Medi-
terranean direction?);
– no mixed types are constructed – reality is mixed (and changing) 
types are not;
– cases are distinguished from ideal types, where the former only ap-
proximate the latter. Classifications, where cases belong to types, 
sometimes conceal considerable differences between cases – for ex-
ample, between the ‘liberal’ US and Canada – and do not leave space 
for change other than the radical jump from one type to another.
Typologies worth considering are those of Robert Boyer (2004: 13f ) and 
Vivien Schmidt (2002a: 107ff ). Boyer draws distinctions between four 
varieties: market-based, social democratic, statist and meso-corporatist, 
the latter referring to the cooperation between labour and capital within 
(large) companies as well as between companies in different branches as 
it exists in East Asian countries. Boyer does not distinguish ideal types 
and cases, however. Vivien Schmidt does. Writing in terms of countries 
coming ‘close’ and ‘closest’ to the ideal types, with no one country ‘entirely 
fitting’, she is the only prominent author presenting a non-dichotomous, 
ideal type-based typology. Her typology of European varieties of capital-
ism consists of the types of market capitalism, state capitalism and man-
aged capitalism.
 What, then, are the ideal types we should work with? We do not need 
to reinvent the wheel in this field and can take types already circulating in 
the discussion. Although Boyer works with classifications instead of ideal 
type-based typologies, I will adopt from him and Schmidt three types of 
embedded capitalism: statist, social democratic/managed and meso-cor-
poratist, which I would like to rename statist, corporatist and – to avoid 
having the concept of corporatism twice in a row – meso-communitarian 
capitalism. The picture of the typology and of national political econo-
mies most approximating the ideal types is this:
1 The liberal type. Here, the market governs every aspect of the econ-
omy, and politics unrestrictedly facilitates private property and the 
market – apart from regulations regarding issues like health and 
human safety. Besides this facilitation and the provision of residual 
social security and a legal and infrastructural framework, state in-
terventionism is very limited and capital-labour relations are largely 
individualised and adversarial. Unions and employers’ associations 
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are weak, and labour as well as companies highly commodified. 
Shareholders and private owners are the only stakeholders. Politi-
cal economies most approximating this ideal type, though in differ-
ent degrees, are those of the Anglo-Saxon countries, but all other 
capitalist countries also feature strong liberal traits. Otherwise they 
would not be capitalist.
2 The statist type. Here, the market is restricted by political regula-
tion that attempts to determine the overall direction of the economy. 
Alongside private owners, the state acts as a prominent stakeholder 
that is assumed to know best the common interest. Statism does not 
directly determine the level of the welfare system and the character 
of the capital-labour relationship, but a hierarchical organisation of 
companies with limited worker rights fits this type best. Social dem-
ocratic statism is not impossible, however. France has traditionally 
been the empirical political economy most approximating this ideal 
type, although statist features have also been strong in other Euro-
pean and East Asian countries. They are also clearly present in the 
countries studied in this volume (least so in Switzerland), and at a 
basic level, even the most liberal political economies are statist.
3 The corporatist type. This type first of all defines the institutionalised 
cooperation between capital and labour. Apart from wage bargain-
ing, it consists of negotiations among the relevant peak organisa-
tions on long-term socio-economic targets in terms of the common 
interest. Corporatist regulation partially corrects market regulation. 
Topics such as social security and income inequality are also on the 
agenda, particularly in tripartite corporatism, where the state takes 
part directly in the negotiations. The commitment of the main socio-
economic players to pragmatism, consensualism and the common in-
terest, however contested the latter may be, is an underlying aspect of 
corporatism. Labour and politics are stakeholders in this system, and 
the former also has a voice within companies. The political economies 
most approximating this type are those analysed in this volume and 
Germany.
4 The meso-communitarian type. This type can be distinguished by 
the organisation of networks of firms as communities. Managers and 
workers are expected to act cooperatively on behalf of the community. 
The networks also act as a welfare agency. Next to basic tasks, politics 
is limited to enhancing the firms’ global competitiveness. This type 
is most approximated in Japan (Anchordoguy 2005) and other Asian 
countries. In this volume, it is less important.
INTRODUCTION
5 The patrimonial type. Also less relevant here, this type is character-
ised by an important role for political leadership based on patron-
client relationships between the state and the economy. It involves a 
specific interaction pattern between political centre, local politicians 
and the top business firms. It exhibits favouritism in the distribution 
of privileges. It is strongly present in non-Western economies.
Figure 1.2 shows this five-dimensional typology. It illustrates a strong-
ly corporatist case in the space between the ideal types. The figure also 
 reflects the fact that all forms of capitalism are liberal and that corporat-
ism, because of its macro-economic orientation, only exists together with 
statism.
Figure 1.2 Illustration of the fi ve-dimensional typology of capitalist varieties featuring an 
imaginary, strongly corporatist case in the fi eld between the ideal types
 
 (the two types less relevant for this volume have dashed lines)
Since meso-communitarianism and patrimonialism are almost neglect-
able in the contemporary West European context, the types relevant in 
this volume are only those of liberalism, statism and corporatism. Of 
these, the latter two, on the basis of the third, normative criterion just 
mentioned, could be divided into social democratic (‘equality of condi-
tions’; ‘co-determination’ at the company level) and conservative (concern 
of ‘the strong’ for the ‘weak’; social harmony as a core value) sub-varieties.5
Corporatist 
Liberal 
Meso-communitarian 
Patrimonial 
 Statist 
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 Recent contextual changes: globalisation, Europeanisation and 
individualisation
Before analysing institutional changes, we must first describe the envi-
ronmental shifts triggering them. Institutional changes are adaptations 
to contextual changes. The main contextual changes in recent decades 
have been globalisation – particularly the intensification of global com-
petition – the process of Europeanisation in the case of Europe, social-
structural change, the related emergence of new interest constellations 
and relatively autonomous ideological processes. The latter notably 
points to neo-liberalism which in the late 1970s started to become the 
dominant strand in economic thinking and which received a push dur-
ing the Thatcher and Reagan years. Since the 1990s, it has been repeated 
time and again that globalisation forces advanced economies to liberalise 
their markets and reduce social expenditures. Did globalisation really 
exert this pressure?
 Globalisation is not a new phenomenon. In terms of trade relative to 
GDP, it was already strong in the heyday of colonialism in the early 20th 
century. During World War I and in the 1920s it receded, and in the years 
of the Great Depression, fascism and World War II, it weakened to a very 
low level. Thereafter, it was not until the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system in the early 1970s that globalisation received some attention again. 
It took until the 1990s for global trade to surpass its pre-World War I 
level. Since then, with the breakdown of Soviet socialism, the removal of 
international trade barriers and – very important for international trans-
actions at financial markets – the introduction of the Internet, globalisa-
tion has accelerated and has become a major topic in politico-economic 
discussions. A new feature of this recent period of globalisation is the 
emergence of new competitors from outside the Western world. China 
and India are the most recent prominent examples.
 The ongoing discussion on globalisation and its consequences is in-
tense, but a number of widely known features seem to be undeniable and 
can be summarised in note form:
–  Since the emergence of high-volume, low-wage production of manu-
factured goods in subsequent regions of Asia and, since 1990, East-
ern Europe, this type of production has gradually moved offshore to 
these regions. It concerns labour-intensive industries characterised 
by batch production at individual workstations, like garment assem-
bly, shoes, toys, luggage and cheap household goods. Some capital-in-
tensive but medium-skill industries like ship-building and consumer 
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electronics also largely disappeared from the advanced economies. As 
a result, in almost every OECD economy, the number of manufactur-
ing jobs has fallen considerably.
– Most recently, ICT equipment is increasingly being produced and de-
veloped in Asia, which is no longer only a competitor in low-wage 
sectors. Taiwan, for example, has become ‘a major world technology 
power’ (Berger 2005: 19), China is moving up the value chain and In-
dia has become an important player in business services (Havik & 
McMorrow 2006: 10, 17).
– The intensification of trade and the relocation of production has also 
brought about a changed international division of labour which in 
part is characterised by the compartmentalisation or modularisation 
of production processes – manufacturing has become ‘a commodity’ 
(Berger 2005: 83).
– One aspect that was made brutally clear to all since 2008 is that glo-
balisation is particularly embodied in the exponential growth in inter-
national financial markets, which have increased in magnitude, speed 
and volatility at the same time that the ability of national governments 
to control their effects is decreasing (Schmidt 2002: 17).
– One implication of the surge in international ﬁ nancial markets and more 
generally the extension of the global division of labour is the increased 
mobility of capital (even if there are path dependencies such as sunk 
costs and the reliance on clusters that limit mobility). Related, though 
disputed, is capital’s increased power vis-à-vis labour and the state.
– The current period of globalisation is ushering in not only new com-
petitors and a new international division of labour but also new cus-
tomers. For example, the more competitive that countries such as 
China become, the more purchasing power they gain and the more 
they can buy goods and services that are still produced in the most 
advanced economies. As a whole, this is a growth-enhancing configu-
ration (cf. Obstfeld & Taylor 2004).
– Moreover, falling prices for imported manufactured goods has in-
creased disposable incomes in the advanced economies and left space 
for an increasing shift in demand towards services and better quality 
manufactures.
Intensified global competition exerts pressure on countries to improve 
their competitiveness and in that sense leads also to pressure for politico-
economic change. It does not dictate the direction of change, however. 
Moreover, empirical cases unequivocally demonstrating the superiority 
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of strongly liberal political economies do not exist. The US and Britain 
have had strong GDP growth in the decade up to 2007/08, but this is also 
true for the smaller European economies analysed in this volume – with 
the exception of the most liberal of them: Switzerland. These countries 
have much less inequality and poverty than Anglo-Saxon countries, and 
they care more for the environment. Both well performing and less well 
performing economies exist in either more liberal or more corporatist 
forms, and the same is true for political economies approximating statist 
or meso-communitarian types. The causal nexus between institutional 
structure and economic performance seems to be weaker than is often 
supposed.
 A sort of special European supplement to globalisation is the process 
of Europeanisation which has taken shape since the late 1980s and early 
1990s. This process can be defined as the convergence of member states of 
the European Union in specific areas, induced by European treaties, leg-
islation or policies (Falkner & Leiber 2004: 3; cf. Schmidt 2006). Relevant 
changes in the context of national capitalisms brought about by Europe-
anisation have been:
– The Single European Act of 1986 where a single European market was 
envisaged, and the Maastricht Treaty on the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU; 1992) which laid down plans for the economic and mon-
etary integration that was realised in subsequent years.
– The establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB; 1997) and of 
the Euro (2002) – at least for the members of ‘Euroland’ (some EU 
member states – e.g. Denmark, Sweden and the UK – have yet to join 
the EMU).
– The criteria for membership in the EMU – the so-called ‘Maastricht 
criteria’ – which states that a member’s budget deficit could not ex-
ceed 3 of GDP, that total public debt must be lower than 60 of GDP 
and that national inflation rates should not be more than 1.5 percent-
age points above the average of the three lowest national inflation 
rates in the EU.
– The establishment of the Directorate General for Competition, or DG 
4. The common market is in essence a liberal endeavour aimed at 
breaking down national economic borders, but with the activities of 
DG 4, it becomes so in a pronounced way. This DG must eliminate 
unfair competition and mergers (including cases against companies 
such as Microsoft which lead to fines of hundreds of millions of Euros 
for the violation of certain rules) and also enforce the ban on direct 
forms of state subsidies to business.
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– The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice prohibiting any 
form of economic protection that violates the principle of equality, 
which for example is the case in constructions that protect private 
companies against hostile takeovers (cf. Höpner & Schäfer 2007: 18ff; 
Zumbansen & Saam 2007). Volkswagen is such a case.
It is particularly via the activities of the EU Commission’s competition 
department that the EU reflects the dominance of neo-liberalism. EMU-
Europeanisation, therefore, has ‘ensured that globalisation has been 
more pronounced in Europe than elsewhere’, and because of its restric-
tive stance and the related move away from Keynesianism towards mon-
etarism, it has led to convergence in the monetary policy arena (Schmidt 
2002a: 4, 14).
 Two years after the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the OECD published 
its Jobs Study (1994) in which the entire neo-liberal policy creed of the 
time was summarised. More than the Maastricht Treaty, it reflected the 
wisdom that had become increasingly influential in the course of the pre-
ceding decade and at the same time strengthened this wisdom – not least 
by a section on ‘Implementing the Jobs Study’ that was included for a num-
ber of years in the OECD’s Country Surveys. The nine recommendations 
made in the Jobs Study (1994: 2; 47-54) are:
1 Set macroeconomic policy such that it will encourage non-inflation-
ary growth. Redirect public spending away from subsidies and make 
fiscal consolidation a main objective for the medium term.
2 Enhance the creation and diffusion of technological know-how by im-
proving frameworks for its development. Intensify R&D.
3 Increase flexibility of working time (both short-term and lifetime) 
voluntarily sought by workers and employers.
4 Nurture an entrepreneurial climate by eliminating impediments to, 
and restrictions on, the creation and expansion of enterprises. Lower 
start-up costs and eliminate any unwarranted regulatory impediments.
5 Make wage and labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions 
that prevent wages from reflecting local conditions and individual 
skill levels. Keep minimum wages low, reduce non-wage labour costs 
and direct taxes.
6 Reform employment security provisions that inhibit the expansion of 
employment in the private sector. Loosen employment protection and 
permit fixed-term contracts.
7 Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and rein-
force their effectiveness.
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8 Improve labour force skills and competences through wide-ranging 
changes in education and training systems.
9 Reform unemployment and related benefit systems. Restrict unem-
ployment insurance benefit entitlements in countries where they are 
especially long, reduce after-tax replacement ratios where these are 
high, and tighten soft eligibility criteria.
A tenth recommendation, implicit in the argument of the Jobs Study, was 
sometimes added:
10 Enhance product market competition so as to reduce monopolistic 
tendencies and weaken insider-outsider mechanisms while also con-
tributing to a more innovative economy.
Recommendations 3-6 and 9 are at the core of the liberal creed, but the 
other ones also sound familiar. After the initial publication of the Jobs 
Study, these recommendations have endlessly been repeated by politi-
cians, economists and journalists, particularly after the Anglo-Saxon 
economies had entered a period of apparently unfettered prosperity in 
the second half of the 1990s, quickly recovering from the burst of the 
tech bubble in 2000/2001. Didn’t this prove that liberalisation as recom-
mended by the OECD was the best response to the new Asian and East 
European competitors?
 Less discussed than globalisation, Europeanisation and the dominance 
of neo-liberal ideas is the contextual change that took place in the social 
structure. It can be summarised under the heading of individualisation. It 
could be fertile ground for the normatively individualist aspects of neo-
liberalism that stress personal initiative and responsibility and – related 
to this – welfare cuts. Social-structural individualisation, which must be 
distinguished from this normative and ideological individualisation, in-
volves the loosening of group and class ties and a process whereby indi-
viduals increasingly have to rely on themselves. Indicators are:
– Demographic ageing (due to a low fertility rate; Ireland and the US are 
exceptions);
– The decline in the number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants (by 
about 30 on average in the Western world between 1970 and the 
early 2000s);
– The divorce rate which has more than doubled in most countries in 
the same period;
– The average household size which shrank by more than 10 towards 
levels of two persons per household in Scandinavia and Germany, 
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somewhat higher levels in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and still rela-
tively high, though sharply declining, levels in countries such as Ire-
land and Italy (CoE 2003; Eurostat 2004);
– The increase in the number of tertiary education attendants – in the 
brief period between 1991 and 2002, the average increase was about 
30, reflecting economic requirements but also the growing impact 
of an individualistic meritocracy (OECD 2004a).
– Another yardstick of individualisation is the decline in union density 
(see Table 1.2). In many countries, trade unions lost one third to one 
half of their members between 1970 and 2003. Exceptions to this trend 
are only Canada and Italy as well as the countries featuring the ‘Ghent 
system’. In the latter (in Belgium and Scandinavia), membership rose 
because unemployment beneﬁ ts are administered by trade unions. To 
be eligible for these beneﬁ ts, one has to belong to a trade union.
Table 1.2 Union density rates (% of the labour force), 1970-2003
1970 1990 2000 2003
Australia 50 41 - 35
Austria 63 47 37 35
Belgium 41 54 56 55
Canada 32 33 28 28
Denmark 60 75 74 70
Finland 51 72 76 74
France 22 10 10 8
Germany 32 31 25 23
Ireland 53 51 38 35
Italy 37 39 35 34
Japan 35 25 - 20
Netherlands 37 25 23 22
New Zealand 55 51 - 22
Norway 57 59 - 53
Spain - 13 - 16
Sweden 68 80 79 -
Switzerland 29 24 18 18
UK 45 39 31 29
US 27 15 13 12
Sources: OECD 2004b: 145; Blanchfl ower 2007: 3
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Did social-structural individualisation lead to decreasing solidarity, en-
hanced normative individualisation, and thereby to diminished support 
for the welfare state? Principally, the first form of individualisation and 
solidarity need not oppose each other; the weakening of the traditional ties 
of families, neighbourhoods and of early voluntary working-class insur-
ance arrangements had been at the basis of modern, state-organised soli-
darity, even if this is a rather anonymous solidarity. It does not, however, 
tell us anything about the support of different layers of society for welfare 
arrangements in the context of changing circumstances. A relevant ques-
tion therefore is whether people currently find individual responsibility 
more important than they did at lower levels of social-structural individu-
alisation. Do they (still) support welfare state solidarity? Tables 1.3 and 
1.4 provide tentative answers to these questions, but the information that 
comparative research provides is sparse and one has to keep in mind the 
considerable contextual differences between the countries surveyed. In a 
crisis year, attitudes will be different from those uttered in times of eco-
nomic growth, and specific national contexts also influence the answers 
given in surveys.
Table 1.3 contains answers given in the years 1996 and 2006 – both years 
of economic upswing. The overall trend points slightly towards more in-
dividualistic attitudes. In 2009, the answers would possibly have been less 
individualistic than in 2006. Remarkable in the table is the generally low 
level of support for a decent living standard for the unemployed; that in the 
US, support for state intervention has increased somewhat,6 albeit from 
a comparatively low level; and that attitudes in West Germany (where 
Table 1.3 Support for welfare state intervention, 1996-2006
 (% that answered “defi nitely”)
Should it be the 
government’s 
responsibility to 
provide:
A job for everyone 
who wants it
Health care for the 
sick
A decent living 
standard for the 
unemployed
To reduce 
income 
diff erences
1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006
West Germany 28 30 51 51 17 15 25 26
East Germany 57 46 66 62 38 26 48 50
Sweden 35 29 71 63 39 27 43 37
US 14 16 39 56 13 16 17 29
Source: Svallfors 2007: 22
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80 of Germans live) with respect to the questions posed approximate 
the US level and are considerably more individualistic than those in East 
Germany and Sweden.7 Eurobarometer surveys in 1976, 1989, 1993 and 
2001 on the causes of poverty point in the same direction. The number 
of people indicating that poverty is caused by laziness decreased sharply 
between 1976 and 1993 in all countries, but increased again after 1993 (Eu-
robarometer 2002: 19).
 The data in Table 1.4 send a different message. This table consists of a 
larger sample of countries and presents data on questions similar to those 
asked in the survey that Table 1.3 is based upon. The attitudes in 2000 are 
not more individualistic than those in 1990 – rather, the trend is reversed. 
Perhaps this is so because of the very years the surveys were conducted. 
1990 was the last year before the recession (in Scandinavia: severe crisis) 
of the early 1990s, while 2000 was the year of the bursting tech bubble. 
Table 1.4 is important as a contrast to Table 1.3 because the comparison of 
the data shows the dependency of attitudes on context and also that the 
differences between countries can be different in different surveys. The 
differences between Sweden and Germany are relatively small in Table 1.3, 
and in 1990 Americans ranked the possibility for unemployed people to 
refuse a job offer higher than most European countries surveyed.
Table 1.4 Valuation of competition and individual responsibility
 (10-point scale*)
Competition is good. It stimulates 
people to work hard and develop 
new ideas
People who are unemployed should 
take any job available or lose their 
unemployment benefi ts
1990 2000 1990 2000
France 4,03 4,73 4,40 4,53
Britain 3,81 4,01 5,33 4,92
Germany 3,25 3,80 4,42 4,09
Austria ... 3,19 ... 3,87
Italy 4,11 4,16 3,63 3,41
Netherlands 4,28 4,68 4,89 5,23
Belgium 4,03 4,80 4,63 4,89
Denmark 3,93 4,02 4,57 4,87
Sweden 3,22 3,46 3,86 3,95
Finland ... 4,28 ... 5,07
Ireland 3,70 3,81 5,28 5,60
US 3,17 ... 4,61 ...
*1 = competition is good; unemployed people have to take any job; 10 = competition is 
harmful; unemployed people may refuse a job off er.
Sources: EVS 1990 and EVS 2000, own calculations
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It seems that there is no clear trend in the support of welfare state in-
terventionism, implying that social-structural individualism (or ‘atomisa-
tion’) does not have structurally strengthened individualist attitudes. At 
least, this is what one can say on the basis of the limited evidence. Broad-
ening this by looking at election results over the past twenty years would 
show that voters have shifted to the right of centre and that social demo-
cratic parties have also made a move away from the left (Swank 2006: 
848). Perhaps this indicates a slightly increased normative individualism.
 Some overall political-economic changes: mid-1990s to mid-2000s
When the environment of national political economies changes, it might 
create space for change within these political economies, and their insti-
tutional structure will come under pressure to (be) adapt(ed) in one or 
the other way. This is true, for example, for the structure of education and 
vocational training systems and the level of welfare benefits. Pressure to 
change does not necessarily bring about real change, and if it takes place 
then its direction is not strictly determined by the changing context – 
at least in most cases. When EU regulation requires member states to 
take specific steps, we have a case of stricter determination; for the rest, 
however, the course of adjustment largely depends on the relevant actors’ 
interpretation of the situation, their knowledge, which is shaped by learn-
ing but also by fads and (perhaps) opportunism, and the power relations 
among them. In the past quarter century, this mix brought about a move 
towards neo-liberalism. In individual countries, this development might 
have been less pronounced, but the general trend is beyond doubt. Ideal-
typical varieties of capitalism do not change (they are analytical construc-
tions), but empirical political economies did.
 What have been the main changes? It is difficult comparatively and 
exactly to identify the major and less major changes, but rising income 
inequality and poverty rates have been recurring themes of political de-
bate in most Western countries, including the strongly corporatist ones. 
Probably related to decreasing union density and the somewhat changed 
social attitudes, income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) 
has increased, though from a low level, in all of our sample countries ex-
cept in Belgium and the Netherlands (see Table 7.3 in the final chapter), 
and in most other Western countries this is also the case. Remarkably, it 
has declined somewhat in the highly liberal political economies of Austra-
lia, Britain and Ireland. In the case of poverty (50 or less of the median 
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income), the picture is similar, with declining rates only in Belgium and 
Norway (slightly in both cases) among the sample countries, and else-
where in Britain, France and Italy.
 Another major change related to Europeanisation and globalisation has 
been the loosened regulation of trade and product markets. This loosen-
ing, above all in non-manufacturing sectors, took place mostly in the pe-
riod from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s (Simmons et al. 2006: 783, 786; 
Siegel 2007: Table 2). Significant changes have also occurred in the fields 
of privatisation and company finance (hedge funds and private equity) as 
well as in the power relationship between capital and labour as expressed 
by the wage share. Privatisation, as measured by the revenues it gener-
ated, has been another process that was boosted in the 1990s (Simmons et 
al. 2006: 786), but it is difficult to find out how much of it was motivated 
by competitiveness considerations and ideological factors and how much 
by budgetary reasons. In the first case, the conviction that the market 
works better would have been central; in the latter, financial need would 
have been the main motivation, as has particularly been the case for (can-
didate) member states of the EMU.
 In the case of hedge funds and private equity, the situation is similar. Un-
til 2008, the assets they managed had grown explosively. In that year, hedge 
funds’ total managed assets were 25 times the volume they managed in 1988 
(see Figure 1.3). For private equity funds the situation is not much diﬀ erent, 
although their spectacular increase only occurred in the years after 2002 
(cf. ITUC 2007: 13). National data for a large number of countries are not 
available, however.8 By inference, the same is true for the value of these as-
sets in relation to the total of assets. Th e latter information would tell us 
Figure 1.3 Hedge funds, development of assets managed, 1988-2008 in billion $
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about the direct impact of these funds on national economies. In any case, 
we can say that these funds have grown signiﬁ cantly and that the larger the 
relative amount of assets they managed, the more substantial the inﬂ uence 
or even control of these ﬁ nancial companies with a decidedly short-term 
orientation. And the stronger this short-term orientation is, the more lib-
eral markets are.
 Furthermore, both these fund types, but particularly hedge funds, em-
body the increasing commoditisation of productive property and employ-
ment by buying and selling companies, or parts of them, in the manner 
consumers buy clothes. Th ey are also exponents of the debt bubble that 
has ballooned since the mid-1990s and that started to burst in 2008. As 
unregulated limited partnerships of financially strong individuals and in-
stitutions (pension funds, no longer outstanding examples of a long-term 
orientation,9 are prominently represented), their operations heavily rely 
on borrowed money – which until the current financial crisis (2008-...) 
was abundantly available at cheap rates, particularly in Asia.
 Private equity funds appear in very diverse forms (see Vitols 2008 for 
a balanced account) and have a somewhat longer-term perspective than 
hedge funds. The latter are characterised by arbitrage strategies, a high 
turnover of assets and aggressive trading as well as managerial incentives 
to outperform financial benchmarks (Goyer 2006: 407). A recurring criti-
cism is that they are ‘milking’ employees, society (because they receive 
tax relief for their leverage) and even shareholders (ITUC 2007). Whether 
or not this is true is not a topic to be discussed here. I will only mention 
the counterarguments: that these funds bring efficiency to sometimes ail-
ing companies and that venture capital funds – a form of private equity 
– are often essential for start-ups.
 A ﬁ nal change worth mentioning which at least indirectly indicates 
change in a liberal direction is the decline of the wage share – i.e. the in-
come of labour (including that of self-employed persons) as a share of GDP 
(see Figure 1.4). Th is has been in decline since about 1975, particularly in Ja-
pan and Europe.10 Th is development is partly due to the shrinking number 
of self-employed persons, the rising number of pensioners receiving a capi-
tal income and the fragile position of low-skilled workers in the context of 
global competition. Competitive wages for these workers are low wages (cf. 
IMF 2007: 171). And perhaps it is true that, before state redistribution, low 
wages, and, as a consequence, the wage share did decline more in Europe 
than in the US, where a considerable group of low-paid workers always 
existed.
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Figure 1.4 Wage share of national income in the EU15, Japan and the US, 1970-2005
 (Share of total wages and salaries in total value addeda), percentage)
a) Total labour compensation, including employers’ social security and pension contributions 
and imputed labour income for self-employed persons.
b) GDP-weighted average of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Source: OECD 2007: 117
The declining wage share moreover illustrates the changed power rela-
tionship between capital and labour. The bargaining position of capital 
vis-à-vis the unions has improved for a number of reasons: its increased 
mobility (or only its alleged mobility) and the related capacity to use the 
threat of exit; the discourse that in order to stay competitive, wage mod-
eration is required; and the decline in union density. As a result, wages 
have trailed the rise in profits and productivity.
 Beside these changes and partially related to them, change also oc-
curred in the ﬁ elds of employment protection, state expenditures, unem-
ployment beneﬁ ts, market capitalisation, collective bargaining coverage 
and the amount of temporary work. For these indicators, more detailed 
data are available. The next step is to calculate, as far as possible, how 
much they have changed from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.
 Institutional change: an attempt to quantify it
In the previous section and in Figure 1.1, the institutional change in a 
liberal direction has roughly been indicated. To measure this change is 
tricky, however, because the qualitative indicators – capital-labour rela-
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tions and state-market relations – will have to be quantified and both the 
qualitative as well as the quantitative ones will have to be weighted. The 
quantification of quality and the weighting (attaching scores to) of every 
indicator is not possible without some degree of arbitrariness and with-
out violating the principle of precision. The qualitative indicators are the 
presence (or absence) and the strength of the institutional arrangements 
mentioned in the type descriptions. Examples of quantitative indicators 
are the level of:
– market capitalisation;
– wage bargaining coverage;
– social security and welfare benefits;
– temporary work;
– employment protection;
– product market regulation;
– public expenditures;
– tax progression;
– employee influence in companies;
– company protection (against hostile takeovers);
– privatisation of infrastructure;
– the average time and cost required to open a business.
Below, we will use the first seven of the quantitative indicators in order to 
roughly determine how much Western political economies have moved 
in a liberal direction. Apart from an indicative estimate, I will abstain 
from the too complicated and less precise attempt to quantify institu-
tional change in terms of statism and corporatism which, together with 
liberalism, are relevant for our sample countries.
 First and foremost, we have to recognise that we are in the realm of 
imprecision here. It is true that when producing statements about ‘more’ 
and ‘less’, ‘higher’ and ‘lower’, we are obliged to argue as exactly as possi-
ble. But because of measurement problems, a sophisticated rule of thumb 
might bring as much of an approximation to precision as advanced sta-
tistical methods do. ‘Hard’ computation becomes problematic when the 
empirical basis is soft. This is the case when comparisons are lopsided 
and basic data are only crude approximations of reality (examples include 
gross instead of net unemployment benefits, or benefits data without the 
related eligibility criteria), when not all data are available for all years, and 
when a number of factors possibly relevant for estimating overall insti-
tutional change are neglected because of a lack of comparative data. Ex-
amples of such factors are the influence of workers in companies (is there 
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any co-determination; did it change?), the regulation of financial markets, 
tax progression, company protection against hostile takeovers, and the 
extent of red tape hampering start-ups. The transformation of quality into 
quantity is another source of imprecision. It renders the social sciences 
by definition less precise than the natural sciences. The transformation is 
regularly done by attaching quantitative scores to qualitative entities (e.g. 
job dismissal procedures). This is a tricky procedure as such, and the rela-
tive weighting of these scores is once again arbitrary.
 The best that we can do, therefore, is to present a rough impression of 
change in the institutional dimensions mentioned (Tables 1.5a and 1.5b 
on pages 30-31). The chosen period is between the mid-1990s and the 
mid-2000s, and the method of measurement is a very simple one. Change 
is calculated first in percent per factor and second as average value. The 
latter is done by weighting the factors (see explanation in Table 1.5b).
 What are the main and most remarkable results? What can be said with 
the cautiousness required because of the weak data basis? The strongest 
liberalisation has taken place in the fields of market capitalisation (up 
to the year 2000, stock prices exploded) and product market regulation 
(apart from specific national developments, the latter also reflects WTO 
agreements and EU activities). In the case of employment protection, the 
picture is somewhat mixed, and the same is true for unemployment ben-
efits and temporary work. The least pronounced changes occurred in the 
coverage of collective bargaining (in nearly half the cases it was stable, in 
four it increased) and in public expenditures. The latter coincide with rel-
atively stable tax receipts (OECD 2008a: 264). There has been a lot of dis-
cussion about a globalisation-forced tax race to the bottom, but income as 
well as corporate taxes have not changed much. Statutory corporate taxes 
have been lowered, but by broadening the tax base the effective rates re-
mained relatively stable (cf. Genschel 2002: 250; Swank 2006). State in-
come shrank primarily because of the privatisation of public companies, 
and so did state expenditures.
 Overall, with the exception of Ireland, all political economies have 
changed in a liberal direction – the most liberal countries becoming even 
more liberal and the less liberal countries becoming less embedded (see 
Table 1.6). It also seems that a slight convergence has taken place between 
Australia, Britain and the US on the one hand and the average of the econ-
omies approximating non-liberal, embedded types on the other hand. 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland on the liberal side and 
Denmark, France, Norway and Spain on the other side do not fit into this 
picture but in terms of inhabitants, these countries are clearly outnum-
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bered by Australia, the UK and the US as well as by Japan, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. Taking this into consideration, the 
last decade differs from the previous one, as it was analysed – on the basis 
of somewhat different criteria – by Hall and Gingerich (2004), who did 
not detect changes worth mentioning. They are still right, however, to 
claim that the differences between e.g. Norway, Belgium and Sweden or 
France and Italy on the one hand and on the other hand the US are still 
large (see Figure 1.5).
Looking at individual countries, the most striking case seems to be Ire-
land that did not liberalise at all. Product market regulation was loosened 
there, market capitalisation grew and state expenditures decreased, but 
employment protection and unemployment benefits increased. Of the 
sample countries, Belgium liberalised the most, followed by Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Finland (a remarkable case due to the explosive Nokia-
related rise in market capitalisation). Japan’s market capitalisation fell, 
reflecting the decline of this country’s stock market, but whether or not 
Japan has considerably liberalised is a disputed question. Here, the indica-
tion of overall change is ‘above average’, which seems to be less than Ronal 
Dore asserts (2006/07: 22f ) – he speaks of a ‘shareholder revolution’ since 
the 1990s – but perhaps more than Steven Vogel (2005: 162), who thinks 
that most change in Japan has been ‘routine adjustment’ and ‘bounded 
innovation (...) shaped by pre-existing institutions’. Italy is worth men-
tioning because of the sharp rise in its unemployment benefits (from a 
pre-modern, non-liberal level to the Western average). Finally, one has 
to mention the significant increase in temporary jobs in countries where 
Table 1.6 Degrees of institutional change on the axis between embedded and liberal 
capitalism, mid-1990s – mid-2005
 (% change in parentheses)
Relatively High Above Average Average Below Average De-liberalisation
New Zealand (21)
Belgium (20)
Japan (17)
Italy (16)
Sweden (16)
Canada (15)
Germany (14)
Netherlands (13)
Finland (13)
Austria (11) Australia (6)
Denmark (7)
France (7)
Spain (7)
UK (7)
Switzerland (6)
US (6)
Norway (5)
Ireland (-4)
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employment protection is still high – Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands 
are examples, while in Britain and the US the amount of temporary work 
is low and relatively stable (but this is not the case in Canada). In Scan-
dinavia, it has declined with the exception of Sweden (a slight increase 
there).
 What these changes show when plotted on the axis between pure lib-
eral and embedded capitalism is roughly illustrated in Figure 1.5 for the 
sample countries, with the US as a contrasting case. This figure is based 
on the data from Tables 1.5a and 1.5b and a system of scores assigned to 
the items these tables contain (for details, see Becker 2009: 71f ). It also 
reflects the fact that every capitalist political economy is basically liberal 
and therefore the continuum starts at the value of 13.12 The most striking 
conclusion is perhaps that Switzerland, which is both highly corporatist 
and highly liberal, is in the vicinity of the US, while the other countries 
remain far, or even very far, from the US (the same could be said of France, 
Germany and Italy, while the remaining Anglo-Saxon countries would 
have to be located somewhere between Switzerland and the US).
Figure 1.5 Location of political economies on the axis between the ideal types of pure 
liberal and embedded capitalism in the mid-1990s and mid-2000s (T1, grey) 
and (T2, black)
     (39) US2     CH2       FIN2 NL2  DK2 S2          A2 B2  N2                    (13)
         US1      CH1         FIN1NL1 DK1   S1         N1     A1  B1
Liberal   |                                     |   Embedded
Changes in a liberal direction are not the only changes that have taken 
place. France has not liberalised much, but statism does seem to have 
declined (Hall 2007). Levy (2005: 123) states that only the statist policies 
and not the statist framework have been dismantled, and that statism be-
came ‘market-conforming’ (ibid: 119). In some of the strongly corporatist 
countries analysed in this volume, by contrast, a specific movement in the 
opposite direction has occurred.
 Due to shifting power relations between capital and labour, wage bar-
gaining – known for its relatively centralised character – has changed in 
four of these countries: Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Starting in the 1980s, bargaining patterns have shifted to a relatively de-
centralised level (a trend that also was visible in most other political econ-
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omies; cf. OECD 2006a: 81). Although the move is in a liberal direction, it 
did not imply a fundamental weakening of corporatism – it only changed 
its face from directly to indirectly centralised corporatism (see Table 1.713), 
sometimes with a brief period of decentralisation in between as in Den-
mark and Sweden.14 In contrast to the four countries with changing cor-
poratism, Belgium, Finland and Norway by and large maintained their 
centralism. And in Switzerland, which is both strongly corporatist as well 
as strongly liberal, wage bargaining is relatively decentralised by tradition 
(which is also due to the fragmented political structure of the country).
 A key feature of indirect centralisation is the political discussion of 
wage guidelines for the negotiations at branch level, with the government, 
the peak organisations of capital and labour as well as expert bodies in-
volved. The national discussion of bargaining guidelines is also the con-
text of the typical corporatist exchanges of, for example, wage restraint 
against tax reduction or the maintenance of a given level of social security 
(the times that increased benefits could be negotiated are over). The re-
markable aspect is that the state has taken the initiative in this context: 
decentralisation was, as Due et al. (1993: 146) call it, a process of cen-
tralised decentralisation. And in indirect centralisation, the government 
behaved as the ‘competition state’ that Cerny (2000) has described. As a 
result, the statist component in the countries approximating corporatism 
became somewhat strengthened in recent years.
In sum, in the (still) highly corporatist political economies we have had, in 
different degrees, decreasing corporatist coordination and statist regula-
tion in certain fields, but in some of these political economies (Austria, 
Table 1.7 Measure of coordination in corporatist wage bargaining systems
1970 1990 2000
Austria Centralised Indirectly centralised Indirectly centralised
Belgium Centralised Centralised Centralised
Denmark Centralised Decentralised Indirectly centralised
Finland Centralised Centralised Centralised
Netherlands Centralised Indirectly centralised Indirectly centralised
Norway Centralised Centralised Centralised
Sweden Centralised Decentralised Indirectly centralised
Switzerland Decentralised Decentralised Decentralised
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Figure 1.6 Rough indication of the Swedish case in the fi eld between the statist, 
corporatist and liberal ideal types at T1 (mid-1990s; fat line) and T2 (mid-2000s; 
thin line)*
*Each of the three rays starts at a value of 0 at the centre of the web and has a maximum value 
of 100. The total of the spider web of the illustrated case must also add up to 100 (percent).
Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) we have also had an extension of 
the role of the state as a guide in wage bargaining. We do not (yet) have 
the instruments and data to determine and graphically illustrate these de-
velopments exactly. In order to quantitatively determine and distinguish 
corporatism and statism, quality has to be transformed into quantity. This 
is a particularly tricky affair. Future work in this area will have to bring 
more precision. In Figure 1.6, I have nonetheless done this quantification 
– in the form of a rough indication by taking over the liberal scores from 
Figure 1.5, distributing the corporatist and statist scores on the basis of 
Siaroff ’s corporatism scale (see Table 1.1), and taking into consideration 
whether corporatism is tripartite (with explicit state involvement) or bi-
partite and whether the state structure is unitarian or federal (for more 
details, see Becker 2009: 75ff ).
 Figure 1.6 illustrates the Swedish development in the field between 
the three relevant ideal types of liberalism, corporatism and statism. 
Sweden is chosen because of its prominent role in the international dis-
cussion and because this country has undergone marked changes in the 
period between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. In the figure, every di-
mension is a continuum in itself that starts at 0. Together, the values a 
country scores must add up to 100. Sweden’s liberalism score has in-
creased from about 40 to nearly 50, while the score on corporatism 
– Swedish corporatism is bipartite – has declined from about 35 to 30 
Statist 
Corporatist 
Liberal 
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and the score on statism has slightly decreased from its mid-1990s level 
of about 25. If we would have chosen Switzerland instead of Sweden, we 
would see an almost static picture – Switzerland moved only slightly– 
where the liberal dimension is more pronounced, the corporatist one less 
so and statism rather weak. As in Sweden, corporatism is bipartite, but 
in contrast to Sweden, the Swiss state structure is federal and contains 
many veto points. And the other countries would reveal different ‘spider 
webs’ again. Before plotting more cases, however, more precision must 
be brought into this work.
 The contributions
The subsequent chapters analyse the recent politico-economic develop-
ments in four pairs of countries: Sweden and Finland, Denmark and Nor-
way, Switzerland and Austria, and Belgium and the Netherlands. Taking 
two countries at a time gives a comparative dimension to the contribution 
and carves out the specific national trajectories with more clarity. All of 
these chapters deal with the same set of questions: What happened to the 
countries’ welfare systems, corporate governance, labour market legisla-
tion and (corporatist) industrial relations? The country contributions also 
point out the relevant additional peculiarities of their cases – e.g. the spe-
cial role of immigrant workers in the Swiss labour market or the conflict-
ridden division between Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium. Each chapter 
has an individual character due to the emphasis on the common aspects 
of their subject in different degrees. In terms of the typology presented in 
this chapter, all case studies investigate the institutional movement in the 
field between the corporatist, statist and liberal types.
 The first case study is that of Karl-Oskar Lindgren on Sweden and Fin-
land. For decades, Sweden has been the Nordic model country par excel-
lence. However, after its severe economic crisis in the early 1990s (along 
with Finland), it lost its model status. Since the 1980s it has been a hot 
discussion topic whether or not Swedish corporatism has seriously been 
weakened or only been changed by the retreat of the employers’ associa-
tion from centralised collective wage bargaining in the late 1980s. In the 
2000s, the country regained its model status, joined this time by Finland, 
the ‘Nokia model’. The author, who is particularly interested in the inter-
play between stability and change, sets out to answer the question how 
much these current ‘Nordic’ political economies differ from the earlier 
Swedish model.
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 Though under strain due to the decline in union membership by a few 
percentage points in recent years, Swedish corporatism has experienced 
a revival since the late 1990s, moving towards state-led indirect centrali-
sation after the social democrats returned to power. This is an example 
of what Lindgren calls continuity through change – a subject he also 
presents brief theoretical ideas about. Change in Finland, where the so-
cial democrats were never as dominant as in Sweden, was rather moder-
ate. Its corporatism is still centralised. Challenges, Lindgren adds, could 
stem from electoral shifts – since the mid-2000s, coalitions of centre and 
liberal parties govern in both countries (in Finland, the Greens are also 
involved) – if they turn out to be structural, as well as from Europeanisa-
tion, which poses a threat to the socio-economic peculiarities of Finland 
and Sweden (but also of other Nordic countries). Support for the welfare 
system is still strong, and the fundamentals appear to be quite stable, 
however.
 The Danish and Norwegian capitalisms are examined in the next chap-
ter by Mikkel Mailand. Because of its oil, Norway is the richest country 
in the world (apart from tiny Luxembourg). Nonetheless, the egalitarian 
social democrats are still the dominant government party. Relatively sta-
ble political relations (though the right wing has grown) correspond to a 
relatively stable, still centralised corporatism. Denmark, by contrast, has 
been governed by conservative-liberal coalitions from 1982 to 1993 and 
since 2003. In the 1990s, the country was considered an economic model 
because of its famous concept of ‘flexicurity’, which combines relatively 
weak dismissal protection with high public employment and a very high 
level of unemployment benefits. Mailand is critical of flexicurity and, in 
a reversal of Esping-Andersen’s concept of ‘decommodification of labour’, 
he analyses it as a step towards ‘re-commodification’.
 Overall, Mailand ends with similar conclusions as Lindgren in the 
previous chapter. He also identifies similar challenges. Denmark has, as 
Sweden, somewhat changed its institutional settings but without under-
mining corporatism, while Norway, as Finland, features a high degree of 
continuity. Not to forget, Norway is not an EU member state and there-
fore less affected by Europeanisation (although far from unaffected by it). 
This is probably one of the reasons that it has been less liberalised than 
Denmark, which after the early 1990s put emphasis on the competitive-
ness of its economy and deregulated it to some degree. Mailand puts his 
cases into historical perspective, and instead of naming them as approxi-
mately corporatist capitalisms he prefers the largely synonymous concept 
of ‘negotiated economies’.
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 From the Nordic region, the book moves to the Alps for an analysis of 
Austria and Switzerland, countries that have not received the attention 
they deserve in comparative political economy. Switzerland has a very 
high employment rate and the reputation as a haven of financial and eco-
nomic stability (as well as a haven for secret bank accounts), and Austria 
has been, almost unnoticed, one of the rising economic stars of the EU 
since its entry in 1995. The authors, André Mach and Alexandre Afon-
so, provide an overview of the developments in these countries’ political 
economies over the last 20 years. First, they investigate socio-economic 
performance and, in a related thread, highlight the institutional founda-
tions of economic governance in both countries. Thereafter, they outline 
continuity and change across the spheres of the political economy dealt 
with in all of the case studies. Throughout their text, they give particular 
attention to the power relations between state and economy as well as 
capital and labour.
 As with the other authors, Mach and Afonso detect a general trend 
towards a more market-driven model that nonetheless did not undermine 
the established basic institutional structures. Furthermore, they write 
that patterns of change must be differentiated both between Austria and 
Switzerland as well as between spheres (for example, industrial relations 
or the welfare system), depending on power relationships and institutions 
governing separate economic spheres. In Austria, the state is considerably 
stronger than in hyper-decentralised Switzerland, and the same is true for 
its corporatism. In contrast to Austrian public intervention, Switzerland 
traditionally places a higher degree of emphasis on private initiative. It 
cannot compensate for the lower reform capacity that strong decentrali-
sation brings about. Comparing these two different countries offers a nice 
illustration of path dependence.
 The final pair of countries consists of Belgium and the Netherlands, 
the latter a distinctly service-led economy and the former still reliant on 
industry to a considerable degree. While the Netherlands in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s has been widely discussed as the Dutch ‘delta’ or ‘polder’ 
model (large parts of the country are in the Rhine delta and are below 
sea level on ‘polders’), Belgium has, just as Austria, largely been ignored 
in international comparisons – an extra reason to include it here. The 
contribution of Hester Houwing and Kurt Vandaele shows that, despite 
the resilience of corporatist industrial relations and welfare institutions, 
socio-economic and employment policies changed since the 1990s to-
wards activation and flexibility in order to raise the employment rates and 
maintain the sustainability of the welfare regime. As a consequence of the 
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relative weakness of the unions and far-reaching financialisation (notably 
in the Netherlands), the authors indicate a shift in a liberal direction.
 In the Netherlands, they observe a declining role of the social partners 
in the formulation of social policy, while the labour market has become 
more flexible. In Belgium, a certain etatisation accompanied liberalisa-
tion. Overall, Belgium is perhaps the more remarkable case. This might 
be because in the late 1990s it tried to copy the Dutch delta model, renam-
ing it the ‘belfry model’ (after all the belfries in the old Flemish cities). It 
was not a success, however. The main reason, prominently outlined in 
Howing’s and Vandaele’s contribution, is the conflict-ridden relationship 
between Flanders and Wallonia. This relationship has undermined Bel-
gian corporatism, enhanced the role of the state and triggered regional 
institutional separatism.
 The final chapters by Schmidt and Becker/Van Kersbergen relate to the 
country studies but are of a different character and broaden the spectrum 
of the volume. In chapter 6, Vivien Schmidt puts the changes of the small 
corporatist countries in a European context and compares their develop-
ment to that of a few bigger EU members, such as France and Germany. 
She also addresses the very important question what smallness means in 
the context of the topics discussed in this volume. Perhaps not everyone 
realises immediately how small some of the sample countries are. Only 
Belgium and the Netherlands have more than 10 million inhabitants – 
the Netherlands with 16 million inhabitants is the most populated. Den-
mark, Finland and Norway have slightly more than five million inhabit-
ants. Many provinces of the bigger European countries (Bavaria and four 
other German states, Catalonia in Spain, Lombardy in Italy) are larger 
than these countries, let alone American states such as California and 
even European capitals such as London and Paris.
 Is smallness an advantage? Politically it has been so in northwest Eu-
rope, Schmidt says, because smallness makes it easier to maintain cor-
poratism and to build up effective decision-making (the Swiss political-
institutional structure is very fragmented, however). The comparative 
analysis of the institutional structure of politics is therefore an important 
element of this chapter. The author’s considerations on the process of Eu-
ropeanisation directly relate to the theme of state capacity. For it appears 
that the small corporatist countries are more successful in following the 
EU criteria than the larger member states – a feature that appears not to 
be true for Ireland and the small southern European countries of Portugal 
and Greece. Economic openness and a pragmatic politico-ideological dis-
course about openness and globalisation are, together with national dif-
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ferences, further elements that, in Schmidt’s view, can give a competitive 
edge to the ‘smalls’ discussed in this volume.
 In the ﬁ nal chapter, Uwe Becker and Kees van Kersbergen begin with 
the fact that, despite the liberalisation described in the previous chapters, 
the sample countries are still highly corporatist and yet belong to the top 
performers in almost every respect. Th erefore, Becker and Van Kersber-
gen ask whether corporatist capitalism is a speciﬁ cally European socio-
economic model. Th ey not only look for a social model in the narrower 
sense of the welfare system but also for a social model in the comprehen-
sive sense of a socio-economic model. Th ey situate their contribution in 
the context of intensiﬁ ed global competition and the current economic 
crisis that has called the ongoing liberalisation of capitalism into question. 
Analysing socio-economic performances (inequality, poverty, care of the 
environment, but also innovative capacity), they ﬁ nd the sample countries 
among the best performers and the Scandinavian political economies even 
as the best of all. Th ey conclude that there are good normative arguments 
to launch corporatist capitalism as a European socio-economic model. 
Becker and Van Kersbergen also address the question whether or not cor-
poratist capitalism – or parts of it – can be realised in other EU countries.
 Notes
* For constructive criticisms I thank Daniel Mügge and Vivien Schmidt.
 Prominent scholars arguing along similar lines are Schmidt (a: f ) and 
Crouch (: , f ). 
 Correspondingly, I generally prefer to talk in terms of political economies 
approximating ideal types like the liberal one instead of naming them liberal. 
When this is incidentally done – as in the title of chapter  – it is only for the 
sake of simplicity and with the meaning of approximating a certain type.
 Take for example political economies that structurally reveal high or, on the 
opposite, low levels of state interventionism. These political economies in-
clude political cultures where state interventionism and state reluctance re-
spectively are considered ‘normal’ by a relevant majority – even if the norm 
is contested. Or take corporatist capital – labour relations that not only, by 
definition, involve negotiations in terms of the common interest, but also a 
culture of consensualism. Culture as a structural property pointing to pat-
terns of interaction among citizens (Thompson et al. ), but also, as in the 
examples, between organisations as well as between citizens and the state, is 
inherent to many (or most) politico-economic relations. As an integral part 
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of social relations, culture does not need to be mentioned as a separate crite-
rion, however. Higher or just lower than average levels of risk-taking and of 
individual independence, by contrast, are examples of relatively autonomous 
cultural traits and therefore not a structural aspect of whatever capitalist 
variety. 
 The names Nordic and Scandinavian are used synonymously in this volume, 
although Lindgren in chapter  prefers Nordic. These names do not have ex-
actly the same meaning – strictly speaking Finland does not belong to Scan-
dinavia – but it has largely become common to use them as synonyms.
 Both may bring about generous welfare systems and redistribution. Of the 
strongly corporatist countries Scandinavia and continental examples most 
approximate this divide, while in the statist field French history has been 
one of social-democratisation (as well as recently of liberalisation). Because 
of the basic liberal – embedded distinction it makes no sense to construct a 
liberal sub-variety of statist and corporatist capitalism. Corporatist or statist 
elements and liberal elements come of course together and constitute spe-
cific hybrids, simply because capitalism is basically liberal.
 This trend is confirmed by a PEW (: ) research on American attitudes 
to the ‘poor and needy’. Seeing the American support for narrowing income 
differences growing one has to keep in mind, however, that the differences 
they accept are much larger than in Europe (cf. Table N.) – even if they 
might have become smaller since . A striking fact is again that West Ger-
mans accept much larger income differences than Scandinavians and even 
the people in Canada and ‘Down Under’ do.
Table N.1 Legitimate income diff erences in eight countries, unskilled factory 
worker is 100
How much do you think a ... should earn
Unskilled factory 
worker Doctor
Chairman of a large 
national company
Sweden 100 195 239
Norway 100 207 228
West Germany 100 384 711
Austria 100 438 615
Australia 100 326 480
N-Zealand 100 351 419
Canada 100 420 512
US 100 614 1114
Source: Svallfors 1997: 289
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 A relevant context is the state-socialist past of the East Germans raising their 
non-individualist attitudes above those of the Swedes.
 One has to buy detailed data from advisory companies, and these data are 
very expensive.
 According to Richard Sennett (: ) pension funds keep stocks on av-
erage for no longer than . months (it is not clear whether he talks about 
American funds or pensions funds worldwide).
 The usual calculation of the wage rate is not undisputed because it does not 
appropriately take into account elements such as transfer and property in-
come and therefore is unable to distinguish between disposable income and 
employee compensation – according to Wikipedia. In an adjusted graph of 
the wage rate the decline is less pronounced.
 The huge changes in market capitalisation –  in Finland – are impos-
sible in the other fields where negotiation and struggle are important factors 
pushing or hampering change. By contrast, market capitalisation (if it is not 
that of former state-owned companies) is a process autonomously managed 
by companies. Moreover, it is strongly influenced by the ups and downs of the 
stock market.
 The basis of the construction is a five-level scale that for every criterion runs 
from very low over low, intermediate and high to very high and attaching  
point to every level (half a point in the case of temporary work though the 
minimum is also one), and giving six points extra to every national political 
economy because capitalism is basically liberal. Because every country gets 
at least one point for each of the seven criteria, the minimum level is  +  = 
 points. The maximum is  +  x  +  = .
 Table . is taken from the Final Report of the th Framework project Small-
cons () and the information regarding Belgium and Norway is taken 
from the contributions of Houwing/Vandaele and Mailand to this volume. 
OECD data (in a: ) slightly differ from those in Table .. They distin-
guish between centralisation and coordination and operate a five-level scale. 
They signal slight changes in the level of Swiss centralisation (from level  
down to level ) and do not see any change in Austria and the Netherlands in 
this respect (constantly level ).
 In Sweden this was largely due to the retreat of employers from any central-
ised bargaining in the late s. In the changed context of  they came 
back, however (cf. Elvander b).

2 The Variety of Capitalism in Sweden and Finland
 Continuity Through Change
 Karl-Oskar Lindgren
In recent years, partly spurred by the failure of the globalisation thesis 
predicting rapid institutional and political convergence across countries 
(e.g. Lash & Urry 1987), we have witnessed an increased interest among 
comparative political economists in the distinctiveness and performance 
of various national economic systems.1 The extensive literature on the 
“varieties of capitalism” that has evolved over the last decade provides 
a particularly prominent example of this current trend (Hall & Soskice 
2001, Hancké et al. 2008).
 Traditionally, the Varieties of Capitalism approach (VoC) holds that de-
veloped industrialised economies cluster into two distinct groups labelled 
Coordinated Market Economies and Liberal Market Economies (CMEs 
and LMEs). In most writings on the topic, these two varieties of capital-
ism are pictured as stable and durable equilibriums to a set of coordina-
tion problems facing economic actors in various spheres of the economy. 
 This account of contemporary capitalism has, however, been criticised 
on typological as well as more substantive grounds. First, a number of 
authors have argued that the liberal-coordinated dichotomy of the VoC 
approach does not adequately cover the fundamental differences exist-
ing in capitalist economies. For instance, in the introductory chapter of 
this book Uwe Becker argues that we are better advised to distinguish 
between five, rather than two, distinct ideal types of capitalism (see also 
Becker 2009). More precisely, Becker suggests that we draw a distinction 
between capitalism of the liberal type on the one hand, and four distinct 
forms of coordinated or embedded capitalism on the other hand – i.e., 
statist, corporatist, patrimonial and meso-communitarian. 
 Second, and of particular relevance for the present chapter, the VoC 
approach has been criticised for exaggerating the extent of institutional 
stability in many countries by portraying non-market coordination as a 
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thing some countries have and others lack, when in reality, “coordination 
is a political process, and an outcome, that has to be actively sustained 
and nurtured” (Thelen 2001: 73). That is, every now and then we should 
expect important political and economic actors to assess whether the co-
ordination practices inherent in the present national capitalist system ac-
tually serve their interests. And to the extent that this is not the case, we 
should expect these actors to try to change the institutional framework 
in a way that furthers their respective interests (Lindgren 2006; Hall & 
Thelen 2009). This is especially true in small open economies, since these 
countries are particularly vulnerable to the competitiveness problems as-
sociated with malfunctioning institutional frameworks (Katzenstein 1985; 
Elvander 2002).
 Because support for the existing institutional framework within a 
country is always contingent upon actors’ perceptions of the effects of 
this framework, institutional stability cannot be assumed but needs to be 
explained. Even more importantly, since stability and change are two sides 
of the same coin, we cannot understand institutional change without un-
derstanding institutional stability (cf. Hall & Thelen 2009). Consequently, 
if the VoC approach is to be anything more than a classification exercise, 
we need to pay greater attention to the dynamics of how distinct national 
capitalist systems evolve and endure over time. 
 Toward this end, this chapter studies the recent developments in the 
national capitalist systems of Sweden and Finland. In an international 
context, Sweden and Finland are interesting in that both countries are 
representatives of what is commonly referred to as the Nordic social mod-
el, which has enjoyed considerable attention among both scholars and 
politicians over the years. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Nordic model, char-
acterised by a large welfare state and extensive non-market coordination 
(mainly of the corporatist type) was commonly hailed as the prototype 
of a well-functioning variety of capitalism that promoted equity as well 
as efficiency. But in the 1990s, and against the backdrop of the severe 
economic crisis hitting Sweden and Finland, the Nordic model fell into 
disarray, and many commentators predicted its imminent demise. None-
theless, in the last few years the Nordic social model seems to have risen 
from the dead, and in many quarters the corporatist Nordic capitalism is 
once again pitted as a viable, or even superior, alternative to the Anglo-
Saxon one (e.g. Sapir 2006). 
 This renewed interest in the Nordic political economy, however, raises 
at least two important questions. To what extent is the current Nordic 
model, as practised in Sweden and Finland, really the same as the cel-
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ebrated Nordic model of the 1970s and 1980s? What explains the relative 
stability and change of different aspects of the national capitalist systems 
in Sweden and Finland over time? The aim of the present chapter is to 
answer these questions.
 By raising and addressing these issues we move beyond the static ac-
count of capitalism still characterising much of the contemporary re-
search on varieties of capitalism. Through its detailed account of the 
more recent developments in Sweden and Finland, the analysis of this 
chapter provides part of the information necessary to answer the question 
posed by Becker in the introduction of the book: i.e., whether and to what 
extent the capitalist systems of the small corporatist economies of West-
ern Europe have experienced a move in a liberal direction as a result of 
the global politico-economic changes taking place in recent decades. Al-
though merely descriptive, the analysis of the chapter also helps to iden-
tify important mechanisms of continuity and change within the capitalist 
systems of small open economies. In this respect, the present study con-
tributes to ongoing attempts aimed at developing a more dynamic theory 
of capitalist diversity (cf. Deeg & Jackson 2007).
 The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section deals with 
the economic and political impacts of the severe economic crisis hitting 
both Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s. The second traces institu-
tional developments since the start of the economic recovery in the mid-
1990s. The third assesses the relative stability and change of the national 
capitalist systems in Sweden and Finland over the last couple of decades, 
and discusses possible explanations for these developments. The fourth 
and final section concludes and points to some of the challenges currently 
facing the Swedish and Finnish varieties of capitalism. 
 The 1990s crisis: a moment for change
Economic development in Sweden and Finland during the 1970s and 1980s 
was marked by relative economic success, and many observers praised the 
Nordic model as a third way between socialism and capitalism. In the 
early 1990s, however, the third way seemed to come to an abrupt end 
when both Sweden and Finland experienced an economic downturn of a 
magnitude unseen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
 The origin of the 1990s crisis has been the subject of intense debate in 
both countries. But most commentators seem to agree – although they 
differ in their emphasis on the relative importance of various factors – 
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that the crisis was spurred by an unfortunate combination of bad policy 
decisions, unsolved structural problems and an international economic 
slump (Honkapohja & Koskela 1999; Hagberg et al. 2006). In Finland, the 
unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union further added to the economic 
problems.
 Regardless of the exact reasons for the economic crisis, however, the 
consequences were severe, as can be seen in the figures displayed in Ta-
ble 2.1. Both the Swedish and the Finnish economies experienced nega-
tive growth rates for three consecutive years from 1991 to 1993. Between 
1990 and 1994, the Finnish unemployment rate rose from 3 to almost 
17 – the second highest in the entire OECD area – and in Sweden, the 
unemployment rate more than quadrupled from 2 to 9 in the same 
period.
As the table makes clear, the rise in unemployment was matched by a 
rapid decline in employment. During the first half of the 1990s, the em-
ployment rate decreased by more than 10 percentage points in both coun-
tries. And, in Sweden in particular, the economic crisis was accompanied 
by low productivity growth and rising income inequality. In both Sweden 
and Finland, the early 1990s was also characterised by falling disposable 
income and profitability. 
Table 2.1 Economic outcomes in Finland and Sweden, 1970-2004
70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04
Finland
Unemployment 2.9 5.7 5.8 5.0 10.9 12.9 9.1
Employment 69.0 69.6 72.0 72.8 65.9 63.3 67.6
Growth 5.6 2.4 3.1 4.0 -1.4 4.6 2.9
Inequality 26.7 21.4 20.5 20.0 20.3 23.4 25.8
Productivity – – – 2.6 1.1 2.3 2.0
Sweden
Unemployment 2.2 1.9 3.0 2.2 5.8 8.6 5.5
Employment 73.6 77.8 78.8 80.0 75.7 70.5 72.9
Growth 3.4 1.5 1.8 2.7 0.1 3.1 2.6
Inequality – 21.1 20.3 21.2 24.5 26.4 28.6
Productivity – – – 0.5 0.4 1.4 2.1
Note: See the appendix for a description of the variables.
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 According to the VoC literature, an external shock like an econom-
ic crisis is considered an important impetus for institutional and policy 
change (cf. Hall & Thelen 2009). In times of crisis, political actors are 
forced to reassess the benefits associated with existing institutions and 
policies, and contemplate available alternatives. The cases under consid-
eration here are no exceptions to this general rule.
 The early 1990s clearly constituted a moment for change in both Swe-
den and Finland. In particular, three different factors came together to 
create a golden window of opportunity for those wanting to liberalise the 
corporatist capitalist models of the two countries. The first was the grow-
ing influence of monetarist and market-liberal ideas in the policy debate, 
as described by Mark Blyth and others (Blyth 2002; see also Boréus 1994, 
Kauppinen 1994). From the market-liberal perspective, overly generous 
welfare policies and extensive product and labour market regulations 
were at the root of the economic crisis in both Sweden and Finland (e.g. 
Henrekson 1996; Lindbeck 1997). The way out of the crisis was therefore 
through welfare cuts and extensive deregulation of product and labour 
markets, since this would reduce the market power of wage-setters and 
thereby lower wage costs and increase employment and productivity, ac-
cording to the market liberals. Second, skyrocketing public deficits in 
both countries made it increasingly difficult for the supporters of univer-
sal welfare provision to oppose public expenditure cuts aimed at balanc-
ing the economy. A third and final factor adding to the pressure on the 
Swedish and Finnish capitalist systems was the election of centre-right 
governments in both countries in 1991. These parties’ support for univer-
sal welfare policies and market regulations was historically considerably 
more contingent, and less ideological, than that of the social democrats. 
The stage was thus set for a radical restructuring of the Swedish and Finn-
ish capitalist systems. 
 In order to see whether and to what extent the national capitalist sys-
tems of Sweden and Finland were subject to change over the course of the 
1990s, we will study the development in the four core areas of the capital-
ist system identified by Becker in his introduction, i.e., the areas of wel-
fare benefits, labour market legislation, industrial relations and corporate 
governance. 
 Starting with the issue of welfare benefits, we may first consider the 
development of benefit generosity over time in three core welfare state 
programmes: unemployment insurance, sickness benefits and pensions. 
In a recent study, Scruggs & Allan (2006) report an aggregate generosity 
score – using a modified form of the procedure used by Esping-Andersen 
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(1990) in the construction of his famous decommodification index – for 
each of these programmes. In the cases of unemployment insurance and 
sickness benefits, the score includes net replacement rates, the coverage 
of the insurance, the duration of benefits, the length of the qualification 
period and the number of waiting days, whereas in the case of pensions, 
the score is composed of pension replacement rates for minimum and 
standard pensions, the pension take-up ratio, qualifying years for stan-
dard pension and the proportion of pension contributions paid by the 
employee. For each of the three programmes, a higher aggregate score 
indicates more generous entitlements. The scores for Sweden and Finland 
over the period 1970-2002 are displayed in Table 2.2.
As can be seen in the table, there was a trend toward less generous welfare 
benefits in both countries during the 1990s. In order to curb the rising 
public deficit in Finland at the beginning of the 1990s, the centre-right 
government found it necessary to impose cutbacks on most welfare en-
titlement programmes. As described by Uusitalo (1996:5), this was done 
by means of a number of different techniques: “indexed increases to ben-
efits were cancelled, compensation levels of earnings-related unemploy-
ment, sickness and maternity benefits were lowered, and eligibility for 
some benefits was tightened.” The greatest opposition to these cutbacks 
Table 2.2 Welfare benefi ts and taxes in Sweden and Finland, 1970-2004
70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04
Finland
UB 4.2 4.9 5.2 8.1 9.2 9.1 8.5
Sickness 9.9 8.7 9.4 10.8 10.6 9.9 9.6
Pensions 10.8 12.9 15.3 16.3 14.6 13.4 12.5
Tax wedge – 41.6 42.9 46.6 47.3 49.3 45.3
Sweden
UB 7.5 9.1 9.9 11.0 11.8 10.9 10.4
Sickness 14.7 15.4 15.4 15.5 15.0 14.1 13.7
Pensions 13.0 15.6 18.5 18.1 16.0 14.8 11.8
Tax wedge – 50.7 50.7 51.7 46.7 50.3 48.3
Note: See the appendix for a description of the variables. The time series for UB, sickness and 
pensions end in 2002, so for these variables the fi gures in the last column refer to the period 
2000-2002. 
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came from the trade unions. In 1992, for instance, Finnish unions coun-
tered a governmental proposal of reduced unemployment benefits with 
the threat of a general strike. The conflict remained unresolved until the 
centre-right government “agreed not to reduce unemployment benefits, 
and instead reluctantly accepted the union’s demand for increased taxes” 
(Sundberg 1993). A similar conflict occurred also in 1994 when the gov-
ernment, in the face of the threat of a general strike, was forced to give up 
its plans for changed labour laws and unemployment benefit cuts (Berg-
holm 2007). 
 The development of welfare benefits in Sweden during the 1990s closely 
mirrored that of Finland, as can be seen in Table 2.2. Under the shadow of 
an exploding public deficit and aggressive speculative attacks against the 
Swedish krona, the centre-right government implemented a number of 
cuts in welfare benefits in 1992 and 1993, most of them with Social Demo-
cratic support. To take but a few examples, unemployment and sickness 
benefits were reduced from 90 to 80 of previous earnings, basic pen-
sions were adjusted downward by 2 percentage points, and the eligibility 
conditions in many social insurance programmes were tightened (Huber 
& Stephens 2001; Palme et al. 2002). As in Finland, the fiercest opposition 
to the welfare cuts in Sweden came from the trade unions. In October 
1992, the LO, the largest blue-collar confederation in Sweden, took a radi-
cal initiative, calling for massive political protests against the centre-right 
government which mobilised tens of thousands of participants across the 
country (Dagens Nyheter 1992). A similar protest, although of smaller 
magnitude, was arranged by the LO the year after. 
 When discussing the development of welfare benefits, it seems conse-
quent to comment at least briefly on the closely related development of 
the tax system. Turning to the development of taxes, we see in Table 2.2 
that in Finland the average tax wedge – defined as income tax plus em-
ployee and employer social contributions less cash benefits as a percent-
age of labour costs – remained at a similar level in the early 1990s as in the 
late 1980s. Looking at the annual figures, however, the tax wedge started 
to increase in 1992 when Finnish taxes were increased in order to curb 
rapidly rising public deficits. 
 In Sweden, on the other hand, taxes were drastically reduced in 1990, 
i.e., before the onset of the economic crisis, when the Social Democratic 
government implemented what in Sweden has been known as the “tax 
reform of the century”. Upon entering office in 1991, the centre-right gov-
ernment had plans to reduce Swedish taxes even further. But due to the 
economic depression, the newly elected government had to give up most 
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of these plans and instead the Swedish tax wedge was kept at a constant 
level during the initial phase of the economic crisis. 
 As mentioned previously, market liberal ideas gained increased cur-
rency in policy debates in Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s. From 
this perspective, high taxes and overly generous welfare benefits were 
part of the structural problem of the Swedish and Finnish economies; 
the other problem was the excessive market power of wage-setters due to 
various types of imperfections in product and labour markets. To assess 
the impact of the 1990s crisis on the national capitalist systems of Swe-
den and Finland, we shall therefore also consider the developments with 
regard to the areas of labour market legislation and industrial relations 
in general, and the nature of competition in product and labour markets 
in particular. Toward this end, Table 2.3 provides data on four important 
and readily available indicators related to the workings of these markets: 
the extent of product market regulations (PMR), employment protection 
legislation (EPL), union density (UD) and the degree of coordination in 
wage bargaining (CWB).
Using the OECD’s index of the strictness of product market regulations, 
we see that there has been a clear trend toward product market deregula-
tion over time in both Finland and Sweden. (The index varies from 0 to 
6, higher values indicating stricter regulations.) Although there are some 
signs of product market deregulation already in the late 1980s, at least 
Table 2.3 Labour and product market regulations in Sweden and Finland, 1970-2003
70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-03
Finland
CWB 3.8 4.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.0 3.8
UD 58.6 66.9 68.8 71.0 76.0 78.5 77.4
EPL 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3
PMR – 5.5 5.4 4.9 4.2 2.8 2.5
Sweden
CWB 5.0 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.8 3.0 3.8
UD 71.0 75.7 79.1 83.3 84.8 84.7 78.7
EPL 1.9 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.7
PMR – 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.6 2.5 2.0
Note: See the appendix for a description of the variables.
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in Finland, the process clearly gained momentum during the first half of 
the 1990s, when large-scale privatisation reforms were launched in both 
countries. 
 In order to describe the developments with regard to employment pro-
tection legislation, the summary score of Allard (2005) is used. Building 
on earlier work by the OECD, this measure assesses the strictness of the 
employment protection legislation on a scale from 0 to 5, with higher 
values indicating a higher degree of job security. As can be seen in Table 
2.3, employment protection increased in both Sweden and Finland from 
the early 1970s to the late 1980s, but thereafter we see somewhat differ-
ent developments in the two countries. Whereas employment protection 
legislation remained largely unchanged in Finland during the 1990s, in 
Sweden it was relaxed in the beginning of the decade at the hands of the 
centre-right government. Nonetheless, even after these reforms, Swedish 
employment protection legislation remained one of the strictest in the 
entire OECD area.
 For a long time, Sweden and Finland, together with Denmark, have been 
the most unionised countries in the world. And as can be seen in the table, 
the direct effect of the 1990s crisis was to further increase union member-
ship in both countries. At a time of crisis, even previously unorganised 
workers turn to unions for protection. Thus, in this regard the economic 
crisis in Sweden and Finland served to strengthen, at least temporarily, 
one of the defining characteristics of the traditional Nordic model. 
 Corporatist wage bargaining – i.e., centralised and highly coordinated 
wage bargaining run by strong and encompassing unions and employer 
organisations – was another salient feature of the traditional Nordic mod-
el. According to many economic observers of the 1980s, well-function-
ing wage bargaining was the main explanation for the good employment 
performance of the Nordic countries during the economic turbulence of 
the 1970s (Katzenstein 1985; Bruno & Sachs 1985). The reason corporat-
ist wage bargaining is thought to be conducive to low unemployment is 
that it forces wage-setters to consider the macro-economic effects of their 
wage settlements, such as the effect on the general price level. Or, us-
ing economic parlance, under corporatist bargaining wage-setters are in-
duced to internalise the negative externalities of high wage settlements.
 As can be seen in Table 2.3, and as is well-documented in previous 
research, there was already a clear tendency toward less extensive wage 
coordination in both countries in the 1980s. (The index measuring the 
degree of coordination in wage bargaining varies from 1 to 5, with higher 
values indicating more extensive coordination.) 
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 This tendency was most marked in Sweden, where the break away from 
centralised bargaining in 1983 by employers and unions in the manufac-
turing sector was a fundamental blow to the centralised wage bargain-
ing system that had been in place in Sweden since the late 1950s. During 
the 1980s, a number of attempts were made to restore centralisation, and 
wage bargaining oscillated between central and industry levels. These at-
tempts, however, finally came to an end when the Swedish Employers’ 
Confederation (henceforth SAF) decided in 1990 – as a direct result of 
growing employer discontent with the outcomes of centralised bargain-
ing – to resign from collective bargaining and closed down its bargaining 
and statistics department (Elvander 1988; Pontusson & Swenson 1996).
 Developments in Finland were similar, although less dramatic. Dur-
ing the 1970s, following the pattern established by the famous Liinamaa 
Agreement in 1968, wage bargaining in Finland usually took the form of 
tripartite income policy agreements between the government, unions and 
employers. But in the 1980s the parties failed to reach such agreements 
on no less than three occasions, and there were clear signs of growing 
dissatisfaction with the centralised wage bargaining system, in particular 
among employers (cf. Lilja 1998).
 The immediate impact of the economic crisis in the early 1990s, howev-
er, was to temporarily stall the move toward decentralised wage bargain-
ing. In Sweden, against the threat of the approaching economic downturn, 
the Social Democratic government managed to push through a central-
ised stabilisation agreement in 1990 by appointing a “national mediation 
commission”, the so-called Rehnberg commission, including representa-
tives of the social partners. This agreement contained low nominal wage 
increases and a general ban on local negotiations for the next two years. 
And in Finland, in the aftermath of the devaluation of the markka in 1992, 
the social partners forged a central income policy agreement that deliv-
ered strictly zero wage increases for the next two years (Asplund 2007).
 Although the advent of the economic recession served to temporarily 
silence employers’ demands for the decentralisation of wage bargaining, 
the crisis did nothing to alter their basic views on this matter. On the con-
trary, employer resistance to centralised bargaining intensified in both 
Finland and Sweden during the early 1990s. In Finland, as Lilja describes, 
although the discussion on the need to decentralise wage bargaining had 
already started in the 1980s, it was “not until the start of the deep reces-
sion in the 1990s that the debate became urgent” (1998: 171). In Sweden, 
the controversy over the forms of wage bargaining was fuelled anew in 
1992 when the Swedish Engineering Employers’ Association (henceforth 
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VI), the leading employer organisation in the manufacturing sector, open-
ly declared that the central (industry) agreements should regulate only 
the peace obligation and general conditions of employment, whereas wag-
es should be negotiated at the local level. This statement was interpreted 
as a direct declaration of war by the manufacturing unions. 
 The employer offensive against centralised wage bargaining was fur-
ther spurred by the election of non-socialist governments in both coun-
tries in 1991. Whereas the centre-right government in Finland explicitly 
expressed an intention “to diminish the role of trade unions and to get rid 
of the old corporatist wage bargaining system” (Kiander 2005: 100), the 
new Swedish government revealed its lukewarm attitude to centralised 
bargaining when refusing to reappoint the Rehnberg commission in 1993. 
 In Finland, the growing claims for decentralisation manifested them-
selves in the bargaining rounds of 1994-1995, which, at the initiative of 
employers and with the tacit support of the government, were conducted 
at the industry level in a fairly uncoordinated manner. The outcome, how-
ever, was not what the employers had hoped for. The bargaining rounds 
were fairly conflict ridden, and despite a record high unemployment rate 
the nominal wage increases were relatively high from an international 
perspective, which served to slow the economic recovery in Finland (Hag-
berg et al. 2006).
 After some limited moves in a decentralised direction in the bargaining 
round of 1993, Swedish employers, led by the VI, intensified their efforts 
to decentralise bargaining in 1995. This resulted in one of the most decen-
tralised and uncoordinated bargaining rounds since the end of the Second 
World War in Sweden. As in Finland, however, the experiment with un-
coordinated bargaining turned out to be a rather unpleasant experience 
for the employers. After an early agreement by the parties in the highly 
profitable forest industry, employers in other sectors were forced to con-
cede to similar wage increases that were high by international standards 
and considered severely detrimental to competitiveness by most employ-
ers outside the forest industry. Consequently, the bargaining round of 
1995-1996, which was the most conflict ridden in Sweden since that of the 
“great conflict” in 1980, caused great discord within the employer collec-
tive and increased awareness of the risks associated with uncoordinated 
wage bargaining.
 The fourth core area of a national capital system identified in the in-
troduction of this book is the system of corporate governance. In the VoC 
literature, the corporate governance system of liberal market economies 
is typically said to be based on dispersed ownership, strong legal pro-
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tection for minority shareholders, and large stock markets, whereas the 
corporate governance system of coordinated market economies is taken 
to be characterised by the opposite – i.e., concentrated ownership, weak 
protection for minority shareholders, and relatively small stock markets 
(Hall & Gingerich 2004: 12).
 Traditionally, the corporate governance systems of Sweden and Finland 
have been of the latter type (see e.g. Carlsson 2007; Liljeblom & Löflund 
2006). Already from the advent of industrialisation, the stock markets 
in both countries used to be characterised by powerful and committed 
owners and a rather high degree of ownership control. Different types of 
dual share systems, in which the voting rights differ across different types 
of shares, have also been in frequent use in both countries, which serve 
to further enhance the power of leading owners. For instance, in Sweden 
many large multinational companies such as ABB, Ericsson and SKF used 
to practice a differentiation of 1 : 1000 between A and B-class shares, and 
similar although somewhat less extreme systems were also common in 
Finland. This meant that the leading owners could remain in control over 
their companies even in a situation in which they no longer owned a ma-
jority of the total shares in the company (as long as they owned A-class 
shares).
 Another distinctive, and inherently corporatistic, feature of the corpo-
rate governance systems of Sweden and Finland has been the practice of 
employee representation on the boards of large- and medium-sized firms. 
In Sweden, legislation concerning employee representation at the board 
level was passed already in the 1970s, granting employee representation 
on the boards of all firms with more than 25 employees. In contrast, em-
ployee representation at the board level in Finland remained voluntary 
for a long time, although the practice of employee board representation 
was rather widespread among Finnish firms from the late 1970s. In 1990, 
however, new legislation was passed in Finland stating that employees 
had the right to be represented on the boards of all firms with more than 
150 employees.
 Similar to the other core economic areas discussed above, the tradi-
tional corporate governance systems of Sweden and Finland came under 
increasing stress in the early 1990s. Most importantly, the combination of 
financial market liberalisation and currency devaluation spurred a sharp 
rise in foreign ownership in both Sweden and Finland during this time. As 
a direct result of this, old ownership structures were challenged and tra-
ditional corporate practices such as the dual share system and employee 
board representation came up for debate in both countries. According to 
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critics of the traditional corporatistic corporate governance model prac-
ticed in Sweden and Finland, the differentiation of voting rights across 
different types of shares as well as the practice of board-level employee 
representation tended to favour conservative corporate strategies and 
make the necessary structural adjustments more difficult to achieve. In 
sum, the sharp rise in foreign ownership as well as the spread of liberal 
market ideas in the policy debate constituted important challenges for 
the corporate governance systems in Sweden and Finland during the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1990s.
 As is evident from the previous discussion, there were clear signs of 
a move in the liberal direction in both Sweden and Finland in the early 
1990s. Social benefits were made less generous in order to curb skyrock-
eting budget deficits, old corporate practices were challenged due to the 
increase in foreign ownership, product markets were deregulated, and the 
coordinated wage bargaining systems of the two countries came under 
heavy pressure. Equally important, however, the early 1990s witnessed a 
sharp drop in intra-elite trust, which for a long time had been one of the 
hallmarks of the Nordic society. The political and economic events of the 
time brought to the fore increased tensions between the organisations of 
the labour markets – as seen in the heated controversy over the proper 
level of bargaining – as well as between the centre-right governments in 
each country and the unions. At odds with the traditional Nordic con-
sensus political model, most cuts in social benefits over this period were 
implemented despite strong union opposition. It was thus not only the 
content but also the form of politics that took liberal turns in Sweden and 
Finland during the years of economic hardship in the early 1990s. We will 
now turn to developments since the mid-1990s.
 Economic recovery and the revival of corporatist capitalism
In Finland as well as in Sweden, signs of economic recovery first became 
visible in the export sector in the aftermath of the large currency deprecia-
tions in both countries in 1992. But it was not until 1994 that the countries 
once again exhibited positive economic growth rates. After that, however, 
economic and productivity growth really took off in both countries. As 
can be seen in Table 2.1, during the second half of the 1990s, the yearly av-
erage rate of growth was 4.6 in Finland and 3.1 in Sweden, and average 
productivity growth rates were 2.3 and 1.4 respectively. These figures 
are very high both by international and historical standards; the Finnish 
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and Swedish economies had not grown this quickly since the early 1970s. 
Further, economic and productivity growth continued to be high in both 
countries during the early 2000s. There was, however, a less dramatic 
recovery of employment in both countries in the latter half of the 1990s. 
In Finland, the unemployment rate peaked at nearly 17 in 1994 and has 
since then gradually lowered to a level of 7 to 8. In Sweden, unemploy-
ment hit its peak of about 10 in 1997, and then fell to its current level of 
between 4 and 6.
 In both Finland and Sweden, the process of economic recovery coin-
cided with the return to power of the Social Democrats. In neither coun-
try, however, did this imply a drastic change in economic policy. Upon 
re-election in 1994, the Swedish Social Democrats did undo some of the 
changes implemented by the earlier centre-right government, in particu-
lar with regard to the administration of unemployment benefits and em-
ployment protection legislation, but they also intensified efforts to im-
prove public finances by implementing additional cost-savings measures 
in many welfare state programmes. For instance, the replacement rate in 
case of sickness or unemployment was further lowered to 75 (although a 
replacement rate of 80 was reinstated in 1997), the indexing of pensions 
was decreased, and both child and housing allowances were lowered. In 
Finland, the so-called rainbow coalition – headed by Social Democratic 
Prime Minister Pavo Lipponen – followed a similar course of action upon 
entering office in 1995, and imposed additional savings measures in many 
areas such as pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment insurance 
(Uusitalo 1996; Benner 2003). 
 Thus, the trend toward less generous social benefits continued in both 
countries in the late 1990s, as can be seen in Table 2.2. At the same time, 
taxes were increased as part of the far-reaching financial stabilisation 
programmes implemented in Sweden and Finland. In Table 2.2, we also 
see that the total tax wedge in Sweden had returned close to its pre-tax 
reform value by the late 1990s, whereas the Finnish tax wedge reached its 
all-time high in 1995-1996.
 Judging from these ﬁ gures, it was therefore not so much the content of 
politics as its form that was re-oriented once the Social Democrats returned 
to power in Finland and Sweden in the mid-1990s. Rather than striking a 
confrontational stance with the unions, as the centre-right governments of 
the early 1990s had done, the Social Democrats sought to implement their 
economic reforms in cooperation with, or at least with the tacit consent of, 
the unions. As a result, a revival of social concertation and partnership was 
seen in both countries during the latter part of the 1990s.
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 This development was particularly pronounced in Finland. One of the 
main priorities of the new Finnish government was to restore coordinated 
wage bargaining. In September 1995, in fact, the government managed to 
get unions and employers to sign a central income policy agreement gov-
erning the development of wages for the next two years in exchange for 
promised tax cuts. The agreement, which contained moderate nominal 
wage increases, was the most comprehensive income policy agreement 
since the Liinamaa agreement in 1968, and one of its initiators went so 
far as to describe it as “representing the peak in the history of Finnish 
incomes policy” (Pekkanen quoted in Rehn 1996: 268).
 The income policy agreement of 1995 marked a return to centralised 
bargaining in Finland and was followed by similar agreements in 1997, 
2001, 2003 and 2005. In fact, during the period 1995-2007, it was only in 
2000 that wage bargaining was conducted at the industry level without a 
previous central agreement. So why did Finnish employers give up their 
principled resistance to centralised bargaining and agree to once again 
take part in tripartite income policy negotiations?
 The first reason for the change in employer attitudes was no doubt 
the experience of the uncoordinated bargaining rounds of 1994 and 1995. 
Despite the widespread consciousness of the crisis in Finnish society and 
mass unemployment, it proved impossible to secure wage restraint and 
labour peace in uncoordinated bargaining at the industry level. With no 
prospect for any labour market reforms aimed at drastically lessening the 
bargaining power of workers, employers decided that, at least for the mo-
ment, the increased stability and predictability ensured by centralised 
bargaining was of higher value than the increased flexibility associated 
with decentralised bargaining.
 Second, it should be noted that even in the early 1990s Finnish employ-
ers took a more pragmatic view than did their Swedish counterparts on 
the issue of centralised bargaining. Even though Finnish employers also 
stressed the need for increased flexibility in wage setting, they never “an-
nounced that centralised agreements would be completely ruled out in 
the future” (Niemelä 1999: 18). Instead, Finnish employers attempted to 
obtain increased room for local-level negotiations within the structure 
of centralised bargaining. To a large extent, this has been a successful 
strategy. Whereas average wage increases in Finland have been effectively 
regulated by the central agreements, decisions on relative wages have in 
the last decade been delegated to the local level to an increasing extent 
(Asplund 2007: 27). And even though there exists continued disagree-
ment between unions and employers over the desirability of increased 
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wage flexibility, recent survey evidence indicates that both parties “are 
reasonably satisfied with the existing framework of collective bargaining 
owing to its stabilising influence on labour market relations and overall 
wage developments” (Pekkarinen & Alho 2005: 83).
 A third factor contributing to the revival of centralised wage bargain-
ing in Finland in the mid-1990s was the decision to join the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). Both Finnish employers and unions have ad-
vanced centralised bargaining as an important means by which to safe-
guard against the types of adverse economic shock to which a small coun-
try like Finland may be subject within a monetary union (Pekkarinen & 
Alho 2005: 75).
 Similar to developments in Finland, in Sweden the failure to secure 
wage moderation and labour peace in the uncoordinated bargaining 
rounds at the industry level in 1995 caused employers to start to re-
consider their principled commitment to decentralised wage bargain-
ing – despite skyrocketing budget deficits and mass unemployment. For 
instance, in a newspaper article in 1995, Göran Trogen, the managing 
director of the second largest employer organisation in the manufactur-
ing sector, urged the parties of the labour market to leave the trenches 
and make efforts to re-establish mutual trust and confidence between 
employers and unions in the spirit of the famous Basic Agreement of 
1938 (Trogen 1995). 
 Moreover, the VI came to the conclusion in 1996, after a thorough eval-
uation of available options with regard to wage bargaining, that the time 
was not yet ripe to push for a complete decentralisation of wage bargain-
ing (Sandgren 2002: 25). Given the strength of their opponents, the VI 
considered wage negotiations at the local level without an accompany-
ing peace obligation too risky. Moreover, during the bargaining rounds 
of 1993 and 1995, the manufacturing unions had made it crystal clear that 
they would never sign a central agreement containing a peace obligation 
if wages were to be decided at the local level. As Göran Johnsson, former 
chair of the largest manufacturing union, Metall, says, “I used to tell them 
[the employers] that of course we are very stupid sometimes, but we are 
not that bloody stupid” (Interview with Johnsson 2002).
 At the same time, the Social Democratic government initiated a dia-
logue with the social partners about the future of collective bargaining in 
Sweden. In 1996, Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson wrote an open 
letter to unions and employers asking for their views on the possibility of 
jointly finding new forms of wage bargaining that could bring down wage 
increases in Sweden to a sound European level. A few weeks later, this 
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letter was followed up by a new letter, this time from the labour market 
minister, urging all parties involved to come up with proposals aimed at 
improving the Swedish wage bargaining system before the end of March 
the next year (Sandgren 2002: 29ff ). 
 The parties of the labour market interpreted the government’s initiative 
as a direct threat of state intervention should they be unable to come to a 
voluntary agreement for an improved structure for wage bargaining. And 
a shared and deep-seated distaste for governmental involvement in wage 
bargaining did indeed bring unions and employers together. The most im-
portant outcome of this process was the so-called Industrial Agreement, 
which was initiated by the trade unions and signed in March 1997 by the 
parties in the manufacturing sector, including the VI. 
 The two most important provisions of the Industrial Agreement were 
the declaration that wage increases in the manufacturing sector should 
set a pattern for wage increases in the rest of the economy, and the intro-
duction of a completely new system for conflict resolution in the manu-
facturing sector. The Industrial Agreement has had a profound effect on 
the Swedish collective bargaining system in at least two regards. First, it 
largely inspired the governmental bill on a new mediation institute that 
was passed by parliament in 2000. Second, it has served as a model for 
similar agreements in other sectors of the economy (Elvander 2002: 130). 
 Moreover, by establishing the Industrial Agreement, unions and em-
ployers in the manufacturing sector came to a truce over wage bargain-
ing levels. Particularly important was that the employers, by signing the 
agreement, at least temporarily decided to give up the push for decen-
tralised bargaining. This should not, however, be interpreted as a funda-
mental shift in employer preferences on the issue. Rather, and as point-
ed out by one of the leaders on the employer side, it simply means that 
employers, by signing the Industrial Agreement, “chose to prioritise the 
cost development, to fight it, over the idea of decentralisation” (Interview 
with Trogen 2002). Former chief negotiator of the VI Anders Sandgren 
provides additional support for this interpretation when mentioning the 
return to power of the Social Democrats as an important factor for the 
organisation’s decision to accept the Industrial Agreement: 
Th e problem with labour dispute measures was the decisive factor. Th e 
government had shown some intentions to come to grip with labour 
disputes, but all experience showed that a Social Democratic govern-
ment was unable to make a decision that the LO opposed (2002: 44).
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To a large extent, the pattern-setting function of the manufacturing sec-
tor has been respected by the other sectors in the bargaining rounds since 
1998. This has meant a revival of wage coordination in Sweden. But unlike 
what was the case in Finland, coordination in Sweden was not restored 
by means of a re-establishment of centralised bargaining. Employer re-
sistance to centralisation was far too strong for this to be possible, even 
though the LO did attempt (largely unsuccessfully) to regain a more im-
portant role in wage bargaining during the late 1990s. Instead, a pattern-
setting system of the German type was established in Sweden by the hands 
of a cross-class coalition in the manufacturing sector.
 The revival of coordinated bargaining in Finland and Sweden during 
the late 1990s described in this section and further illustrated in Table 
2.3 indicates, at least partially, a return of coordinated capitalism in these 
countries. Another sign of this is that the relations between the trade 
unions and the government improved considerably in both countries once 
the Social Democrats returned to power in the mid-1990s. In line with the 
traditional mode of Nordic country decision-making, the Social Demo-
crats took great care to implement savings measures in cooperation with, 
or at least with the tacit consent of, the unions (Anderson 2001; Uusitalo 
1996). The return to importance of social concentration is also evident in 
the large pension reforms undertaken in Sweden and Finland in the last 
decade. Anderson, for instance, argues that the historical political com-
promise in the introduction of the new pension system in Sweden would 
not have been possible without the tacit agreement between employers 
and unions about the necessity of reform (2001: 1065). And in Finland the 
grand pension reform of 2005 was a direct result of a tripartite agreement 
between the social partners and the government (EIRO 2001).
 No doubt the revival of coordinated capitalism in Sweden and Finland 
in the mid-1990s was most pronounced with respect to the reforms taken 
by politics. That said, however, there were also some indications in both 
countries of a reversal, or at least a significant weakening, of the liberali-
sation trend with respect to policy content in the early 2000s. In Sweden, 
unemployment benefits, sickness benefits and child allowances were all 
made more generous during the first half of the 2000s (although both 
unemployment and sickness benefits have, once again, been made less 
generous since the centre-right government took office in 2006). Simi-
larly, changes were made in Finland in the early 2000s to mitigate some 
of the cuts implemented during the recession of the 1990s. These changes 
included increases in national pensions, a restoration of the minimum 
allowance in sickness insurance benefits and an increase in the earnings-
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related unemployment allowance (Niemelä & Salminen 2006). In Table 
2.2 we can also see that taxes were lowered in both Finland and Sweden 
once public finances had recovered by the late 1990s. This development 
has been most marked in Finland, in which the tax wedge has been low-
ered to the level of the early 1980s. Yet, from an international perspective 
Sweden and Finland still stand out as high tax economies. So we should 
refrain from interpreting these tax cuts as clear signs of their capitalism 
moving in a liberal direction. Especially since recent tax cuts in Sweden 
and Finland were aimed to a large extent at bringing taxes back to their 
pre-crisis level. 
 There are, however, also areas in which the liberalisation trend is more 
visible. In particular, the deregulation of product markets continued in 
both countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as can be seen in Table 
2.3. Moreover there are some, although not very strong, indications that 
the liberalisation of the corporate governance systems in Sweden and Fin-
land that was initiated in the early 1990s has gained some momentum. 
For instance, the fraction of listed companies applying shares with dif-
ferentiated voting rights has been declining in both Sweden and Finland 
over the last decade (OECD 2007: 22). Often this development has been 
a direct result of increased foreign ownership or international mergers. 
Obviously, the reduced importance of the dual share system has served to 
strengthen the position of minority shareholders, although from an inter-
national perspective, dual-class shares are still in rather wide use in Swe-
den and Finland. Some observers, especially trade union representatives, 
have also argued that the increased frequency of international mergers 
in Sweden and Finland has made the traditional system of employee rep-
resentation at the board level more vulnerable, since when mergers take 
place employees risk being excluded from the various boards (see e.g. 
Kvam 2001).
 At the same time, as in most other OECD countries, the stock market 
has grown rapidly in both countries in recent years. Today, both Sweden 
and Finland have well developed equity markets. Yet liberalisation has 
been slower with regard to the dispersion of ownership. From an inter-
national perspective, ownership is still rather concentrated in Sweden as 
well as in Finland, and in both countries family ownership continues to 
play an important role (Pedersen & Thomsen 1999; Faccio & Lang 2002). 
Thus, although there is a slight tendency of a move in a liberal direction 
of the corporate governance systems of Sweden and Finland over the last 
decades, the magnitude of this move should not be exaggerated. The cor-
porate governance systems of Sweden and Finland still seem to be closer 
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to the ideal type of corporatist capitalism than to that of liberal market 
capitalism. 
 Turning to the developments in the labour markets, the increase in 
union density experienced by both Sweden and Finland during the eco-
nomic crisis was offset once the economy turned for the better in the 
latter half of the decade, as can be seen from Table 2.3. During the 2000s, 
unionisation was in decline in both countries, and although we lack reli-
able data for the most recent developments, this trend seems to be accen-
tuating. It should be noted, however, that the decline is from a very high 
level and despite the recent drop in union density, Sweden and Finland 
still stand out as two of the most heavily unionised countries in the world. 
A fact that bears witness to the continued strength of the Swedish and 
Finnish unions is that employment protection legislation has been kept 
more or less intact (see Table 2.3) over the last decade even though many 
policy experts, national as well as international, have pointed to the need 
for liberalising reforms in this area.
 Sources of stability and change 
The fast economic recovery of Finland and Sweden in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s has, together with similar developments in Denmark (partic-
ularly its ‘flexicurity’; see Mailand’s contribution in this volume), inspired 
a renewed interest in the Nordic political economies, which is once again 
being portrayed as a viable alternative to Anglo-Saxon laissez faire capi-
talism. Some even speak of a Nordic miracle (Dutch Ministry of Finance 
2005). This, however, raises the question of how Nordic the current Nor-
dic model is.
 Asking whether the contemporary Nordic model, as practiced in Fin-
land and Sweden, is the same as the traditional one is like asking whether 
the glass is half empty or half full. The previous discussion has shown that 
there are important instances of both continuity and change in the two 
countries under study, and it is not obvious how to assess overall develop-
ments.
 There is no doubt that welfare benefits became less generous in Swe-
den and Finland over the course of the 1990s. Yet, looking back on the 
1990s crisis in Sweden, Palme et al. (2002: 137) summarise the welfare re-
forms in the following way: “On the whole, what marked the changes was 
that, on the one hand, they were very large in numbers and tended to limit 
generosity, but their magnitude, on the other hand, was small.” Lindbom 
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(2001) makes a similar point when characterising the cutbacks in welfare 
in Sweden as a case of adjustment rather than of retrenchment. These 
descriptions also square nicely with Finnish developments over the same 
period, since as Benner (2003: 137) for instance notes, the 1990s welfare 
reforms in Finland were “more of a quantitative than a qualitative nature.” 
In summary, although there was a tendency toward welfare state liberali-
sation in both Sweden and Finland during the 1990s, the core elements of 
the two welfare states appear to have survived the crisis. 
 The findings with respect to developments in the product and labour 
markets are likewise mixed. In both Sweden and Finland, we have ob-
served a trend toward product market deregulation and liberalisation of 
corporate governance since the early 1990s. And after a temporary in-
crease in union density at the height of the economic crisis in Finland and 
Sweden, unionisation has been on the decline in both countries. Equally 
important, however, is that both countries have witnessed a revival of 
coordinated wage bargaining, another hallmark of the traditional Nordic 
model, from the mid-1990s.
 Given that the early 1990s constituted a golden window of opportu-
nity for those wanting to liberalise the Swedish and Finnish variety of 
capitalism, in my view it is, however, not so much the traces of change as 
the traces of continuity that are in need of explanation. Starting with the 
question of welfare state change, we may ask why we did not see more 
radical welfare state reforms in Sweden and Finland during this period. It 
appears the relative stability of the Swedish and Finnish welfare states can 
be attributed to two main factors. 
 First, even in the midst of a severe economic crisis – and despite the 
prominence of monetarist and market liberal ideas in the policy debate – 
public support for a universalistic and generous welfare state remained 
very high in both Finland and Sweden. Regarding Finland, Sihvo and 
Uusitalo (1995: 257) show that for each of the five types of social benefits 
they investigated, the balance of opinion – i.e., the difference between the 
percentage of those who think more tax money should be spent on the 
benefit in question and the percentage of those who think less tax money 
should be spent on it – was still positive at the height of the economic 
downturn in 1993.2 Svallfors (1995: 69) presents survey results indicating 
that public support for the welfare state in Sweden was as high in 1992 
as in 1986. As Katzenstein (1985) and others have argued, strong welfare 
state support in small open economies such as Finland and Sweden may 
be explained by the need of individuals to shield against the vagaries of a 
globalised economy.
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 Although this strong support for welfare in Sweden and Finland did not 
preclude cuts in public expenditure to alleviate the economic crisis, the 
fact that public support for the welfare state remained high even in times 
of crisis no doubt had a restraining effect on the number and magnitude 
of welfare reforms implemented. A testimony to this is that Swedish and 
Finnish politicians took great care throughout the crisis to present wel-
fare cuts as a means by which to maintain the universalistic welfare state, 
rather than as a way to abolish it. 
 A second factor contributing to the relative stability of the Swedish 
and Finnish welfare states during the 1990s crisis was heavy trade union 
opposition to cutbacks in social welfare. Several times the powerful Finn-
ish unions managed to get the government to renounce planned welfare 
cuts by threatening general strikes. Similarly, Swedish unions mobilised, 
at least partly successfully, protests against proposed cutbacks in social 
benefits on several occasions during the 1990s. For instance, the deci-
sion to increase the replacement rate from 75 to 80 in unemployment 
and sickness insurance benefits in 1997 was a direct concession to LO 
demands (Scarbrough 2000; Edbalk 2007).
 The strong position of the trade unions in Sweden and Finland also goes 
a long way toward explaining the revival of coordinated wage bargaining 
over the last decade. In a context like the Nordic one characterised by 
high union density, few restrictions on the use of industrial action, and 
generous welfare benefits that increased the bargaining position of the 
unions by decreasing competition from “outsiders”, decentralised wage 
bargaining has entailed substantial risk for employers. The experiment 
with uncoordinated and fairly decentralised bargaining in Finland and 
Sweden during the mid-1990s made this abundantly clear. Furthermore, 
once the Social Democrats returned to power in Sweden and Finland, em-
ployers no longer saw any prospect for legislative reforms aimed at drasti-
cally lessening the bargaining power of unions. This induced employers to 
give up their principled demand for full-blooded decentralisation of wage 
bargaining. At the same time, the return to coordinated wage bargaining 
in the two countries helped to bring wage formation under control, which 
in turn lessened the demand for further liberalisation of welfare and la-
bour market policies. 
 Consequently, and as I have argued in more detail elsewhere (Lindgren 
2006), whereas the presence of large unions and generous welfare benefits 
serve to increase the gains associated with coordinated wage bargaining 
by increasing the amount of negative externalities that can be internalised, 
coordinated wage bargaining serves to increase the gains associated with 
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strong unions and generous welfare benefits by weakening the link be-
tween social protection and unemployment. Thus we are here faced with 
an important instance of so-called institutional complementarity, i.e., a 
situation in which the co-existence of a particular set of institutions en-
hances the performance of each individual institution.
  Although Deeg (2007) might be correct in suggesting that the relation-
ship between institutional complementarities and institutional change is 
much more ambiguous and contingent than commonly thought, the in-
stitutional complementarities identified here clearly had a stabilising ef-
fect on developments in Sweden and Finland during the turbulent times 
of recent decades. That is to say, an important reason we did not see a 
more radical liberalisation of the Finnish and Swedish national capitalist 
systems during the 1990s was that such defenders of the traditional Nor-
dic model as the unions managed to utilise the presence of institutional 
complementarities to their advantage.
 Conclusion
No doubt the current Swedish and Finnish national capitalist systems de-
part in important respects from the capitalism that characterised these 
countries during the heyday of the traditional Nordic model. Yet it still 
seems justified to identify them as distinctively Nordic. This is because, 
recent changes notwithstanding, the current capitalist systems of Sweden 
and Finland much more closely resemble the type of capitalism practised 
in these countries in the 1970s and 1980s than the Anglo-Saxon capitalism 
of the 2000s or the Anglo-Saxon capitalism of the 1970s and 1980s for that 
matter. 
 Moreover, and as Hall and Thelen (2009) point out, it is important 
to distinguish the institutional changes that weaken the coordination ca-
pacities of coordinated market economies such as the strongly corporat-
ist Nordic ones from those changes leaving these capacities intact. And, 
as has been shown in this chapter, many of the changes undertaken in 
Finland and Sweden since the early 1990s have been of the former type. 
Cutbacks in social welfare during the economic recession, for instance, 
were not so much driven by a wish to abolish the universalistic welfare 
state as by a wish to maintain its core elements through a period of ex-
treme economic hardship. This interpretation is further substantiated by 
the fact that in both countries, cuts in welfare spending in the 1990s were 
accompanied by tax increases. If the intent had been to fundamentally 
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change the national capital systems in Sweden and Finland, taxes should 
have been cut along with welfare benefits.
 Similarly, changes to the wage bargaining systems during the latter half 
of the 1990s should be seen as an attempt to restore effective wage coor-
dination in Finland and Sweden, which was one of the hallmarks of the 
traditional Nordic model. In Finland, as we have seen, wage coordination 
was restored through a series of centralised income policy agreements. 
But although the formal attributes of the old centralised bargaining sys-
tem have largely been left intact, there is at the same time a clear trend 
toward the delegation of responsibilities to the local level. This is thus an 
example of how institutional change can be pursued through a reinter-
pretation of the meanings of old institutions (see Hall & Thelen 2009). 
In Sweden, however, employer antagonism toward centralised wage bar-
gaining was too strong to make this type of institutional change possible. 
Instead, coordinated wage bargaining has been restored at the initiative of 
a cross-class alliance in the manufacturing sector, by means of the intro-
duction of a new and regularised system for pattern-setting bargaining. 
 To a large extent, the recent transformation of the Swedish and Finnish 
capitalist systems can thus be seen as a way to maintain the basic func-
tionality of their political economies in a period of immense external, as 
well as internal, pressure for change. The most suitable characterisation 
of the evolution of the national capitalist systems of Sweden and Finland 
over the last couple of decades, therefore, seems to be continuity through 
change. 
 This finding speaks to the close but often neglected connection be-
tween the concepts of continuity and change. Given that the external cir-
cumstances are changing, in politics the way to maintain things as they are 
is often through change, and not seldom maintaining things as they are is 
the most effective means to ensure fundamental change. Although intui-
tive, this observation has far-reaching implications for future research in 
the field. Most importantly, in order to construct a truly dynamic theory 
of capitalist diversity, we need to go beyond the traditional dichotomy of 
continuity and change and develop a more elaborated typology differen-
tiating between various forms of continuity and change. In doing so, we 
ought to focus on the function of changing or not changing a particular 
policy over time. 
 The fact that the coordinated model in Sweden and Finland appears to 
have survived the immediate crisis of the economic downturn of the 1990s 
does not, however, mean the model is secured for eternity. As pointed 
out in the introduction, ultimately corporatist coordination of the type 
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practised in Sweden and Finland is an outcome that has to be actively sus-
tained and nurtured. The survival of the Nordic capitalism in these coun-
tries therefore hinges on the fact that the model can continue to serve the 
interest of powerful actors also in the future. It is not difficult to identify 
a number of contemporary challenges to the existing institutional frame-
works in Sweden and Finland. 
 In Sweden, for instance, there is growing discontent with the new bar-
gaining system among the non-manufacturing unions; they have threat-
ened to disregard the pattern-setting function of the manufacturing sec-
tor in the next bargaining round if not granted greater influence over the 
determination of wages (LO-Tidningen 2007). At the same time, the cen-
tre-right government, elected in 2006, has come into open conflict with 
the unions over cuts and changes implemented in the unemployment and 
sickness insurance plans. 
 Likewise, there are indications of increased tension in the Finnish bar-
gaining systems. Following the announcement by the influential Federa-
tion of Finnish Technology Industries that it would follow a decentral-
ised approach in the bargaining round of 2008, a new central income 
policy agreement failed to materialise once the old agreement termi-
nated at the end of 2007. The outcome of the sectoral bargaining round 
of 2008 was rather high nominal wage increases which have caused the 
Finnish government to stall planned tax decreases. The costliness of the 
agreements notwithstanding, Finnish employers report that they are sat-
isfied with the sectoral bargaining round since it has delegated impor-
tant decision-making powers to the local level (EIRO 2008a). It is still 
too early to tell whether the bargaining round of 2008 represents a new 
turning point with regard to collective bargaining in Finland, or whether 
it merely represents a means by which to temporarily relieve some of the 
pressure that has accumulated over the years of central income policy 
agreements.
 Finally, two additional challenges of a more fundamental nature facing 
Finland and Sweden should be mentioned. The first is weakening unioni-
sation. If the Swedish and Finnish unions continue to lose members at 
the current pace, the universalistic welfare state will eventually lose one 
of its strongest contenders, and at the same time employer incentives to 
participate in coordinated bargaining will lessen. In the long run, such 
a development will undermine the very institutional complementarities 
that helped maintain the Nordic model throughout the 1990s.
 A second important challenge is the ruling in December 2007 by the EC 
court in the much discussed case of Laval concerning a trade union boy-
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cott of a Latvian building company operating in Sweden. The essence of 
the decision of the court was that the Swedish trade unions are restricted 
in their use of industrial action to force foreign companies to sign collec-
tive agreements when operating in Sweden (EIRO 2008b). According to 
the trade unions, this ruling constitutes a fundamental blow to the Nordic 
model of collective bargaining in which minimum protection standards 
are established in collective agreements rather than enshrined in law as 
in many other European countries. The more precise implications of the 
court’s verdict are still a matter for debate, however, and it is still too early 
to determine the future importance of this ruling.
 As pointed out in the introduction, an existing institutional framework 
can be sustained only as long as it serves the purpose of important eco-
nomic actors. Today, Sweden’s and Finland’s Nordic capitalism still pro-
vides a viable alternative to the type of free market capitalism practised 
in Anglo-Saxon countries, but this will continue to be the case only to 
the extent that the Nordic model can adapt to meet the challenges it is 
currently facing. Historically, however, adaptability has been one of the 
trademarks of the Nordic countries.
 Interviews
With G. Johnsson, Chairman Metall. Interview conducted on 6 May 2002.
With G. Trogen, Chairman Almega. Interview conducted on 5 April 2002.
 Appendix: Measures and Data Sources
Wage Coordination (CWB). This measure of wage coordination is taken 
from Kenworthy (2001). The index ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 is the 
minimum coordination. Kenworthy’s data covers only the period up 
to 2000 but has been extended for the period 2001-2003 by the pres-
ent author. 
Employment. Civilian employment as percentage of the population aged 
15-64. The series builds on OECD data but was obtained from Armin-
geon et al. (2008).
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). This is Allard’s (2005) measure 
of job security. The indicator measures the strictness of employment 
protection legislation annually on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, higher 
values indicating stricter regulation (higher job security).
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Growth. The annual growth rate of real GDP in percent. The data builds 
on data collected by the OECD but were obtained from Armingeon 
et al. (2008).
Inequality. The Gini coefficient of disposable income. The data are drawn 
from income surveys conducted at irregular intervals. The Swedish 
data are from Statistics Sweden and the Finnish data are from Statis-
tics Finland. The data series for the two countries are not exactly com-
parable, since there are some slight differences in the official methods 
for calculating disposable income in Sweden and Finland.
Pensions. An index of the overall generosity of the pension system com-
puted on the basis of pension replacement rates for minimum and 
standard pensions, the pension take-up ratio, qualifying years for 
standard pension, and the proportion of pension contributions paid 
by the employee. See Scruggs & Allan (2006) for computational de-
tails. Data are from Scruggs (2005). 
Product market regulations (PMR). This is an OECD indicator of regula-
tory and market regulations in seven non-manufacturing industries. 
The industries are classified in each period along a scale from 0 to 6, 
from least to most restrictive, on five regulatory and market dimen-
sions. The scores are then averaged across the industries to obtain an 
economy-wide measure. Data were obtained from OECD.Stat.
Productivity. Annual multi-factor productivity growth in percent. Data 
were obtained from OECD.Stat.
Unemployment benefits (UB). An index of the overall generosity of unem-
ployment benefits computed on the basis of net replacement rates, 
the coverage of the insurance, the duration of benefits, the length of 
the qualification period, and the number of waiting days. See Scrug-
gs & Allan (2006) for computational details. Data are from Scruggs 
(2005). 
Union density (UD). Net union density in percent. Data were obtained 
from Nickell (2006).
Unemployment. Standardised unemployment rates. The series builds on 
OECD data but was obtained from Armingeon et al. (2008).
Sickness. An index of the overall generosity of sickness benefits computed 
on the basis of net replacement rates, the coverage of the insurance, 
the duration of benefits, the length of the qualification period, and 
the number of waiting days. See Scruggs & Allan (2006) for computa-
tional details. Data are from Scruggs (2005). 
Tax wedge. This measure is defined as income tax plus employee and em-
ployer social contributions less cash benefits as a percentage of labour 
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costs for an average production worker (AWP) in the manufacturing 
sector. Data are from the OECD database Taxing Wages.
 Notes
 The research for this chapter was funded by the Swedish Council for Working 
Life and Research as well as the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation.
 The five types of social benefits investigated are: unemployment insurance, 
sickness insurance, national pensions, child allowance, and housing allo-
wance.
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3 Change and Continuity in Danish and Norwegian 
 Capitalism:  Corporatism and Beyond 
 Mikkel Mailand
 Introduction
The literature on varieties of capitalism (VoC) (e.g. Hall & Soskice 2001; 
Rueda & Pontusson 2000; Hall & Gingerich 2004) has illuminated con-
temporary relations between state and social partners as well as between 
capital and labour in advanced economies. As stated in other chapters in 
this volume, the literature on VoC has largely focused on the larger indus-
trial countries and ignored the small EU member states. This is also the 
case with the small Scandinavian countries. There are only a few excep-
tions (e.g. Campbell et al. 2006) within the VoC literature.
 Relations between state, capital and labour are often presented in ear-
lier studies in political economy and industrial relations – especially those 
found within the studies of corporatism –as one of the key issues to un-
derstand the dynamics of Scandinavian states. Cooperation and consen-
sus-oriented relations between these actors – which in terms of power 
are more equal than in many other countries – have also been said to be 
an important factor in the economic success of these countries. Sweden 
became the prime example of Scandinavian corporatism and was often 
included in comparative studies (Korpi 1983; Katzenstein 1985; Rothstein 
1992). Less attention was paid to labour market relations in the two other 
Scandinavian countries: Norway and Denmark.
 Taking as its point of departure the premise that relations between 
state, capital and labour are of special importance in understanding the 
dynamics of capitalism in these small Scandinavian countries, the follow-
ing analysis will pay special attention to corporatism in a wider empiri-
cal comparative analysis of the state and development of capitalism in 
Denmark and Norway. However, corporatism and the four other themes 
selected for the country-chapters in this volume – welfare state system, 
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labour market legislation, corporate governance and tax regime – are 
closely connected, because corporatism should be seen as policy pro-
cesses employed in relation to various economic and social issues, such 
as the four other areas. In the two small Scandinavian countries in focus, 
corporatism is especially relevant for the first two of the four areas, as will 
be illustrated by the analysis below. Hence, elements of corporatism will 
be found in sections other than the section on corporatism below.
 This chapter argues that although Denmark and Norway can be seen as 
Coordinated Market Economies (CME) – one of the two types within the 
VoC approach – a more accurate description might be Negotiated Econ-
omies (NE; Pedersen 2006; Campbell & Pedersen 2007). NE is a more 
decentralised, network-based and learning-oriented version of a coordi-
nated market economy and resembles the corporatist type that Becker 
proposes in the introduction to this volume. In this chapter I prefer the 
concept of the ‘negotiated economy’, however. In the period under inves-
tigation, NE has somewhat weakened in the two countries’ political econ-
omy and given way to a move in a liberal direction. This change seems to 
have been stronger in Denmark than in Norway, but it has not meant that 
either of these countries closely approximates the ideal-typical Liberal 
Market Economy (LME).
 Th e following section presents in brief the political and economic con-
text in the two countries. Th e third section contains analyses of peak-level 
and meso-corporatism in Denmark and Norway. Th e following three sec-
tions brieﬂ y analyse developments in labour market legislation, the welfare 
state, corporate governance and the tax regime. Th e ﬁ nal section sums up 
similarities and diﬀ erences between the two countries and brieﬂ y discuss-
es the question of the most appropriate typology for describing the Danish 
and Norwegian developments in the ﬁ ve selected ﬁ elds. Finally, the direc-
tion of reforms and other changes within the two countries are discussed.
 The political and economic context of the two countries 
In Denmark, industrialisation took place relatively late, whereas the in-
stitutionalisation of industrial relations took place relatively early. The 
September Compromise of 1899, in which the employers’ organisations 
and the trade unions recognised each other, is usually seen as the heyday 
of organised industrial relations in Denmark. The sequence of industri-
alisation and the institutionalisation of industrial relations created an in-
dustrial relations system marked by craft divisions. 
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 Since the 1930s, the Social Democratic Party has played an important 
role in the development of the Danish welfare state. But it has been less 
strong than in the other Scandinavian countries because when in govern-
ment, it has often been in minority governments. The tradition of minor-
ity governments has continued into later decades, but in recent years the 
social democrats have repeatedly not been a part of the government: from 
1982-1993 and again from 2001 until today, liberal and conservative par-
ties have been in office. However, these governments have not seriously 
challenged the welfare state. 
 The changes in governments in recent decades have taken place more 
or less simultaneously with changes in the economic climate. Like many 
other European countries, Denmark experienced a period of nearly con-
stant low growth and high unemployment from the 1970s to the early 
1990s, but in the mid-1990s unemployment started to decrease rapidly. 
 Denmark was affected, but not hard-hit, by the international recession 
at the beginning of the present decade. With unemployment at around 
3 in recent years, labour shortages have been felt in some sectors. How-
ever, it remains to be seen to what extent this positive state of the Danish 
economy will be influenced by the present financial crisis. In late 2008, 
Danish exports experienced their largest decline in the country’s history. 
As in Norway, the migration of labourers from new EU member states was 
one of the ways in which the demand for labour was met, but in Denmark 
migration was slower to take off than in its northern neighbour.
 Norway’s industrialisation occurred late, was patchy and closely con-
nected to its natural resources. This development has fostered diverse 
patterns of unionism and class coalitions – as in Denmark, but in contrast 
to Sweden. The Norwegian economy has for many years been heavily de-
pendent on exports based on natural resources, especially oil. 
 As in Denmark, Norway’s social democratic party has been in govern-
ment for most of the period from the 1940s to the 1980s, but the party has 
been stronger and more dominant than in Denmark. However, in more 
recent decades, the social democrats have experienced long periods in 
opposition: between 1981 and 1986, between 1997 and 2000, and again 
from 2001 to 2005. The relationship between the biggest trade union 
confederation (LO) and the social democrats is still close, and contrary 
to the situation in Denmark there are also close formal links (Lismoen 
2002).
 The long-lasting economic boom – supported by revenues from oil and 
other natural resources – has increased the demand for labour. An inflow 
of a large number of migrant workers from the new EU member states has 
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helped to satisfy this demand. Nevertheless, employers complain about 
labour shortages, and the unemployment rate in 2006 was as low as 3 
(Dølvik 2007: 27).
 Change and continuity in industrial relations and corporatism 
Th is section focuses on industrial relations and peak-level corporatism in 
the two countries. So-called ‘meso-level corporatism’ – corporatism within 
speciﬁ c policy areas – will be examined in the section on welfare regimes.
 
Peak-level corporatism in Denmark 
Industrial relations in Denmark have been marked by relatively central-
ised coordination and strong, consensus-oriented social partner organ-
isations. However, in the late 1980s, a process was begun that ended up 
making sectoral framework agreements for company-level bargaining the 
norm – a system that has been described as centralised-decentralisation 
(Due et al. 1993). In spite of this, both the coverage of collective agree-
ments and trade union organisational rates have remained high and have 
long stood at around 70 percent.
 In general, the state’s role in industrial relations has been shrinking. 
The role has primarily been restricted to arbitration and conciliation 
and rare interventions in collective bargaining rounds. Peak-level corpo-
ratist arrangements regarding wages and income policy have been lim-
ited. Hence, Denmark is not like other European member states, where 
governments and social partners signed ‘social pacts’ during the 1990s 
(Ebbinghaus & Hassel 1997; Fajertag & Pochet 2000; Bacarro 2003), and 
Denmark has never had a permanent general tripartite body, such as the 
socio-economic councils seen in Austria, the Netherlands, Portugal or 
Spain. However, there have been plenty of other national-level tripartite 
activities. This reflects the Danish model of industrial relations, where 
the core is a bipartite and relatively centralised system of collective bar-
gaining between strong social partners, but where the social partners are 
involved in the formulation of legislation related to the labour market and 
in the administration of it (Due et al. 1993). 
 Nevertheless, in the 1990s there have been attempts to set up permanent 
general tripartite structures and to reach ‘social pact’-like agreements. Al-
though these attempts did not lead to any pacts or general tripartite bod-
ies of the scope and scale known in a number of other EU countries, the 
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so-called Tripartite Forum and its aﬃ  liated Statistical Committee did play 
some role for a short period in the late 1990s. Moreover, it could be argued 
that although no explicit social pacts were signed in the 1990s, the tripar-
tite ‘Common Declaration’ from 1987 which prescribed wage restraint has 
been a ‘functional equivalent’ of the social pacts in other countries during 
the 1990s because it has been internalised to a very high degree the ac-
tions of the key societal actors. Th e Common Declaration terminated in 
1998, but a new bipartite agreement on wage restraints was reached the 
same year in the form of the so-called Negotiation Climate Agreement 
(Klimaaftalen). With the Common Declaration’s general agreement on 
wage restraint and with wages and employment conditions almost solely 
regulated by collective agreements, remaining issues to establish tripartite 
dialogues mainly concerned welfare issues. Due to a strong economy and 
labour shortages, wage restraint has been under heavy pressure both in 
the private and public sectors in recent years. However, labour migration 
and more recently the economic recession may have helped to keep wage 
demands down.
 The decentralisation process of industrial relations, among other things, 
was made possible by the weakened power position of labour (Mailand 
1996). Still, the Danish trade unions hold a relatively strong position and 
are from time to time able to challenge employers and government alike, 
as well as strike both bipartite and tripartite agreements – some of which 
will be presented below. To what extent this will continue remains to be 
seen. The strong consensus between the employers’ associations and the 
trade unions have been weakened somewhat in the present decade, re-
ducing the social partners’ opportunities to set the scene, and the trade 
unions have started to lose members at a rapid pace.
 Given the voluntaristic tradition of industrial relations in Denmark, we 
must question the adequacy of using the term ‘corporatism’ to describe 
the industrial relations system. Hence, few Danish industrial relations 
researchers do so. If one must talk about corporatism in Denmark it is 
more accurate to do so in relation to the formulation and administration 
of welfare-state policies than in relation to the regulation of wages and 
conditions at work (see below). 
Peak-level corporatism in Norway 
Norway has traditionally had one of the most centralised coordination 
of industrial relations in Europe, and the state also plays a strong role in 
wage setting in the private sector, in contrast to the situation in Denmark. 
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Union density is lower than in Denmark – around 53 – which might be 
because the trade unions do not administer the unemployment insurance 
funds as in Denmark.
 From the 1970s, the dependence on natural resources led to larger fluc-
tuations in the economy and more state intervention in wage setting than 
elsewhere. In response to the economic crisis, falling oil prices and indus-
trial conflict, the main social partners agreed in 1987-88 in informal talks 
with the Labour government to break the inflationary wage-spiral and 
restore competitiveness by a combination of centralised income policies 
and austere economic policies. 
 The informal agreement of 1988 was codified in 1992 in the so-called 
Solidarity Alternative spelled out by a government-appointed tripartite 
body. The aim was to halve unemployment in five years and the tools were 
a combination of wage moderation, tax reform, review of public expen-
diture, expansion of active labour market policies (ALMP) and training, 
structural policy measures, and finally monetary policy, which aimed to 
achieve a stable exchange rate (Dølvik & Martin 2000: 280).
 The Solidarity Alternative did not – in the short term at least – solve 
the problems of the economy. Unemployment rose to 9 and production 
in the private sector declined. However, facilitated by the revenues from 
oil exports and improvements in the international economy in 1993, the 
Norwegian economy started to recover.
 Despite LO’s commitment to continued wage moderation, the wage-
restraint policy experienced a breakdown in 1998 after large-scale strikes 
had led to record-high wage increases far beyond inflation. The change 
from a Labour government to a centre-right government in 1997 contrib-
uted to the end of the Solidarity Alternative. The new government pro-
posed the abolition of one holiday and suggested cuts in sick pay and 
other benefits as part of a crisis package, but this upset the trade union 
movement and led to the first strike ever in which all trade union confed-
erations participated. The development illustrates, according to some ob-
servers, the inability of the Norwegian trade union movement to sustain 
wage moderation through an extended boom period (Dølvik & Martin 
2000: 284-8).
 Nevertheless, the government succeeded in getting the trade unions 
involved in yet another round of crisis management in late 1998. LO had 
never allowed the other trade union confederations to take part in income 
policy talks, but this time all confederations on both sides were invited 
to the table in a number of tripartite committees. The most important of 
these were the so-called Arntsen committee set up to prepare for the 1999 
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pay round. In the committee it was agreed that the forthcoming wage in-
crease should be limited to 4. LO managed to obtain an improvement in 
life-long training in exchange for its wage restraint promises (ibid.: 286).
 Norway was hit hard by the international recession of the early 2000s 
when 25,000 jobs were eliminated. A new round of concerted income pol-
icy was initiated under the centre-right government that came to power in 
2001 after just one year of social-democratic rule. The centre-right gov-
ernment attempted to liberalise the labour market, especially with regard 
to policies on temporary workers, but the Labour Party blocked these 
when it came into power again in 2005 (Dølvik 2007: 27).
 Although power relations between labour and capital might have 
changed in favour of the latter due to the internationalisation of produc-
tion, the ongoing process of individualisation and other pan-European 
developments, the trade unions and their social democratic allies have 
prevented large-scale transformations in a liberal direction.
 As in Denmark, Norway has corporatist structures within specific pol-
icy areas – both in relation to formulating regulation and implementing 
the policy. These will be dealt with now.
 Changes in labour market legislation 
The voluntaristic industrial relations tradition in Denmark – which to 
some extent is also found in Norway – implies inter alia that labour mar-
ket legislation is relatively limited and few important changes have taken 
place in this area in recent years. Nonetheless, some important changes 
in labour market regulation have been agreed upon between the social 
partners.
Denmark 
Denmark has for some years now been considered the model country for 
flexicurity – the fashionable combination of flexibility and security in 
the labour market. The Danish flexicurity model has developed gradu-
ally over one hundred years and has often been said to include consider-
able flexibility through liberal rules for hire-and-fire, active labour market 
policy and generous social benefits, which together create an equilibrium 
leading to high mobility and high employment rates (e.g. Bredgaard et al. 
2006).1 The ‘leg’ of the triangle related to labour market regulation – the 
liberal hire-and-fire rules – were decided upon primarily by the social 
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partners, since these matters are mainly regulated through the collective 
agreements.
 In international comparative studies, the most widely used index for 
hire-and-ﬁ re rules is the OECD’s employment protection legislation in-
dex (which also includes regulation by collective agreements). Th is index 
more or less conﬁ rms that employment protection in Denmark is liberal 
even though it is not among the most liberal countries: Denmark is only 
the tenth least strictly regulated out of 28 countries analysed. Th e devel-
opment in Denmark has been in the direction of making regulation more 
liberal (OECD 2005; see also Table 1.6a in the introduction of this volume).
 The increased role of sector-wide agreements seen in recent years has 
further developed and deepened flexicurity. Developments in the key bar-
gaining sector – the manufacturing industry – can also be found in other 
sectors, where flexibility was extended to the organisation of work, over-
time etc. Over the last ten years, the scope for shop stewards and manage-
ment to draw up local agreements on working-time issues has been sys-
tematically expanded. As long as negotiations at the plant level take place 
within the framework agreements at the sector level, both employers and 
employees agreed to decentralise bargaining authority. This decentralisa-
tion is a precondition for the flexibility achieved in this area. The possibil-
ity of negotiating wages at the local level has existed in the metalworking 
industry ever since the start of its collective bargaining history. Hence, in 
the manufacturing sector the possibility of paying wages related to per-
formance or results is, in principle, unchanged. But the scope for local 
wage negotiation has increased with the decentralisation of the bargain-
ing system (Andersen & Mailand 2005).
 The right to continuing training was introduced in Danish collective 
agreements in the early 1990s. This can be seen as a development contrib-
uting to functional flexibility, i.e. the potential for employees to perform 
several and various functions in the same enterprise. Provided the em-
ployees receive a sufficiently broad upgrading of skills, continuing train-
ing also helps to increase labour market mobility in general. The collective 
bargaining system also provides security. Since the late 1980s, it has been 
the declared goal of the social partners to secure both the competitiveness 
of enterprises and the employment of employees. For the trade unions, 
the order of priority at subsequent collective bargaining rounds has been 
‘job feast over wage feast.’ As a consequence of the expanded scope of 
the bargaining agenda, other forms of security have been included in the 
collective agreements (ibid.). The result has been that the already flexible 
Danish labour market has become even more flexible.
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 However, it is not the case that legislation has had no role at all in 
the recent development of labour market regulation. Firstly, it is impor-
tant to be aware that salaried employees’ hire-and-fire is regulated by 
legislation that in general provides longer terms of notice than the col-
lective agreements do. Secondly, until 1990, temporary employment was 
relatively strictly regulated. Special permission was required for actors 
other than the public employment service to act as temporary work agen-
cies (Csonka 1992). The liberalisation of the employment service in 1990 
contributed to bringing down the Danish employment protection (EPL) 
score.
 Thirdly, since only around 70 of employees in Denmark are covered 
by collective agreements, the government has – on its own initiative or 
as a result from pressure from the EU – introduced so-called ‘follow-up’ 
legislation, which extends the regulation to those not covered by the col-
lective agreements. This has been the case in relation to EU directives on 
part-time and temporary work, for instance. Fourthly, health and safety 
at work has primarily always been regulated by legislation in Denmark. 
Finally, the indirect politicisation of collective bargaining described in the 
section on corporatism can be seen as implementing legislation though 
‘the shadow of hierarchy.’
Norway 
As indicated in the section on corporatism, Norway has more centralised 
industrial relations than Denmark, with a greater role for the state. How-
ever, when it comes to the strictness of employment protection legislation 
(which also includes rules deriving from collective agreements), the OECD 
ﬁ nds that this is only somewhat stricter than in Denmark, and that it has 
changed less since the late 1980s than Danish regulation has (OECD 2005). 
 The legal regulation is stricter than in Denmark in at least three areas: 
working time, hire-and-fire rules in the public sector, and temporary work 
(Larsen 2006). However, regarding the use of temporary work, it was as 
late as 2006 that the first Norwegian collective agreement on temporary 
agency workers was signed (Lismoen 2007). 
 These rules have, however, not blocked a massive inflow of labour mi-
grants especially from the new European member states, which first and 
foremost have been attracted by job opportunities and high wages. But 
the inflow has triggered further regulation. For instance, to avoid social 
dumping and the social exploitation of migrant workers, the collective 
agreements have been extended to all companies within certain sectors. 
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This has taken place in the construction sector and is also being consid-
ered in the metalworking industry (Lismoen 2008).
 Changes in the welfare system 
Both Denmark and Norway are universalistic, Scandinavian welfare state 
regimes according to Esping-Andersen’s well-known typology which also 
includes the continental or corporatist welfare state regime and the liberal 
welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). Several important changes 
have taken place in recent decades, but here the focus will be on three is-
sues all related to the labour market: the introduction of occupational pen-
sions; activation policies – that is, the ‘recommodiﬁ cation’ or the transition 
from passive beneﬁ ts to active measures; and further education and train-
ing. Th ey cover only a minority of the relevant areas, but include some of 
the most important reforms in the recent development of work and welfare 
in the two countries. In this section the focus is mainly on policy content 
but it also includes information on policy processes, among them the issue-
speciﬁ c corporatism (meso-corporatism) mentioned above.
Denmark 
As a universal Scandinavian welfare state, issues such as pensions have 
not traditionally been related to the individual’s position in the labour 
market as in Denmark’s southern neighbours. However, with the spread 
of occupational pensions, this has started to change.
 The first occupational pension2 fund was established in 1900, but no 
more than a third of employees were covered by the 1980s. Extensive tri-
partite work on pensions in the 1980s prepared the ground and established 
a consensus for a breakthrough in the collective bargaining round of 1991. 
In this round of bargaining, the sector federations played a stronger role 
than in previous negotiations. The sectoral pension funds took the form 
of investment companies with capital and labour equally represented in 
the board and a trade union chairmen – a bipartite construction that the 
employers could also accept.
 The percentage of employees covered by occupational pensions, as well 
as the percentage of employees’ income paid to the funds, have increased 
during the 1990s. In 2003, it was estimated that 92 of all employees were 
covered, although not to the same extent. Referring to these calculations, 
the social democratic government found no need to introduce additional 
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legislation as promised by the previous government. This would have ex-
tended occupational pensions to all groups. Importantly, LO also accept-
ed this decision. 
 An even more important change in Danish welfare policy was the grad-
ual development of activation policies.3 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
a marked shift from a predominantly passive policy to a more active poli-
cy took place. Th is transformation was supported by new discourses. Th e 
work capacity and work ethic of the unemployed were called into question, 
and structural unemployment (manpower shortage concurrent with high 
unemployment) was high on the political agenda. Increasingly policymak-
ers did not think it possible to solve the problems of unemployment within 
the framework of the existing employment schemes and support systems. A 
consensus gradually developed that activation policy was part of the cure. 
 The newly elected Social Democratic government therefore introduced 
labour market reform in 1994 (which, however, mainly repeated the rec-
ommendations from a tripartite committee from the previous conserva-
tive-led government). This reform targeted the so-called uninsured un-
employed, i.e. unemployed recipients of the unemployment benefit funds. 
The state-led Public Employment Service (PES) was responsible for their 
activation. From a period characterised by fiscal tightening and politi-
cally accepted high rates of unemployment, compensated by far-reaching 
protection systems (administered by the unions), a giant leap was made 
to an expansive fiscal policy, genuine and early individual education and 
training of the unemployed, plus new regionalised corporatist steering ar-
rangements. Furthermore, the government gradually introduced shorter 
periods of eligibility for unemployment benefit (seven years in 1994, re-
duced to four years in 1999), tougher availability assessments and com-
pulsory activation. The benefit level remained unchanged, but the right 
to unemployment benefit could no longer be regained via activation or 
employment schemes. The maximum period spent in the unemployment 
benefit system was capped at seven years, with the possibility of an ex-
tension of two years’ leave. Moreover, leave schemes for up to one year 
on unemployment benefit were introduced for sabbaticals, childcare and 
training/education in order to reduce the labour supply. These rights ap-
plied to both the employed and the unemployed.4 
 This strategy seemed to be very successful: unemployment was halved 
in five years, without causing any significant bottleneck or inflationary 
problems. However, the 1994 reform was adjusted several times. Each 
adjustment enrolled more and more unemployed persons in activation 
programmes. This was done by progressively tightening the obligation to 
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provide the unemployed with an activation offer, by restricting access to 
the unemployment benefit system, by reducing the total unemployment 
benefit period from seven to four years, and by tougher availability assess-
ments generally. The local authorities’ activation schemes targeting the 
uninsured unemployed developed partly along similar lines to the activa-
tion schemes of the public employment services (PES). That is, activation 
applied to nearly all uninsured unemployed. However, the local authori-
ties’ schemes still differed in terms of instruments and target groups. 
 Th e liberal-conservative government that came to oﬃ  ce in late 2001 
changed the content of activation policy by emphasising more assistance 
in job search and more stress on job training in the private sector, limiting 
the use of education as an activation tool. Moreover, after the reform intro-
duced in 2002, social assistance and social insurance clients were brought 
under the same legislation, and the tri- and multipartite bodies at the cen-
tral level were amalgamated. Finally, the reform led to the increased use of 
new private actors such as temporary work agencies, private training insti-
tutions and consultancies in delivering the activation measures. Yet reform 
measures in 2007 – this time of the local administrative structure – granted 
the municipalities greater responsibility for activation policy, merged the 
PES and the municipalities activation schemes, and reduced the role of so-
cial partners at the regional and local levels even more. 
 Another important dimension of the Danish welfare state is the volu-
minous continuous training system. Its development took oﬀ  when labour 
market training centres – called AMUs – were established in the 1960s. 
Over the years, a range of continuing training courses have been developed, 
some more vocational than others. Th ese numerous courses can be divided 
into vocational adult education and training (in which AMUs are one of 
the cornerstones), general adult education, and training and general educa-
tion (folkeoplysning). Continuous training – including training for the em-
ployed – has been publicly ﬁ nanced to a larger extent than in most other EU 
countries and the level of training and education activities mentioned is the 
highest in the European Union. So-called ‘occupational self-governance’ 
has been the governance model, and bi- or tripartite bodies are found on all 
levels: an intersectoral council advising the minister, sector-based ‘continu-
ous training councils’ as well as boards for the individual schools. 
 The latest continuous training reform in 2001 introduced the (tripar-
tite) Board for the Labour Market Financing of Education and Training. As 
part of the reform’s aims to concentrate public finances on the less skilled 
and on formal or recognised competences while including more compa-
nies in financing the activities, the board was asked to give advice on the 
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total volume of continuous education, the financing of the activities and 
how the different activities should be weighted. If it is foreseen that the 
activities will exceed the budgetary limit, the board has the opportunity 
to request additional funding from employers. This is in line with another 
tendency to increase the role of the social partners in continuous training, 
namely the introduction or extension of employees’ rights to take part in 
continuous training (Due et al. 2005).
 The preparation of the 2001 reform took place without the participa-
tion of the social partners in the pre-legislative committee that concluded 
its work in 1999. However, the white paper was discussed in the ‘Tripartite 
Forum’ and its aﬃ  liated Statistical Committee (see above). During the ne-
gotiations, the social partners agreed with most elements of the reform as 
proposed in the white paper, including the guidelines for the Labour Mar-
ket Financing of Education and Training, which later became one of the 
new features in the reform (Due et al. 2005). Hence, what started out as a 
process from which the social partners were excluded ended up as a con-
certed process. More recently in autumn 2004, civil servants published an 
in-depth study of continuous training in Denmark, which formed the start-
ing point for tripartite negotiations in early 2006. Th ese negotiations led to 
a tripartite declaration of intent that might again lead to an agreement on 
large-scale reform in this area in the coming years in order to have the social 
partners carry a greater part of the ﬁ nancial burden of continuous training. 
In the private sector, collective bargaining was established as planned in 
2007. Since 2008, all employers in the manufacturing industry have been 
obliged to pay approximately 35 euros per employee to the fund annually – 
an amount to be doubled in 2009. From 2009, employees with more than 
nine months’ seniority will be entitled to have up to two weeks of continu-
ous training – of their own choice – ﬁ nanced from the funds. Agreements 
on higher contributions to the fund are expected in later bargaining rounds 
(Due & Madsen 2006; DI & CO-industri 2007; Mailand 2008). 
Norway
Active social and labour market policy has not had such a strong profile 
in Norway as in Denmark, and in 2004 spending on active labour market 
policy stood at 0.4 of GDP and passive measures at 0.5 – the compa-
rable figures for Denmark were 1.8 and 2.7 (OECD 2006: 271-274).5 In 
Norway, the way to fulfil the aim of full employment was through regional 
policies and state funding of enterprises in difficulty combined with the 
income policy described above in the 1960s and 1970s, whereas active and 
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passive labour market policies played a larger role in the Danish attempt 
to cope with their unemployment figures that were higher than in Norway 
(Halvorsen & Jensen 2004: 467). 
 Norway did, however, develop some active measures and when unem-
ployment increased in the early 1980s, the maximum benefit period was 
increased. At the end of the 1980s, the discourse started to change and 
the ‘work line’ (arbeidslinjen) began to underline the incentives to work, 
rights and duty. At the same time, the obligation to work was strength-
ened and the maximum period for receiving unemployment benefit was 
reduced to three years in 1998 and to two years in 2003 (Arbeids- og So-
cialdepartementet 2005). Compared with Denmark’s activation policy, in 
Norway more attention has been paid to letting the unemployed take part 
in training, subsidised employment and other ‘second chances,’ and more 
emphasis has been put on benefit sanctions, the tightening of eligibility 
rules and so on (see also Halvorsen & Jensen 2004: 474).
 The role of the social partners in activation policy is not as developed 
as in Denmark, but nevertheless the social partners do have influence 
through a number of tripartite bodies at the national as well as local level.
 One of these areas is continuous training (training of people in work). 
This area is covered by a corporatist tradition in that the social partners 
as a general rule are involved in policy formulation and – through their 
representation on boards – in policy implementation through the 130 lo-
cal training centres (European Commission 2003). Moreover, training has 
become a bargaining issue for the social partners at the peak-level as well 
as at the sector level (Skule et al. 2002: 273). 
 The latest large-scale reform in the continuous training area is the 
Competence Reform of 1998. This reform cannot strictly be said to be 
sector-specific in that it was agreed upon in connection to an income 
policy agreement (see above). The initiative for the reform came from the 
trade union confederation LO, which had identified continuous training 
as one of its prime targets. The LO and NHO (the employers’ confedera-
tion) had already agreed to add a separate chapter on continuous training 
in the 1994 Basic Agreement, and in 1996 the parliament called on the 
government to set up a committee to prepare reform measures for lifelong 
learning. Hence, the reform was prepared in the Buer committee set up 
with strong social partner representation. The committee’s report from 
1997 identified the workplace as the most important site for learning and 
called for, inter alia: a strong role for the social partners in the design of 
the coming reform, including the funding issue; recognition of informal 
competences; and the right for employees to take study leave (ibid.: 271). 
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The reform was passed by parliament and included the elements called 
for by the committee as well as tax exemption for employers financing 
education and other elements (European Commission 2003).
 To support the implementation of the reform, the issue of continu-
ous training became part of the following bargaining rounds. In the 1999 
bargaining round, LO again agreed to exchange wage restraint for an im-
provement in continuous training. The government promised to spend 
400 million NOK on a Competence Building Program. However, an agree-
ment could not be reached on a model for financing educational leave. In 
the 2000 bargaining round, continuous training was again on the table. 
This time LO proposed that wage restraint should be traded off against 
the employers’ financing of life subsistence during educational leave. But 
the parties did not agree on this, and the LO leaders’ proposal was later 
turned down in a ballot of LO members. The members did not accept 
the idea of trading wages for continuous training – they preferred higher 
wages and longer holidays (Skule et al. 2002: 271).
 As in Denmark, occupational pensions have become one of the recent 
decade’s most controversial topics in the welfare and work area, but much 
later than in its southern neighbour. It is only within the last two or three 
years that a new pension system has crystallised.
 Compared with the situation in Denmark, the reform of the occupa-
tional pension system in Norway has been much more integrated in an 
overall effort to recast all forms of pensions at once. In 2001, a pension 
committee was set up to consider ‘the main objectives and principles of 
an integrated future pension system,’ including a division of responsibil-
ity between the state and non-state pensions and the possibility of intro-
ducing a fund-based system. The committee – which had the participa-
tion of experts but not of the social partners – recommended a stronger 
employment-dependent element in the pension system (Neergaard 2004). 
In 2005, Parliament finally decided that all employees should have a statu-
tory right to occupational pensions – in 2003 only an estimated 55 of all 
employees had obtained that right (Van het Kaar & Grünell 2004). The 
minimum contribution from companies was set at 2 of the salary.
 Changes in corporate governance and the tax regime
As with the welfare system it is not possible to cover all aspects of cor-
porate governance. Hence, the following will mostly focus on the pres-
ence and regulation of multinational corporations (MNCs) and corporate 
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taxes. Since the issue of corporate governance partly overlaps with tax 
regimes, we will analyse these two under the same heading.
Denmark 
Regarding the issue of corporate governance, it is notable that MNCs rep-
resent only around 1 of all private companies in Denmark but 16 of 
employees and 17 of turnover. Hence, they are much larger than the av-
erage Danish company. The average MNC has 74 employees, whereas the 
average Danish company has only four employees (Navrbjerg 2006). 
 Along with the other Nordic countries, Denmark is traditionally ranked 
among the top countries with the most competitive economies in the 
world. Most recently in the Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005 
released by the World Economic Forum, Denmark was ranked the fifth 
most competitive economy in the world. In 2005, corporate taxes were 
reduced to 28  (Aarnsted & Koch 2005). 
 A special kind of MNC has attracted a great deal of attention in recent 
years – the private equity firm (kapitalfonde). It is usually understood to 
be a financial buyer that aims to buy a company with a view to selling it 
at a surplus.Private equity firms are feared as ‘tough’ employers without 
any interest in investing for the long term in the companies they buy. It is 
difficult to gauge how active this special form of MNC is in Denmark, but 
estimates of the amount involved were USD 112 million in 2007 and USD 
192 million in 2008. Most of them are found within the manufacturing 
industry (Navrbjerg 2008). 
 From an international perspective, the Danish tax regime is charac-
terised by a relatively heavy tax burden (approximately 50 of GDP) as 
well as a relatively high proportion of revenues from personal taxes and 
low proportion of revenues from property taxes and social security taxes. 
Moreover, as Table 3.1 indicates, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 
have been increasing during the last 20 years – from 44.1 in 1985 to 
50.3 in 2005. This level is one of the highest in the OECD countries 
(OECD 2007).
 In 1987, the first of a number of tax reforms was introduced. Prior to the 
tax reform of 1987, the Danish tax system was characterised by high mar-
ginal tax rates with fairly narrow tax bases. Personal income taxation was 
based on a single income definition, taxable income, which included all 
types of income and deductions. In this system, negative capital income 
was taxed at the margin for all households, implying very low or negative 
real after-tax interest rates on household savings. The tax system also 
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contained loopholes that narrowed the tax base, such as the tax exemp-
tion of certain capital gains on shares. The corresponding high marginal 
tax rates on wage income and very generous deductions for especially in-
terest expenditures caused severe distortions in terms of low labour sup-
ply and low private sector financial savings. The 1987 reform involved a 
shift in the structure of taxation from labour income to the consumption 
of natural resources by lowering personal income taxation and increasing 
green taxes. The aim of lowering income taxation has, however, partly 
been offset by the gradual increase in local government tax rates during 
the period. The increase in corporate taxation in the reforms has been 
offset by other measures over the period, in particular a general decrease 
in the corporate tax rate from 50 in 1987 to 30 in 2001 (Jensen 2001). 
In order to make work pay, the 1990s also saw the introduction of a job 
allowance (tax deduction for earned income). 
 The cornerstone of the present Liberal-Conservative government’s tax 
policies is a freeze on taxes that has been in effect since 2002. The tax 
freeze entails that a tax or duty may not increase, regardless of whether 
it is determined as a percentage or a nominal amount. However, income 
taxes are still relatively high. To support economic growth and to further 
expand the labour supply, the government will lower taxes on (earned) 
income. To improve work incentives and to make work pay, the job allow-
ance was already raised from 2.5 to 4.25 of individual income, and the 
marginal tax rate was reduced by raising the income threshold for the 6 
middle income tax (Regeringen 2007).
Norway6 
In 2006, 17 of the employees in the private sector in Norway worked in 
foreign-owned enterprises – a figure similar to the Danish one. 
 In terms of the business environment, investment conditions in Nor-
way are generally favourable. The country has an open, stable economy 
with no foreign exchange controls and a sound macroeconomic policy. 
The corporate tax rate is 28, which is below the EU15 average of 31. As a 
party to the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement and a member of 
international organisations such as the OECD, the WTO and the IMF, the 
country is firmly integrated into the international system of rules regulat-
ing investment and trade.
 In accordance with the EEA agreement, foreign nationals and foreign-
owned companies are free to acquire real estate in Norway as well as 
shares in Norwegian companies without any government interference. 
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This is, however, a fairly recent development. In 1995, the Law on In-
dustrial Acquisitions (Erhvervsloven) replaced the relevant paragraphs in 
the Concession Law of 1917 (Industrikonsesjonsloven) under which foreign 
acquisitions of real estate or shares of companies holding rights to real 
estate in Norway required a government concession. Under the new law, 
the concession requirements were replaced by a reporting system which 
required any acquisition of more than one third of a Norwegian company 
– by foreign and Norwegian actors alike – to be reported to the govern-
ment. The Law on Industrial Acquisitions was abolished in 2002. This 
means that general regulations on foreign industrial ownership in Norway 
no longer exist.
 Fiscal incentives and tax breaks for FDI are currently absent from the 
Norwegian system. In terms of non-regulatory measures such as proac-
tive investment promotion and facilitation along with targeted grants, 
Norway has taken a rather passive approach, and these measures do not 
feature in the current policy. 
 In terms of cultural attitudes vis-à-vis FDI, there seems to be some 
variation between public and political opinion. While the general public 
tends to view foreign ownership as a threat to national interests, poli-
cymakers are generally less categorical. The fear of losing control over 
national resources is no doubt present, but FDI is at the same time ac-
knowledged as an important source for inflows of capital, technology and 
competence.
 From an international perspective, the Norwegian tax regime is marked 
by a heavy tax burden with income tax as the most important source, but 
both the tax burden and the composition of the revenue is closer to the 
OECD average than the Danish equivalents (OECD 2004). 
 Th e most important of the recent tax reforms took place in 1992. Th e 
basic aim was to reduce tax-induced distortions by lowering statutory tax 
rates and to broaden the tax base, thereby making it revenue- and distri-
bution-neutral. By broadening the tax base in the direction of a more ac-
curate measurement of income, it was hoped that the diﬀ erentials in the 
taxation of diﬀ erent activities would be reduced. Th e reform aﬀ ected the 
taxation of wage earners, the self-employed and corporations. Th e maxi-
mum marginal tax rate on labour income was reduced from 57.8 to 49.5 
(and from 64.9 to 52.4 for the self-employed), and the marginal tax rate 
on capital income was reduced from 40.5 to 28 (Aarbu & Th oresen 1997). 
 Since the 1992 reform, income tax has been levied on two different 
concepts of income: general income and personal income. In this dual 
income tax system, capital income earned by personal taxpayers is taxed 
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as general income at a flat tax rate of 28, while income derived from 
labour and pensions is taxed progressively as personal income (with the 
top rate at 64.7 in 2004). The flat 28 tax rate is also applied to the in-
come of limited companies and other corporate taxpayers. To bridge the 
gap between the tax rates of general and personal income, the 1992 tax 
reform introduced a ‘split model’ in which a part of the taxable income of 
self-employed individuals was deemed to be capital income and subject 
to the 28 tax only and the residual income treated as personal income 
subject to progressive tax rates. This split model also applied to income 
earned by partnerships and limited companies where two-thirds or more 
of the partnership or company in question was owned by active partners 
or shareholders (Ministry of Finance 2007). 
 This split model did not work as was intended. Over the years, the rate 
differential between taxes on general and personal income increased sig-
nificantly, from 28.1 percentage points in 1992 to 36.7 percentage points 
ten years later. In 2005 the centre-right government introduced yet an-
other reform that, inter alia, saw a reduction of the marginal tax rates of 
labour income (personal income), and also made these rates applicable 
on profits exceeding risk-free returns in solely owned enterprises – i.e. 
self-employed individuals (ibid.). The present Labour government has 
introduced a tax ceiling similar to the Danish one, which has especially 
benefited homeowners because of increasing housing prices. 
But there are still differences with the development in Denmark. The total 
tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has hardly increased during the last 
20 years and is still around 43 – much lower than in Denmark (OECD 
2007). Moreover, despite similarities in some ways, the tax revenue dis-
tribution between sources differs in that social security makes up a larger 
– and income tax a smaller – percentage of the total revenue in Norway 
than in Denmark.
Table 3.1 Development of tax revenue in Denmark and Norway from 1985 to 2005, in 
percent
1985 1995 2005
Denmark 44.1 48.8 50.3
Norway 42.7 40.9 43.7
OECD average 32.7 34.9 36.2
Source: OECD (2007e)
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 Conclusions
Having described the development of the five selected features – corpo-
ratism, welfare state, labour market regulation, corporate governance and 
tax regime – in Denmark and Norway, the state and development of these 
features will now be compared in terms of the typology distinguishing a 
liberal and a negotiated economy (NE). The latter should be understood 
as a sub-type of the CME as it has been proposed by Pedersen (e.g. 2006) 
and Campbell and Pedersen (2007). This type resembles the corporatist 
type put forward in the introduction to this volume.
 According to Campbell and Pedersen, not only Denmark and Norway 
but also Finland and the Netherlands can be labelled an NE. An NE can be 
specified with respect to at least three core features all related to corpo-
ratism:
1 Firstly, in an NE, corporatism is not necessarily centralised and thus 
can also take a decentralised form. This fits well the above descrip-
tion that illustrated the importance of sub-national levels (the sec-
toral level, the meso-level, the regional level and the firm level) for 
corporatism in Denmark and Norway. 
2 Secondly, according to Campbell and Pedersen, the policy learning 
processes in these countries have included interests other than capital 
and labour. This has facilitated mobilisation of consensus around ‘the 
national strategies for international competitiveness.’ However, this 
statement only partly fits with the presentation of corporatism above. 
Apart from the social partners, it is mainly organisations of the local 
authorities that have been closely involved in the work and welfare re-
lated areas presented – the involvement of NGOs and other interests 
has been modest. In most cases the social partners still have privi-
leged access, even though it has been weakened to some extent. But 
in other areas such as environmental policies, housing policy, health 
policy and agricultural policy, other interest organisations than the 
social partners have a stronger say, at least in Denmark (e.g. Blom-
Hansen & Daugbjerg 1999).
3 Thirdly, the traditional corporatist arrangement has developed into 
what – with inspiration from Visser & Hemerijck (1997), Traxler et al. 
(2001) and Molina & Rhodes (2002) – is called ‘trimmed corporatism.’ 
This form of corporatism includes four elements: an ideology empha-
sising the importance of adapting to the international competition; a 
multilevel system of interest organisations involved in policymaking, 
policy implementation and ‘policy fine tuning’; a collective system of 
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knowledge generation that supports the national consensus on a com-
petitive strategy. Again, this description fits well with the develop-
ments described in Denmark and Norway. 
In sum, the NE ideal type delivers a seemingly trustworthy third position 
to the two models included in the Varieties of Capitalism approach – even 
though the NE is a variant of the CME.
Policy process – corporatism 
The emphasis in this contribution was put on corporatism which should 
be seen as a form of policy process – and less on the policy content in the 
four areas described. 
 It is possible to conclude that corporatism is still alive and kicking in 
both Denmark and Norway. The institutional set-up around industrial re-
lations and the policy areas in focus have been restructured, but as a gen-
eral rule the social partners have been involved both in the defining and 
restructuring processes and implementing them, even though in general 
their role has been reduced. Hence, the two countries are in this regard 
clearly still closer to the NE than to the LME model.
 Th ere are a large number of similarities between the two countries, both 
in the context of coporatist arrangements and corporatism itself. Firstly, the 
labour market parties are still relatively strong, both countries are consen-
sus seeking and – after economic ups and downs – both have experienced 
more than ten years of employment growth. Secondly, the social demo-
cratic party has been a key player in both countries, and despite long peri-
ods in opposition in recent years, egalitarian norms are still dominant. Th e 
right-wing governments have not dismantled the welfare state. Th ey have 
rightly restructured it, but so have the social democratic-led governments 
too – and they have been no less willing to include the social partners in the 
processes than the social democrats. Th irdly, corporatist arrangements in 
both countries are widespread in the three welfare-policy areas analysed, 
even though variations are found between areas, periods and between the 
two countries. Furthermore, it seems that the actors in both countries have 
addressed similar challenges in the three welfare areas in focus.
 There are also a number of important differences in the regulation of 
the two countries and with regard to where corporatism is found. The 
state has played a much more active role in setting wages in Norway than 
in Denmark, and tripartite income-policy agreements are much more 
widespread in Norway. Hence, Norway seems to be a more ‘traditional’ 
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corporatist country in that peak-level corporatism has remained strong 
decade after decade. 
 On the other hand, meso-level corporatism (corporatism related to 
specific policy areas or issues) seems to be weakened and weaker in the 
three selected areas in Norway than in Denmark. This finding is sup-
ported by a recent comparative analysis that shows that the number of 
boards and committees that involve social partners has decreased in Nor-
way since the 1970s, which is not the case in Denmark (Christensen et 
al. 2008). Because Denmark combines voluntarism in industrial relations 
with neo-corporatism in welfare state issues (see also Mailand 2005), and 
meso-level corporatism has not weakened, Denmark represents weaker 
peak-level corporatism and stronger meso-level corporatism, whereas the 
opposite situation is the case in Norway.
 Furthermore, there might be yet another difference related to the 
stronger involvement of the state in industrial relations in Norway. In 
Denmark, corporatism has a strong informal component (see e.g. Due 
& Madsen 1996; Pedersen 2006) meaning that bi- and tripartite coordi-
nation often takes place beyond formal corporatist bodies. The stronger 
state involvement in industrial relations and the more developed formal 
institutions for this in Norway might result in a different balance between 
formality and informality in Norwegian corporatism than in the Danish 
one. However, it is not possible from the descriptions above to tell if this 
is the case or not.
 The question arises whether corporatism can be sustained in these 
two countries. Contrary to the ad hoc social pacts experienced since the 
1990s in countries lacking strong social partners, it is difficult to imagine 
Scandinavian corporatism without strong social partner organisations. 
Membership is declining in both countries but is still high, and the social 
partners still have privileged access to the government in most policy ar-
eas, even in those areas where influence has been reduced. Moreover, the 
social partners’ role in the regulation of wages and working conditions is 
not weaker now than in the past. Challenges such as offshoring, demo-
graphic changes, changes of governments, different forms of marketisa-
tion, fluctuating business cycles, and – especially in Denmark – pressure 
from companies to decentralise industrial relations have transformed the 
established models of regulation but have far from dismantled them. Fur-
thermore, in recent years corporatist arrangements have been seen in new 
areas such as labour migration.
 So, despite its partial dismantling, corporatism is still a relevant term 
for the regulation of work and welfare in Scandinavia. It is likely that there 
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will be such a feature as Scandinavian corporatism, if not for another cen-
tury, at least for the coming decade. However, if the present slow decline 
in the trade unions’ organisational density in Denmark and Norway de-
velops into rapid decline, the future for Scandinavian corporatism might 
seem more troubled. 
Policy areas – labour market, welfare state, corporate governance and 
tax regime 
The labour market legislation area is also marked by similarities with 
strong roles for the social partners. Legislation plays a stronger role in 
Norway, regulation is more centralised, and employment protection is a 
bit stricter and has moved less in a liberal direction than in Denmark. 
However, in neither country is the regulation among the most liberal in 
the OECD, despite Denmark’s label as a ‘flexicurity’ best case. In sum, nei-
ther Denmark nor Norway present clear examples of NE or LME when it 
comes to labour market legislation. Denmark is in a middle position lean-
ing towards the liberal ideal type, whereas Norway is in a middle position 
leaning towards the coordinated ideal type.
 Regarding welfare state policy, only the development in social and la-
bour market policies were analysed. Both countries are universalistic, so-
cial-democratic welfare states. However, decommodification in this area 
has been replaced by recommodification policies where citizen-based 
universal rights to social assistance as well as to social security have been 
modified by the right-and-responsibility turn. This development, which 
can be seen as a move in a liberal direction, has been more marked in 
Denmark than in Norway. However, the development in Denmark has 
more elements of providing the unemployed with new competences 
through the activation schemes, whereas the Norwegian schemes seems 
to be more of the ‘work-first’ type, which can also be seen as leaning more 
towards the LME. 
 There have not been substantial changes in relation to corporate gov-
ernance. Both countries are relatively open to foreign direct investment, 
but neither offer tax breaks or other special economic incentives to for-
eign investors. It is not all status quo, however. In Denmark, a high tax 
country, there has been a rising awareness of multinational companies’ 
attempts to reduce their tax burden through ‘creative financial manage-
ment’, but at the same time corporate tax has been reduced. Moreover, 
both countries have witnessed an increase in FDI. The tax regime in both 
countries is characterised by an above-average tax burden. The burden 
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is highest in Denmark and builds more on income tax and less on social 
contributions than in Norway. Again, the countries seem to be situated 
within the NE type. Reforms have also taken place in Denmark in order 
to ‘make work pay’, and the income tax dimension has been reduced by 
introducing green taxes, among others. In sum, recent changes in the tax 
regime in Denmark can be seen as a modest step in the direction of the 
liberal type, whereas the changes in Norway do not represent important 
changes. 
 The developments in these five areas are summarised in Table 3.2. It 
shows that although both Denmark and Norway both fall within the NE 
model, features that have similarities with the liberal market economy 
have existed for years and changes that can be seen as taking these capital-
ist economies closer to the LME have taken place during the last 20 years 
– but maybe more so in Denmark than in Norway.
What neither the VoC nor the NE approach tells us, though, is why there 
have been changes in the two Scandinavian countries in a more ‘liberal’ 
direction and why these changes seem to have been stronger in Den-
mark than in Norway – at least in relation to the dimensions presented 
here. These changes towards ‘liberalisation’ have been noticed in other 
recent studies of European political economies (Streeck 2008; Howell 
2003; Coates 2005; Hall & Thelen 2009). Some of these authors, how-
ever, discuss to what extent it really is the same path that is followed 
and whether the directions of change and the destinations are the same. 
In the case of Denmark and Norway, it is certain that the changes in 
a liberal direction have not transformed the two countries into liberal 
market economies.
Table 3.2 Varieties of capitalism, state and development in Denmark and Norway
Denmark Norway
Corporatism NE ( LME) NE (  LME)
Labour market legislation LME/NE (in most regards LME) NE/LME 
Welfare state NE  LME NE  LME
Corporate governance and tax regime NE ( LME) NE 
( ) = limited development 
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 Notes
 In some newer publications well developed lifelong learning is added as a 
fourth leg of the Danish flexicurity model. 
 The section on occupation pensions builds on Due & Madsen ().
 Where nothing else is stated the source of this section is Larsen & Mailand 
(). 
 The favourable conditions for taking leave were reduced significantly during 
the s, and sabbatical leave has now been abolished.
  is the latest year with comparable figures between these two countries. 
 The source of the following presentation of corporate governance in Norway 
is Aanstad & Koch (). 
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4 Coming Together But Staying Apart
 Continuity and Change in the Austrian and Swiss Varieties of 
Capitalism
 Alexandre Afonso and André Mach
 Introduction1
Austria and Switzerland are two small open European economies that 
share many similarities but also significant differences in their structures 
of economic governance. Both can be considered as strongly corporatist, 
since major aspects of their economic regulation rely upon a system of 
organised cooperation between labour and capital, but their respective 
positions on the “liberal” and “statist” axis (see Becker, this volume) vary 
to an important extent.
 On the one hand, Austria and Switzerland have most commonly been 
identified as political economies where cooperation between economic 
actors has prevailed over arms-length competition. According to Katzen-
stein (1984; 1985), the dual strategy of external laissez-faire and domestic 
interventionism pursued by small European states was made possible by 
the co-operative stance prevailing among political and economic elites. 
Similarly, in the classification scheme of the varieties of capitalism ap-
proach (Hall & Soskice 2001), both countries are labelled coordinated 
market economies (CMEs), where non-market mechanisms of coordina-
tion play a crucial role in the setup of relations between economic actors. 
Aspects particularly worth mentioning are highly coordinated industrial 
relations, corporatist institutions (Katzenstein 1985) as well as a high de-
gree of cartelisation in the domestic product market (Schröter 1999) and 
in the rules governing corporate governance (David & Mach 2004). In this 
perspective, both Austria and Switzerland are good examples of political 
economies where cooperative mechanisms of coordination have played a 
central role in the organisation of production processes. 
 On the other hand, the Austrian and Swiss political economies also 
display important differences in their underlying institutional arrange-
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ments and power relationships. Most importantly, market mechanisms 
and private solutions have played a more privileged role in Switzerland 
than in Austria, where political control over the economy has been great-
er. Along this latter line, Katzenstein (1984; 1985) already made a distinc-
tion between the liberal variant (Switzerland, the Netherlands and Bel-
gium) and the social variant (Austria, Denmark, Norway) of democratic 
corporatism. These two variants differed in the respective strengths of 
their employer and labour organisations. Switzerland was considered the 
most liberal example, with weak trade unions, well organised and strongly 
export-oriented employers, and essentially private adaptation strategies 
designed within strongly cohesive business organisations. Austria, known 
for its “Austro-Keynesianism” combining fiscal, monetary and incomes 
policy throughout the post-war decades (Scharpf 1991), appeared to be 
the foremost example of social corporatism, with strong trade unions 
entertaining close ties with a dominant social-democratic party, weaker 
business associations dominated by SMEs, and public adaptation strate-
gies. In Austria, the state has traditionally played a predominant role in 
shaping economic change, notably through an important industrial sec-
tor under public control. By contrast, in Switzerland, a much less inter-
ventionist central state combined with a powerful coordination potential 
among business interests has been a dominant feature in the organisation 
of the political economy.
 This chapter assesses institutional continuity and change in these two 
countries. In the face of growing internationalisation, budgetary con-
straints and European integration, continuity and change have been de-
termined by prevailing interest configurations and institutional limits in 
terms of public intervention and private governance. Hence, the domi-
nance of private employers in Switzerland has fostered rapid change in 
areas where private regulation prevailed, such as corporate governance, 
whereas institutional veto points have strongly limited change in areas 
where public intervention was necessary. By contrast, the larger scope 
of public intervention in Austria and its more majoritarian features have 
allowed more space for change in welfare reforms, while the strong insti-
tutionalisation of corporatist institutions in labour market governance, 
for instance, has made it more resilient to change than Switzerland. In 
this respect, Austria and Switzerland provide good examples of how insti-
tutional change is dependent on the respective share of public regulation 
and private governance.
 This chapter is structured as follows. We first briefly outline economic 
performance and macro-institutional frameworks in both countries. The 
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next sections assess the dynamics of continuity and change in the differ-
ent spheres of their political economies: corporate governance and eco-
nomic regulation, labour market and industrial relations, and the welfare 
state. For each sphere, we assess the extent and type of change in a com-
parative perspective.
 Performance and institutional regime
Austria and Switzerland have displayed fairly similar positive results in 
terms of macroeconomic performance (see Table 4.1). Besides high em-
ployment ratios, especially for Switzerland, unemployment has never ex-
ceeded 5 during the last thirty years. In the case of Switzerland, econom-
ic growth remained modest during the 1990s in comparison with other 
European countries (for more details, see Bonoli & Mach 2000; Hemerijck 
et al. 2000; Merrien & Becker 2005). By contrast, this was compensated 
to some extent in Austria by its entry into the EU in 1995 and the opening 
of new markets in Central and Southeastern Europe. Concerning their 
employment structure, the proportion of industrial jobs has declined but 
remains above the OECD average. Both economies also became much 
more dependent on their external economic environment, with a steady 
increase in exports as a share of GDP and the increasing importance of 
outward foreign direct investment, particularly in the Swiss case (see Ta-
ble 4.2 below). 
Structuring factors in political economies can be grasped through the 
macro-institutional regime – the political system and the main political 
players including those of capital and labour – and the sectoral regimes 
Table 4.1 Macroeconomic performance
Austria Switzerland
1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s
1. Real GDP growth (%) 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.3 1.1 1.9
2. Infl ation (%) 3.8 2.4 2.0 3.3 2.3 1.0
1. Employment ratio (%) 63.8 67.3 68.2 76.7 84.0 84.0
2. Unemployment (%) 3.3 3.8 4.4 0.6 3.0 3.5
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2007)
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governing specific spheres such as corporate governance, industrial rela-
tions and the welfare state. The first factor strongly determines the level 
of public intervention and tripartite corporatism possible in a political 
economy. Austria and Switzerland are very different in this respect, which 
accounts to a great extent for the divergent paths of development in their 
varieties of capitalism. In a nutshell, the differences can be summarised as 
fragmented state, constrained executive power and bourgeois dominance 
in Switzerland, and centralised state, stronger executive power and strong 
labour in Austria.
 The great number of institutional barriers to state action in Switzer-
land has fostered extensive private self-regulation strategies in the eco-
nomic sphere, whereas state intervention and public regulations have 
played a more important role in Austria. First, both countries are for-
mally federalist, but Swiss cantons enjoy many more competences (in do-
mains such as health/welfare, education and justice/police) than Austrian 
Länder, which has limited the potential for centralised macroeconomic 
management in Switzerland (Lijphart 1999: 189). Second, due to perfect 
bicameralism and direct democracy, executive power in Switzerland is 
much more constrained than in Austria, which features a more typical 
parliamentary democracy with a weak second chamber. Switzerland, by 
contrast, has been governed by grand coalitions with identical party com-
positions since 1959.
 Given the low level of party discipline, majorities must be built up de-
pending on the issue, which pushes Swiss governments into constant ne-
gotiations with parliamentary factions in a similar fashion to the system 
in the US. On top of this, laws are subjected to a referendum if 50,000 
voters request it. In practice, this gives a veto power to any interest group 
able to gather those signatures. Finally, Austria and Switzerland have di-
verged significantly with regard to power relations between political forc-
es. While in Austria social democracy has taken part in government on an 
equal or dominant basis vis-à-vis the right for 52 years between 1945 and 
2008 (Pelinka 2008: 434), Swiss social democrats have always (continu-
ously since 1943) participated on a minority basis in coalitions dominated 
by centre-right parties. The Swiss labour movement has been structurally 
weaker because of a number of adverse factors: a decentralised economic 
structure, the dominance of small firms, linguistic and religious cleavages 
and the continuous presence of a large foreign workforce – about a quar-
ter of the active population – not endowed with electoral rights.
 At the same time, for its part, Swiss business organised effectively ear-
ly on under the leadership of export industries, finance and banking. In 
COMING TOGETHER BUT STAYING APART
comparison, Austrian business has historically been weaker, mainly as a 
result of political alliances favouring the preservation of agriculture and 
handicraft at the expense of big business, and a large state sector allow-
ing little room for the emergence of private business power (Traxler 1998: 
240). These political constellations have strongly conditioned the priori-
ties of policymaking. Austria carried out a form of centralised macroeco-
nomic management (“Austro-Keynesianism”) until the 1980s. This proved 
fairly successful in managing the oil shocks before being progressively 
abandoned from the 1980s onwards, along with the substantial privatisa-
tion of a hitherto large public industrial sector. Over this period, unem-
ployment rose to about 5 and the government started to implement bud-
getary discipline and to move to a partial retrenchment of social benefits 
(Obinger & Talos 2009). The choice to join the EU in 1995 accelerated the 
reforms toward privatisation and liberalisation; it also implied conform-
ing to the Maastricht criteria concerning public finances and prompted 
austerity measures. 
 By contrast, Switzerland never relied on a Keynesian approach to mac-
roeconomic coordination and has favoured private adaptation strategies 
instead, thereby illustrating the adjustment pattern of “liberal” corporat-
ism as outlined earlier by Katzenstein. Since World War II, Switzerland 
has notably relied on the massive presence of foreign workers with pre-
carious work permits that have continuously constituted a significant part 
of the workforce (from 15 to 25) and allowed for the adjustment of 
the supply of foreign labour to economic conditions up until the 1990s 
(Afonso 2005; Fluckiger 1998). Piotet (1987) characterised this pattern of 
adjustment as “selective corporatism”. Foreign and female workers main-
ly bore the costs of economic downturns, whereas the Swiss male “core” 
workforce remained rather unaffected. In part because of the degree of 
flexibility of the labour market, substantial policy and economic changes 
did not take place in the 1980s. This changed with the recession at the 
beginning of the 1990s, which constituted a turning point in the economic 
evolution of the post-war period (for more details, see Bonoli & Mach 
2000; Merrien & Becker 2005).
 For the first time since the 1930s, unemployment increased sharply, 
reaching more than 4 in 1994, and public debt rose, partially due to slow 
GDP growth. The 1990s were also marked by important debates concern-
ing Switzerland’s relationship to the EU (rejection of the proposal to enter 
the European Economic Area in a referendum in 1992). Within this con-
text, in the early 1990s there was a shift in the political orientation of the 
business community, especially its export-oriented sector. The initiative 
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originated within an informal group of representatives of Switzerland’s 
largest companies, along with several neo-liberal academic economists. 
Switzerland’s competitiveness, they argued, was endangered by regula-
tions and non-competitive arrangements making products and services 
too expensive (for more details, see Mach 2006). Even though the group’s 
proposals were not fully implemented, they largely inspired the orien-
tation of the social and economic policy reforms during the 1990s and 
2000s. This constituted the general framework in which the changes in 
the different spheres of the economy outlined below took place.
 Corporate governance and economic regulation
The increasing liberalisation of product and financial markets at the in-
ternational level during the last thirty years has represented a profound 
change in the economic environment of small European states. Even if 
they could be expected to be less vulnerable to economic globalisation 
because of their longstanding integration in world markets, these dynam-
ics nevertheless represented a profound change in the nature of external 
constraints they had to deal with. They fostered important reforms in the 
field of corporate governance and, more generally, in the nature and scope 
of economic regulation in both countries. 
 Here, we focus our analysis on two dimensions. First, we examine the 
reforms of the national corporate governance system in the two countries 
which plays a crucial role in how companies are controlled and financed. 
Second, we look more broadly at product market regulation, including the 
liberalisation policies carried out by the two countries during the 1990s. 
 Whereas Katzenstein (1985) underlined the importance of corporatist 
institutions and domestic compensation in the strategy of small European 
states to cope with the pressures of international markets, one can also 
identify specific characteristics in their corporate governance systems. 
Two elements are particularly important: the high degree of cohesion of 
the business community and the combination of free trade policies with 
elements of “selective protectionism” (for more details, see David & Mach 
2004). Small European states are generally characterised by dense inter-
firm networks, cohesive business elites and the prevalence of regulations 
designed to preserve national control over large companies in company 
law and financial rules. This applies fairly well to Austria and Switzerland, 
even though the instruments whereby this control was exerted were quite 
different. In the Swiss case, a highly cohesive business community was the 
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major architect of the functioning of the corporate governance system. 
In Austria by contrast, control over the largest companies was essentially 
exercised by the state through state-owned banks and holdings.
 Despite its high degree of internationalisation, the Swiss business com-
munity has maintained significant leeway in its corporate governance – in 
terms of power of decision and control over shareholding – while leading 
positions were kept in the hands of Swiss citizens. Three central elements 
were at the heart of this policy: a high concentration of ownership; a high 
density of interlocking directorates, especially the close relations between 
banks and industry; and the existence of specific protectionist regulations 
(laid down in company law) that allowed for the preservation of domestic 
corporate control in the hands of a small group of insiders (large historical 
shareholders, managers and bank directors).
 Switzerland was often dubbed the “fortress of the Alps” by the in-
ternational financial community (David & Mach 2004; Schnyder et al. 
2005). With the liberalisation of financial markets since the 1980s and the 
opening up of new opportunities for investment, the financial sector has 
gained increasing importance. This change has favoured the emergence 
of new actors (particularly institutional investors) that imposed new con-
straints on large Swiss companies by developing aggressive strategies to 
increase returns on the equity of their portfolio investments. Moreover, it 
also induced “traditional” actors (notably the large banks) to change their 
preferences and strategies. The liberalisation of financial markets and the 
increasing influence of investors emphasising financial liquidity, share-
holder protection and accounting transparency put increasing pressure 
on the Swiss corporate governance system. Its traditional functioning 
was affected on two dimensions: a profound change in the mechanisms of 
control of Swiss companies and the reform of the regulatory framework. 
 First, under pressure from new institutional investors, a gradual disap-
pearance of the traditional mechanisms of control among the largest Swiss 
companies from the end of the 1980s could be observed. Most large com-
panies progressively abandoned their protectionist mechanisms (such as 
voting right distortions) through the simplification of their capital struc-
ture.2 The sharp growth of market capitalisation (see Table 4.3) also indi-
cates the increasing importance of stock markets as capital providers for 
companies, and the growing role of institutional investors in corporate 
control. We can also identify a clear breakdown of the Swiss intercom-
pany network (interlocking directorates) during the 1990s (Schnyder et al. 
2005). This is especially true for the traditionally close ties between large 
banks and non-financial companies. This change is related to the shift in 
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strategy of the largest Swiss banks, whose revenues increasingly stemmed 
from investment banking activities rather than traditional credit practices 
(see Schnyder et al. 2005).
 Second, and alongside the changing practices of the largest companies, 
the regulatory framework was profoundly reformed during the 1990s with 
the reform of company law (1992) and the adoption of a new stock ex-
change law (1996). Even if these did not represent a brutal change and 
were the result of compromises between the decisive actors, the new reg-
ulations imposed changes in traditional corporate governance practices 
towards more transparency in disclosure rules and accounting presenta-
tion (Mach et al. 2007). 
 Changes in the mechanisms of control and the regulatory framework 
led to new strategies among the largest Swiss companies, which were 
much more exposed to the pressure of stock market evaluation and to the 
critical appreciation of institutional investors focusing on the promotion 
of shareholder value. The sharp increase in the amount of profits redis-
tributed to shareholders (through dividend payouts and share buybacks) 
was an important feature of the new strategic orientation of firms during 
the second half of the 1990s. The increase in mergers and acquisitions 
also resulted in huge mergers between some of the largest Swiss multi-
nationals, threatened by potential foreign acquisitions: Ciba and Sandoz 
into Novartis in 1996, UBS and SBS in 1998, Crédit Suisse and Winterthur 
insurance in 1999.
 Many restructurings of major industrial companies also took place. 
These restructurings were generally motivated by the will to concentrate 
the activities of the companies on their core business and to abandon 
less profitable segments. This was the case for ABB, Sulzer or Algroup, 
some of the largest Swiss industrial firms, and also others in the chemical 
and pharmaceutical sectors. These changes were completely in line with 
those who advocate a more “shareholder value” oriented strategy of the 
companies (for more details, Schnyder et al. 2005). With respect to the 
longstanding patterns mentioned above, it is also worth mentioning that 
some important Swiss companies are now controlled by foreign compa-
nies: this is the case for Swiss (the national airline company controlled by 
Lufthansa), Winterthur insurance, Sulzer, Algroup and Serono, which are 
among the most well-known examples. At the same time, Swiss multina-
tional companies saw a strong expansion abroad, which is illustrated by 
the sharp increase in the total outward FDI stocks during the 1990s (see 
Table 4.2).
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In Austria, the issues surrounding the debates on corporate governance 
have been different. The major topic has been the privatisation of the 
large state-owned companies since the mid-1980s. Large Austrian com-
panies are much less internationalised than their Swiss counterparts. This 
is mainly due to the central role of the state, which held controlling ma-
jorities of votes in most large firms (Kurzer 1993: 95) and thus prevented 
Austrian companies from expanding abroad (see Table 4.2 on FDI). This 
central position of the Austrian state in the control and strategy of the 
largest companies goes back to the Nationalisation Acts of 1946 and 1947. 
In 1989, the Austrian state was the largest domestic shareholder of the 
corporations listed on the stock exchange, holding 37.3 of the shares 
(Gugler et al. 2001; Jud 1994: 473).
 The banking sector, which entertains close connections with Austrian 
governmental institutions, is another major actor in the corporate gov-
ernance of large firms. Interlocking directorates are also very common 
in Austria, as many executives of banks are represented on various su-
pervisory boards (Jud 1994: 483ff ). The predominance of the state was 
not challenged until the end of the 1980s. Since state-owned firms pro-
duced mainly raw materials and some heavy machinery, they posed no 
direct threat to small firms, dominated by family ownership, specialised 
in the production of consumer goods and politically close to the ÖVP. 
There was even a degree of complementarity, small firms being supplied 
by large ones in cheap energy, building materials, iron and steel, and es-
sential equipment. For the social-democratic party and the trade unions, 
this system was a way of exerting control over Austrian industry (Kurzer 
Table 4.2 Outward and inward foreign direct investment, 1985-2007 (% of GDP)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2007
Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In
Austria 2.0 5.7 2.7 6.2 5.1 7.6 12.9 15.7 34.0 34.0
Switzerland 27.0 10.8 28.9 15.0 46.3 18.6 92.9 34.7 142.6 65.7
Source: UNCTAD 2008 World Investment Report
Table 4.3 Evolution of market capitalisation, 1975-2005 (% of GDP)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2005
Austria 9 3 7 17 14 15 18 17 14 41
Switzerland 30 42 91 69 130 136 225 260 322 256
Source: OECD Financial Market Trends (various issues)
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1993: 102-103). It is thus not surprising that, in contrast to Switzerland, 
employee representation has played an important role in Austria, organ-
ised along the lines of the German co-determination system (Jud 1994: 
467). 
 Similar to Switzerland, the concentration of ownership was particu-
larly strong in Austria. By international standards, Austria seems to be 
the European country with the highest ownership concentration (Gugler 
et al. 2001). This concentration was strengthened by the existence of the 
state-owned holding (OIAG created in 1970) and the practice of “pyra-
miding” (mainly by banks), which allowed for the extension of control at 
a relatively low cost (Kurzer 1993: chap. 4; Gugler et al. 2001). In its hey-
day in 1975, the OIAG group counted 120,000 employees (approximately 
18 of all persons employed in industry). Twenty years later, the situation 
had changed dramatically: in 1993, the state holding company has been 
transformed into a privatisation agency with the objective of relinquish-
ing its majority stakes. The number of employees of the state holding fell 
to 4,800 as a result of the privatisation programme launched by the gov-
ernment during the 1990s. Even if efficiency increases in the privatised 
companies were officially mentioned as the main objective – especially 
after losses incurred by the nationalised industrial firms during the weak 
growth period of the 1980s – another major reason for this extensive pri-
vatisation programme was to increase public revenues through sellouts in 
order to reduce public deficits (Aiginger 1999; Nowotny 1998).
 In many ways, the privatisations and the disappearance of the state 
holding represented a profound change in the Austrian corporate gov-
ernance system. However, even if the maximising of revenue was a cen-
tral criteria for choosing among the potential buyers, a second criteria 
was also introduced: the continuing operation in Austria of the privatised 
firms. The strategic goal was to keep these companies under Austrian 
influence and to make sure that headquarter functions and the resulting 
qualified employment opportunities would be located in Austria. For ex-
ample, AMAG was sold in 1996 at a negative price to a joint venture con-
sisting of the management and a large, private Austrian company. A kind 
of “national preference clause” was thus granted (Aiginger 1999: 265). In 
parallel with the privatisation programme and in the context of EU mem-
bership, several regulatory reforms concerning financial markets and the 
stock exchange were also adopted during the 1990s. The main objectives 
of these new regulations were to favour the transparency of companies, to 
facilitate financial transactions and to promote the traditionally underde-
veloped Austrian stock exchange.
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 Starting from a very different initial configuration (the presence of large 
multinational companies in Switzerland and the traditional dominance of 
nationalised state-owned companies in Austria), both countries followed 
a more liberal market driven policy in the field of corporate governance. 
This was done through a policy of privatisation and of state withdrawal 
from the major companies in Austria. In Switzerland, the changes were 
mainly the results of the changing strategies of the largest Swiss com-
panies which progressively abandoned their traditional mechanisms of 
control in a new international economic context. Large companies have 
become much more trans-nationalised and subject to the pressure of fi-
nancial markets, Austria to a much lesser extent than Switzerland.
 Product market regulation has also been the subject of important re-
forms since the beginning of the 1990s; both countries followed liberalisa-
tion policies in order to promote competition in their domestic markets. 
In Austria, as a member of the EU, these liberalisation policies were most-
ly underpinned by the implementation of European directives, whereas in 
Switzerland, domestic impulses were more important. In both countries, 
the different indicators measuring the degree of product market regula-
tions distorting the functioning of competition decreased substantially 
from the beginning of the 1990s.
 Despite the emphasis usually put on its liberal character and openness, 
the exposure of the Swiss economy to international markets has been 
significantly mitigated by different measures, such as subsidies (for ag-
riculture), public regulations or private cartels, all of which have facili-
tated non-competitive behaviour while protecting domestic markets from 
international competition. Several studies emphasised how almost two 
thirds of domestic prices were either administered, strongly regulated or 
fixed by private cartels, which helped to explain the high level of domestic 
prices (Hauser & Bradke 1992). Because of changes in the international 
environment during the early 1990s (GATT agreements and European 
economic integration), and because of internal demands to promote com-
petition, heavy pressure was finally applied to a domestic sector increas-
ingly regarded as a “rent-seeking”, non-competitive and structurally weak 
part of the economy. Because of the dual structure of its economy, charac-
terised by the existence of “selective protectionist” mechanisms aimed at 
protecting domestic sectors, liberalisation policies in the domestic mar-
ket took a particularly important place in Switzerland during the 1990s. 
 After the negative result of the referendum on entry into the EEA in 
December 1992, the government launched a programme of “economic 
revitalisation” whose main objective was to reduce production costs in 
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the domestic sectors and enhance competition in the internal market; its 
leitmotiv was: “competitiveness abroad through increasing competition 
on domestic markets” (Mach 2006). One of the key elements of the revit-
alisation programme and inspired by European regulations were reforms 
of the “cartel law” in 1995 and 2003. Although the new law did not for-
mally forbid cartels, it provided clearer guidelines and gave more power 
to antitrust authorities to combat anticompetitive practices. This reform 
faced strong opposition from the Small Business Association (USAM), 
which initially threatened to challenge the new law with a referendum but 
eventually accepted it. The revitalisation programme also included a new 
federal law on the internal market, which was expected to facilitate the 
free movement of goods, services and persons in the Swiss territory, and 
thus to reduce market segmentation across cantons.
 Liberalisation measures further concerned the reform of agricultural 
policy and regulations of public procurement in the context of the GATT 
agreements. Such measures did generate some opposition among organ-
ised interests representing domestic economic sectors. Like all other Eu-
ropean states, though with some delay, Switzerland also decided to lib-
eralise its telecommunications sector (with a partial privatisation of the 
public operator) and, to a lesser extent, postal services before the first 
of January 1998, when the European directive on liberalising telecom-
munications came into force.3 However, a first proposal to liberalise the 
electricity market was refused in a popular vote in 2002 after an optional 
referendum launched by the trade unions and the social democratic party 
(for more details, see Maggetti et al. 2010). 
 In Austria, the first state-owned companies that were privatised at the 
end of the 1980s were not natural monopolies in network industries but 
touched mainly the manufacturing and banking sectors. With the adhe-
sion to the EU in 1995 and the need to comply with its directives, further 
privatisation and liberalisation measures concerned the telecommunica-
tions, postal services and electricity sectors. The general competition leg-
islation was also strengthened during the 2000s, with the creation of a 
new independent federal competition authority in 2002.
 Labour market and industrial relations
In Austria and Switzerland, labour market governance relies heavily on 
a system of cooperation between trade unions and employers, even if 
the extent of this coordination differs between the two countries: strong 
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corporatism in Austria, and “lean” corporatism in Switzerland. By any 
standards, Austria is the corporatist country par excellence. It ranks first 
– ahead of Norway – in all 23 rankings of corporatism in the literature 
reviewed by Siaroff (1999: 184). Even in the case of collective bargaining 
at the sectoral level, organised interests are highly centralised, and the 
outcomes of bargaining apply to the whole economy. Switzerland, for its 
part, has been considered a more ambiguous case as regards its degree of 
corporatism, particularly in terms of the centralisation of interest groups 
(more fragmented on the side of labour) and wage bargaining.4
 Reflecting the different balance of power between business and labour 
in the two countries, the scope of public regulation of employment rela-
tionships is also less extensive in Switzerland than in Austria. Labour law 
in Switzerland has been mostly limited to issues of health and safety at 
work, leaving the central points of employment relationships to collective 
bargaining and collective labour agreement (CLAs); legal constraints on 
hiring and firing have been low in comparative perspective (cf. Becker 
in this volume, Table 1.5a). The degree of public regulation is somewhat 
higher in Austria, but collective bargaining is still the central regulation 
mode, which is reflected in the absence of a statutory minimum wage in 
both countries.5 Social partners have traditionally played a predominant 
role in core areas such as wage setting, the joint elaboration of govern-
mental policy proposals, or vocational education. In this latter domain, 
both countries have a system of dual apprenticeship training (schooling 
and professional practice) involving both public authorities and compa-
nies. Similar to Germany, the system of apprenticeship ensures a smooth 
transition between school and employment through the acquisition of 
specific skills, thereby ensuring low youth unemployment rates in com-
parative perspective (Culpepper 2007; Trampusch 2008a).
 The Austrian system of industrial relations, built after World War II, 
is exceptional in many respects with regards to its structure and institu-
tional anchorage. In its heyday in the 1960s, both prices and wages were 
coordinated in a corporatist fashion through the so-called parity com-
mission, until price control lost its effectiveness in the late 1970s along 
with the increase in imports. It was only formally abandoned in 1994 
(Traxler 1998: 246). Nowadays, despite the international (notably the en-
try in the EMU) and structural pressures that have challenged corporat-
ism elsewhere in Europe, industrial relations in Austria have remained 
remarkably stable in recent decades, mainly thanks to deeply rooted in-
stitutional structures (Traxler 1998: 239). One of these central features is 
compulsory membership of all companies, farmers and wage earners in 
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the system of Chambers, designed as official semi-public bodies of inter-
est representation.
 On the employers’ side, the Economic Chamber (WKO) and its re-
gional affiliates have a monopoly of representation for all companies for 
both wage bargaining and consultation on draft legislation and adminis-
trative orders. On the workers’ side, there is a division of tasks between 
the Chamber of Labour (BAK – Bundesarbeitskammer), which officially 
represents workers’ interests in public policymaking, and the ÖGB (Ös-
terreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) which takes part in collective bargain-
ing. In contrast to the Arbeitskammer, membership in the ÖGB is not 
compulsory. The relations between them are based on an informal divi-
sion of tasks rather than competition. Collective bargaining in Austria is 
conducted almost exclusively at the sectoral level, with a high level of co-
ordination between sectors. The metalworking sector traditionally opens 
the bargaining round and sets the standard for other sectors. 
 The statutory membership of all employers in the Economic Chamber 
is the main mechanism that explains the coverage rates approaching 100 
that have persisted until now (EIRO 2005; Traxler 1998). Since all com-
panies are members of the Economic Chamber, they are all bound by the 
collective agreements negotiated by the peak organisation. This in turn 
extends to all workers independent of whether they are trade union mem-
bers or not. Hence, even if union membership has declined steadily since 
the 1960s (see Table 4.4), this has not had any effect on the level of cover-
age of collective bargaining. However, despite this institutional stability, 
the Austrian system is also faced with a trend of “organised decentralisa-
tion” whereby specific elements are shifted to lower bargaining levels to 
allow for more flexibility across firms (Traxler 1995). For instance, the 
WKO has recently been calling for the suppression of productivity as a 
key pay-setting criterion in collective bargaining, and for the introduc-
tion of profit-sharing schemes at the firm level instead, so that wage in-
creases would be more closely linked to the performance of individual 
firms (EIRO 2008). Despite the high degree of coordination of the system, 
wage inequalities have also been fairly important across sectors, gender 
and employee status.
 In contrast to the relative stability in collective bargaining, fairly rad-
ical changes have been observed in the influence of social partners in 
policymaking in Austria. As argued above, the social partners (BAK and 
WKO) played a predominant role in the formulation of policies. They had 
a legal right to be consulted on any policy proposal through the Begutach-
tungsverfahren (consultation procedure). Policy deals were usually struck 
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behind closed doors between the peak associations in close interaction 
with ruling parties, and parliament was usually a mere rubber-stamping 
institution for corporatist deals. In recent years, however, this system has 
been challenged by the erosion of the electoral base of the two traditional 
parties and the emergence of new parties hostile to corporatism, notably 
the populist FPÖ and the Green Party (Crepaz 1994; Traxler 1998: 258-
259).
 The accession to power of a new “black and blue” (ÖVP/FPÖ) coalition 
in 2000 after nearly thirty years of social-democratic presence in govern-
ment has constituted a turning point in this process. Ruling parties have 
increasingly sought to bypass the veto power of social partners by margin-
alising them in policy procedures, and parliament (as a locus of power for 
ruling parties rather than of social partners) seems to have gained in im-
portance as an agenda-setting arena during this period (Obinger & Talos 
2006; Pelinka 2008). Many reforms inspired by a pro-market agenda have 
been brought forward against their will. Some of these reforms, notably 
in public pensions, were met by protest strikes, which partly accounts for 
the increase of industrial action in the 2000s (see Table 4.4). Besides this, 
the corporatist system has been faced with increasing legitimacy prob-
lems reflected by declining membership. The influence of social partners, 
however, seems to have been restored with the return of a grand coalition 
in 2006 (Afonso 2010b).
 In historical terms, Swiss industrial relations have displayed much 
more liberal features and a lesser degree of coordination than in Austria, 
notably with regard to the centralisation of wage bargaining (Fluder & 
Hotz-Hart 1998: 274). Switzerland has been a contested case of corporat-
ism precisely because of its fragmented organisational base. Traditionally, 
corporatism in Switzerland has been strong with regard to social partner 
involvement in policymaking and somewhat weak with regard to wage 
bargaining as such (Oesch 2007: 339). Even if the Swiss system of indus-
trial relations can be considered a corporatist/coordinated model, it has 
always been a light/liberal variant of it from its early times of develop-
ment. To some extent, it constituted a forerunner of what is now termed 
“competitive” or “supply-side” corporatism, in the sense that labour ac-
quiescence has never been traded with expansionary economic policies 
but rather with more immaterial compensations, like participation rights 
in policymaking (Traxler 2001). Industrial peace was presented as a sine 
qua non for competitiveness in a strongly export-oriented economy.
 Collective bargaining in Switzerland also takes place essentially at the 
sectoral level, while some collective labour agreements are negotiated at 
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the company level for big companies such as major retailers Migros and 
Coop. The coverage of collective bargaining is fairly low in comparative 
terms and covers slightly less than half of the workforce (see Table 4.4). 
The outcomes of collective bargaining may be extended beyond signing 
parties, and made legally enforceable by public authorities if they gather 
more than half of the workers and half of the companies in any given sec-
tor; this has traditionally been the case in the construction sector. Simi-
larly to Austria, though in a much more informal way, the coordination of 
wages across economic sectors mainly takes place through highly organ-
ised sectoral employer organisations (under the umbrella of the peak level 
employer association, Schweizerische Arbeitgeberverband – SAV) (Oesch 
2007: 338; Soskice 1990: 41). In Switzerland, the trade union movement 
has been much more fragmented along religious or occupational lines. In 
2000, the biggest trade union Confederation, the Schweizerischer Gewerk-
schaftsbund (SGB), only gathered about 50 of all trade union members. 
Besides the SGB, there are a number of other smaller trade union confed-
erations, notably for white-collar workers, the Christian federation CNG, 
or specific professions like teachers, police officers or nurses (Mach & 
Oesch 2003: 164).
Despite its already fairly liberal nature, the Swiss system of industrial re-
lations was challenged in the 1990s by the abrupt change in economic 
conditions outlined above, marked by economic stagnation and the rise 
of unemployment to unprecedented levels (Mach 2006). In some sectors, 
like the machine industry, employment shrank by a third. Until then, the 
Table 4.4 Labour market and wage bargaining indicators (decade averages)
Austria Switzerland
1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s
1. Coverage of collective 
bargaining (%)
96.0 99.0 99.0 50.0 47.4 44.8
2. Trade union density (%) 52.1 41.7 34.4 27.9 22.6 20.0
3. Centralisation of wage 
bargaining index (0-1)*
0.917 0.895 0.777 0.385 0.392 0.409
4. Index of strike activity (working 
days lost per 1000 workers)
2.0 3.5 50.0 0.4 1.4 3.4
Source: Visser (2009) and own calculations based on Armingeon et al. (2007)
*With 1 indicating high centralisation and 0 indicating low centralisation.
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Swiss labour market had remained virtually untouched by international 
crises due to the high level of flexibility in the labour supply provided by 
foreign workers (see above). During the 1980s, Switzerland was in a situ-
ation of full employment that could not be found elsewhere in Europe. 
Things changed radically in the 1990s, when unemployment could no 
longer be “exported” due to the stabilisation of the legal situation of for-
eign workers, who were now entitled to unemployment benefits (Afonso 
2005). Changing labour market conditions but also international pres-
sures on the Swiss economy created opportunities for substantial changes 
in the Swiss system of industrial relations and labour market governance 
in general.
 First, there was a decentralisation “offensive” by employers, who asked 
for substantial issues of collective bargaining to be shifted from the sec-
toral to the company or plant level. Between 1991 and 1996, the number of 
CLAs concluded at the firm level increased by 11.5, whereas the number 
of sectoral CLAs declined by 2.5. Since the late 1990s, wage setting and 
working time regulation has been decentralised to the company level in 
important industries such as chemicals, clothing, banking, media print-
ing and, to a lesser extent, watch-making (Mach & Oesch 2003: 166). This 
furthers weakens the position of labour, also because work councils only 
play a marginal role in the Swiss economy. 
 Second, besides changes in the level of bargaining, certain changes also 
took place in its material content. On the one hand, automatic compen-
sation of inflation was removed from many major sectoral agreements 
at the beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, a growing number of 
CLAs provided for individual rather than general wages increases. This, 
combined with higher unemployment among low-skilled workers, con-
tributed not only to a significant amount of wage restraint in the 1990s 
but also to a rise in wage inequalities. General wage increases have almost 
systematically been below inflation, so that actual real incomes have even 
declined during the decade. This has been especially the case for low-
skilled workers, since individual wage increases mainly benefit skilled 
workers. These evolutions have, however, followed different paths across 
sectors, depending on the amount of skill required and their exposure to 
international competition (Mach & Oesch 2003). On the trade union side, 
this changing environment has been met with new strategies, notably 
trade union mergers, an increase in industrial action or a more frequent 
resort to the political sphere (popular initiatives, referendums or legisla-
tive proposals) to compensate for losing ground in the sphere of collective 
bargaining (see for instance Trampusch 2008b; Widmer 2007).
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 With regard to the traditionally very important role of foreign labour, 
the old system of immigration quotas which theoretically allowed pub-
lic authorities to control the supply of foreign workers and adjust it to 
economic conditions was progressively abandoned for EU workers and 
replaced by free movement as part of a series of bilateral agreements with 
the EU (Afonso 2007; Fischer et al. 2002). This opening up induced mas-
sive potential changes in the Swiss labour market due to persisting wage 
differentials between Switzerland and neighbouring countries. In order 
to prevent wage dumping, trade unions asked for a package of “ﬂ anking 
measures” involving the facilitated extension of collective bargaining, the 
possibility of introducing minimum wages and increased labour market 
control in the case of “observed abuse”. Th is package was reluctantly ac-
cepted by employers’ associations and right-wing parties. Hence, despite a 
decentralisation and deregulation trend that started at the beginning of the 
1990s, there has also been some extension of coordination later on in some 
economic sectors in relation to these “ﬂ anking measures”. For instance, the 
number of collective agreements that have been extended and made legally 
binding by the state has increased in recent years. In the face of increased 
competition from EU member states, notably through the posting of work-
ers, the protection of existing standards through legally binding CLAs has 
been perceived by some employers, mainly in the construction sector, as a 
means to protect their market shares (Oesch 2007: 348).
 There has also been evolution with regard to the other side of corpo-
ratism, namely social partner participation in policymaking. Corporat-
ist policymaking seems to have been on the decline due to a number of 
factors: increased ideological polarisation also favoured by a more right-
wing composition of parliament, retrenchment pressures on the welfare 
state, the mediatisation of politics, and the difficulties of traditional so-
cial partners to represent post-materialist values such as gender equality 
(Häusermann et al. 2004). It has been more difficult for social partners to 
reach compromises on issues of social and economic policy, so that after 
the failure of corporatist talks, the reform of pensions or unemployment 
benefits have been ultimately struck in parliament rather than in corpo-
ratist arenas. On the other hand, social partners have played a central role 
in very important recent policymaking processes for the Swiss economy, 
such as the opening up of the labour market to EU workers mentioned 
above (Afonso 2010). Contrary to Austria, the actual veto power given to 
interest groups by the institution of directed democracy has made it dif-
ficult to leave them aside, although patterns may vary across sectors and 
issues (see for instance Mach et al. 2003).
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 As a general picture, changes in the two countries in the sphere of in-
dustrial relations display diverging trends with regard to collective bar-
gaining and participation in policy formulation. The already decentral-
ised system of collective bargaining in Switzerland underwent a further 
decentralisation trend, whereas the highly coordinated Austrian system 
displayed relative continuity. On the other hand, whereas a right-wing 
coalition in Austria marginalised corporatist actors in policymaking, the 
veto power conferred to organised interests by direct democracy ham-
pered this phenomenon in Switzerland, even if the capacity to strike cor-
poratist deals has indeed been challenged.
 Welfare state
Both Austria and Switzerland display the ideal-typical characteristics of 
Bismarckian welfare states, namely eligibility conditioned by labour mar-
ket participation, earnings-related benefits, a system of funding based on 
contributions from wages rather than taxes, and devolved and decentral-
ised policy management (Häusermann 2009; Obinger & Talos 2009). In 
both cases, its functioning tends to favour income compensation rather 
than redistribution as such, and the setting up of funding and benefits 
has been guided by the male breadwinner model. However, due to the 
differences in power configurations and institutional veto points outlined 
above, their welfare states have also displayed significant differences in 
their expansion and timing of development. On the one hand, because 
of the great number of veto points (mainly federalism and direct democ-
racy), the Swiss welfare state has displayed an important delay vis-à-vis 
Austria with regard to the introduction of its core welfare programmes.6 
On the other hand, this institutional context has also slowed down re-
trenchment trends over the last two decades in Switzerland. By contrast, 
the welfare state in Austria has expanded more quickly, but has also re-
cently undergone slightly more important changes because of the lighter 
institutional vetoes on policy change as well as the advent of a new right-
wing ruling coalition in 2000.
 Just like in Germany, the first social security measures (in particular 
social assistance, unemployment benefits, pensions) were introduced in 
Austria in order to pacify an insurgent working class in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, under the Habsburg monarchy and in the inter-
war period (Obinger & Talos 2006: 51ff.). During the Trente Glorieuses, 
the social security net underwent a considerable expansion under the in-
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fluence of a progressive consensus between social democrats and con-
servatives, as well as a powerful labour movement: compulsory social 
protection included an ever greater proportion of workers, notably self-
employed workers. The level of allowances also increased with the expan-
sion of living standards. Between 1955 and 1985, social expenses increased 
from 15.9 to 27 of GDP. These measures not only included passive mea-
sures of protection but also active measures, such as active labour market 
policy, introduced in 1968 (Obinger & Talos 2006: 53). By international 
standards, Austria has displayed an above-average level of social spending 
over the twentieth century. 
 The trajectory of welfare state expansion in Switzerland has been sig-
nificantly different. First, decentralised political structures and the power 
of business interests opposed to state intervention have fostered a frag-
mented, heterogeneous and layered system of social protection mixing 
private, public and semi-public service providers: private companies, 
trade unions, communes and cantons. Welfare state expansion has been 
a “pragmatic bricolage” of different existing social protection schemes 
rather than a real “government masterplan” (Häusermann 2009: 2; see 
also Leimgruber 2008). Until 1945, federal money was only spent in the 
form of subsidies to those different kinds of institutions in the domain 
of health, accident and unemployment. As argued above, the transfer of 
competences from cantons to the federal state was faced with the con-
straints set by federalism and direct democracy, so that the establishment 
of a nationwide system of welfare provision has been very difficult to 
achieve (Obinger 1998).7
 Several measures of expansion have been refused by a majority of 
citizens in referendums over the twentieth century (see the example of 
health insurance in Immergut 1992). A major difference between Aus-
tria and Switzerland has also been the balance between public, semi-
public and private carriers of social protection. This difference is espe-
cially observable in the domains of pensions and health: whereas about 
80 of the Swiss workforce was covered by occupational pension plans 
in 2000, this proportion was only about 16 in Austria (Url 2003). The 
Swiss “three-pillar” system, which combines a system of pay-as-you-go 
public pensions, occupational pensions based on capitalisation, and op-
tional individual savings accounts, has been praised as the way to follow 
for many countries (Leimgruber 2008). Health insurance in Switzerland is 
also exclusively carried out by private companies, and contribution levels 
are not based on incomes; low incomes received public subsidies. Ac-
cordingly, the Swiss welfare state is one of the least redistributive in the 
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OECD, inclusive of the liberal states (Iversen & Stephens 2008: 603; see 
also Häusermann 2009).
 If the institutional framework has influenced the patterns of develop-
ment of the welfare state, it has also conditioned patterns of continuity 
and change over the last two decades. Hence, the extent of changes can 
be considered more important in Austria than in Switzerland, even if 
the direction of changes has shown many similarities. As elsewhere, the 
ageing of societies, transformations in the structure of employment and 
financial difficulties have put welfare states under pressure for reform. 
Faced with rising public deficits and debts caused by problems in large 
parts of state-owned industries in the mid-1980s, the SPÖ/ÖVP coali-
tion that came to power in 1987 implemented a programme of cost con-
tainment that resulted in several measures of welfare retrenchment (for 
instance in eligibility for early retirement) and increased contributions 
(Obinger & Talos 2009: 9).
 In labour market policy, a combination of benefit cutbacks and in-
creased control over the unemployed towards activation was put in 
place. Besides these retrenchment measures, however, a series of new 
benefits in care or health insurance were introduced, and the Austrian 
welfare state did not depart from its central characteristics during this 
period. The real breakthrough may have come in 2000 with the acces-
sion to power of the right-wing ÖVP/FPÖ coalition, that carried out a 
series of reforms along a neoliberal agenda – that is, a paradigm shift 
with regard to Austrian “social corporatism”. A series of cutbacks in un-
employment benefits (lower replacement rate, the end of indexation of 
benefits to inflation and wages) was carried out. A contested reform of 
pensions providing for the abolition of early retirement schemes and an 
increased length of contribution was met by the largest strike movement 
in Austrian history.
 Interestingly, in the long run, the aim was to depart from a pay-as-you-
go system and move more towards a three-pillar system as found in Swit-
zerland. These reforms were met with considerable protest from trade 
unions in 2003, especially because the new coalition tried to implement 
the reforms by bypassing the traditional role of social partners in social 
policies (Obinger & Talos 2006). In sum, a series of retrenchment mea-
sures did take place in Austria, which is reflected to some extent in the 
evolution of social expenditures that slightly decreased between 1995 and 
2003 (see Table 4.5).
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Even though it was faced with fairly similar challenges, the Swiss wel-
fare state did not undergo such radical changes as early as in Austria, at 
least in terms of retrenchment. On the economic side, Switzerland was 
not faced with major disturbances on the labour market until the begin-
ning of the 1990s, so that major pressures for welfare state reform came 
later than in most other countries. Besides this, because of its late institu-
tionalisation, the costs of welfare were still at a low level by international 
standards when the Swiss economy was hit by economic unrest in the 
1990s (Häusermann 2009). On the political side, even though a number of 
reforms have been implemented, rapid retrenchment measures have been 
slowed down by the many veto points of the political system (especially 
the optional referendum, which allows opponents to call for a popular 
vote on any reform adopted by parliament), and change has tended to be 
of an incremental nature. Interestingly, while the referendum was used 
by conservative political forces to oppose welfare state expansion up to 
the 1980s, it has since been used by social democrats and trade unions to 
oppose its cutback in the 1990s and 2000s. Direct democracy implies a 
strong political bias towards the status quo.
 In general, reform dynamics have been guided by retrenchment and 
financial consolidation on the one hand, and recalibration to take into 
account new social needs and demands on the other (Häusermann 2009). 
In many reforms, given the veto institutional constraints outlined above, 
recalibration (valued by the left and progressive strands within the right) 
has been used as a quid pro quo for retrenchment (championed by the 
conservative right) (Bonoli 1999; Häusermann et al. 2004). However, 
patterns of change have varied across areas of social protection. In pen-
Table 4.5 Social expenditures as a percentage of GDP
Austria Switzerland
1985 1995 2003 1985 1995 2003
Total public social expenditures 23.9 26.6 26.1 14.8 17.5 20.5
Pensions 11.0 12.3 12.8 5.8 6.5 6.8
Health 4.9 5.9 5.1 3.9 4.7 6.0
Family policy 2.9 3.1 3.1 1.0 1.2 1.5
Disability benefi ts 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.5 3.3
Unemployment: passive measures 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.3 1.1 1.0
Unemployment: active measures 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.7
Source: Armingeon et al. (2007)
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sions, an important reform was achieved in the mid-1990s that provided 
for an increase in the age of retirement for women but also introduced a 
“splitting system” whereby the contributions of both spouses would be 
added, divided by two and counted separately, as well as pension credits 
for mothers. Both measures improved the benefits of women, especially 
non-working women.
 The last attempt at reform, which included unilateral retrenchment 
measures, such as cutbacks for widows or a further rise in the retire-
ment age for women, was rejected in a popular referendum in 2003. In 
unemployment insurance, a series of urgent measures were carried out 
by decree in the 1990s to cope with the important increase in unemploy-
ment: the maximum period of entitlement was increased to two years, 
but the replacement rate was lowered from 80 to 70. Another impor-
tant reform introduced a set of activation measures whereby resources 
devoted to active labour market policies were multiplied by 6; at the same 
time, increased control and possible sanctions were introduced for the 
unemployed not “actively seeking work” (Bertozzi et al. 2005). In 2002, 
citizens accepted another reform measure providing for a toughening of 
conditions of entitlement and a shortening of the maximum period of 
allowances (Afonso 2010). In general, it has proven easier to carry out 
retrenchment in domains that concern a fringe of the population – like 
unemployment or disability policy – than in pensions, where cuts po-
tentially affect everyone. Partly because existing schemes were so weakly 
developed in comparison with other countries, expansion measures have 
been achieved in family policy, with the introduction of a maternity in-
surance in 2005, and a harmonisation of family allowances in 2006. Con-
fronted with important cost increases, the domain of health insurance has 
been a constant issue of debates over the last decade, and has remained 
in a deadlock so far. Both attempts to increase the role of the state and 
restrict reimbursements have been rejected so far. 
 Generally speaking, the constraining institutional framework in Swit-
zerland has fostered more incremental reforms than in Austria, especial-
ly when the latter was governed by a right-wing coalition from 2000 to 
2006. It must be kept in mind, however, that Swiss welfare programmes 
have remained at a lower level in terms of the array of social risks cov-
ered by law. In some ways, the wider heterogeneity of welfare provision 
(private/public mix) has also fostered a more flexible evolution because 
of the wider array of tools available, and an already greater importance 
of market-based schemes of social provision. As argued above, the Swiss 
“three-pillar” pension system (combining public, occupational and pri-
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vate schemes) has been considered – at least until the 2008 financial cri-
sis – more ready for population ageing than strictly public schemes like 
the Austrian one (Leimgruber 2008). However, the great fragmentation of 
welfare provision, for instance in the domain of health, has led to lower 
costs in Austria than in Switzerland, where both the overall cost of the 
health system and the individual cost burden for patients is among the 
highest in the OECD.
 Conclusion
Patterns of change and continuity in the Austrian and Swiss varieties of 
capitalism display an overall trend towards a more market-driven ori-
entation, but prevailing institutional and coalitional determinants have 
strongly influenced the extent and direction of change across the different 
spheres of economic governance (industrial relations, corporate gover-
nance, welfare state). The trajectory and scope of change, as summarised 
in Table 4.6, vary both between the countries and between the spheres, 
depending on the interaction between power configurations and the in-
stitutional regimes governing the different spheres. With its weak trade 
unions, strong business and lean welfare state, the Swiss political econo-
my seemed generally more readily adaptable to the constraints of a new 
international environment focusing on markets as the dominant mode of 
regulation. However, if change has been fairly swift in domains where pri-
vate employer governance was the dominant mode of regulation – such 
as corporate governance and industrial relations – pressures for change 
have been faced with powerful institutional barriers (most notably direct 
democracy) in domains where institutional change required political in-
tervention. In Austria, by way of contrast, the extensive role of the state 
in the political economy has made political intervention more important 
in triggering economic change, whereas the nature of the power configu-
ration within private organised interests was not particularly favourable 
to enhanced market solutions. In Switzerland, substantial change still es-
sentially takes place through private employer coordination, whereas in 
Austria change is mainly triggered by public intervention, as shown by the 
scope of welfare state reforms carried out by the conservative coalition 
that came to power in 2000 (Obinger & Talos 2006).
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In the framework adopted here, longstanding institutional arrangements 
and power configurations continue to determine continuity and change 
both at the macro- and sectoral level. The constant defiance of Swiss 
dominant economic interests towards state intervention has favoured 
a relatively high level of private flexibility in the face of changing eco-
nomic conditions. On the other hand, to the extent that public decisions 
are needed, Austria has probably displayed a higher reform capacity, for 
better or for worse. In this respect, longstanding distributions of power 
to public and private actors continue to determine patterns of continuity 
and change in their varieties of capitalism.
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Table 4.6 Summary of continuity and change
Austria Switzerland
Political framework 
and power 
relationships
Centralised federalism;
employers dominated by SMEs, 
strong labour; policy capacity 
dependent on coalitions.
Decentralised federalism;
strong export-oriented business, 
weak labour; policy capacity 
constrained by various institutional 
veto points.
Corporate 
governance and 
economic regulation
Important changes in corporate 
control through privatisation 
and liberalisation, especially 
since EU-adhesion; promotion of 
competition.
Important changes in corporate 
control, market-driven reforms 
of corporate governance; new 
public regulations to promote 
competition.
Industrial relations 
and labour market
Continuity in collective bargaining 
despite organised decentralisation;
marginalisation trend of social 
partners in policymaking.
Decentralisation trend;  no 
marginalisation due to veto power 
conferred by direct democracy, but 
declining capacity to strike deals.
Welfare state Acceleration of retrenchment 
reforms under black-blue coalition.
Retrenchment hindered in some 
domains by direct democracy; 
recalibration.
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 The largest companies introduced a “single share”, which reduces the pos-
sibility to control the composition of the shareholders. In , only . of 
the companies listed at the Stock Exchange had a “single share”; in , this 
proportion reached . (out of  companies). This does not mean, how-
ever, the end of family ownership and the victory of minority shareholders. 
There are still other measures, which allow Swiss corporations to channel 
the evolution of their shareholding structure: they may fix ceilings for vot-
ing rights at shareholders’ meetings or introduce a percentage limit for each 
individual shareholding.
 The Swiss Confederation remains, however, the majority owner in Swisscom 
(the biggest phone and internet provider) and in Swiss Post.
 In Siaroff ’s () indicator of corporatism termed “integration” understood 
as “a long-term co-operative pattern of shared economic management in-
volving the social partners and existing at various levels such as plant-level 
management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of national policies 
in competitiveness-related matters (education, social policy, etc.)”, Austria 
ranked first with . out of , whereas Switzerland ranked seventh with 
. in the mid s.
 However, an agreement on an intersectoral minimum wage has been reached 
by Austrian social partners in  (EIRO ).
  For example: accident insurance ( in Austria vs.  in Switzerland), 
mandatory unemployment insurance ( vs. ), old age pensions ( 
vs. ), mandatory health insurance ( vs. ) or maternity insurance 
( vs. ) (Obinger and Talos , ff; Leimgruber , ).
 The time gap between the adoption of a constitutional principle and its com-
ing into effect into a law has been extremely large:  years for health insur-
ance ( vs. ),  years for maternity insurance ( vs. ) and  
years for state pensions ( vs. ) (Häusermann ).
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5 Liberal Convergence, Growing Outcome Divergence?
 Institutional Continuity and Changing Trajectories in the 
‘Low Countries’
 Hester Houwing and Kurt Vandaele
 Introduction: historical similarities and diff erences
Belgium and the Netherlands, with respectively 10 and 16 million inhab-
itants, have several similarities in the cultural, political and economic 
spheres. Belgian and Dutch societies have often been described as ‘con-
sociational democracies’ because of the existence of competing ‘pillars’ 
(groups) organised along ideological, notably religious, lines but with 
overarching institutions for facilitating negotiation and compromise by 
elites. Since the 1960s the consociational formula has been eroded by the 
continuing process of ‘depillarisation’, which in itself was caused by chang-
ing social values such as rising secularism. Nevertheless, the present op-
portunity structure for influence is still based on a proportional electoral 
system and party coalitions and hence, changes in socio-economic policy 
take place incrementally rather than in sharp swings. 
 Both countries are also small in an economic sense: given their narrow 
domestic market, they are economically dependent upon access to world 
markets but unable to inﬂ uence world market prices. Due to this, econom-
ic vulnerability is a widespread assumption among the political-econom-
ic elite and much attention is paid to the competitiveness of companies. 
While regional economic integration is promoted to pro-actively avoid the 
need for economic adjustment, corporatist arrangements are adopted re-
actively for facilitating rapid adjustment with a minimum of social conﬂ ict 
(Jones 2008). Both countries have been promoting social partnership by 
setting up corporatist institutions at diﬀ erent levels of the economy. Repre-
sentatives of both sides of industry – i.e. employers’ associations and trade 
unions – have also been involved in the administration and management of 
the welfare system, the design and development of which is strongly shaped 
by Christian democratic and social democratic views on social policy. 
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 Given a political system historically based on consensus, a regulated 
market regime and a Bismarckian continental welfare system, it comes 
as no surprise that both Belgium and the Netherlands have been identi-
fied as corporatist sub-varieties of coordinated market economies (Bruff 
2008) or as straight cases approximating the corporatist capitalism type 
(see Becker in this volume). Apart from the similarities, there has been 
also a burgeoning body of literature in recent years pointing to profound 
historical differences in the economic structure, state tradition and la-
bour-capital relations of both countries and stressing the path-dependent 
trajectories of the Belgian and Dutch corporatist institutional complex 
(Arnoldus 2007; Vercauteren 2007). Moreover, new comparative studies 
give evidence to different policy dynamics causing dissimilar socio-eco-
nomic outcomes that have become particularly apparent since the 1990s 
(Hemerijck & Marx 2010; Kuipers 2006; Van Gyes et al. 2009).
 Another striking finding from recent international studies (often not 
including the Belgian case) is that the Netherlands is often grouped with-
in the cluster of Scandinavian countries with regards to labour market 
regulation (EC 2007), possibly shifting away from its southern neighbour. 
Taking those recent studies into account and based on our reading of sec-
ondary literature, we find indications that, while the institutional corpo-
ratist configuration remains largely intact, Belgium and the Netherlands 
are moving in the same broad direction today, i.e. leaving non-liberal 
capitalism, but at the same time their socio-economic outcomes seem to 
show more dissimilarities in comparison with previous decades. 
 This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2 describes the insti-
tutional framework and the organisational structure of the main inter-
est associations in the socio-economic sphere, highlighting the growing 
regional differences in Belgium. In subsequent sections we delve further 
into the dynamics of industrial relations since the late 1990s. Section 3 fo-
cuses on corporate governance practices, section 4 analyses the degree of 
wage coordination and deals with the main developments in labour mar-
ket regulation. Section 5 looks at the welfare and tax regimes, and section 
6 concludes this chapter.
 Industrial relations: changing yet continued social partnership
The Netherlands has traditionally been a traders’ country which in the 
17th century was the centre of the commercial world. It industrialised in 
the 19th century, but it never developed a strong industry-based economy. 
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Figure 5.1 Deindustrialisation and trade in the Low Countries, 1970-2008/9
Source: stats.OECD.org
Note: Deindustrialisation: 100 minus the sum of civilian employment in agriculture and 
industry as a percentage of the working age population. Trade: trade-to-GDP ratio at constant 
prices and constant exchange rates (base year is 2000).
Belgium has even older roots in trade, but for its current outfit it is more 
important that it is the oldest industrial site on the European continent. 
Until the 1960s, it had a strong position in the production of coal, steel 
and related industrial products. Since its inception, uneven regional eco-
nomic development was a significant feature of its economic space. It be-
came particularly apparent in the 1960s when the coal and steel industries 
in French-speaking Wallonia declined while Dutch-speaking Flanders di-
versified and extended its industrial structure through foreign investment 
from notably the automotive and petrochemical branches. Since then, the 
divide between the two parts of the country has deepened. In 1994 it be-
came pronounced by the establishment of a federal structure separating 
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels, the bilingual capital. Today, Flemish and 
Wallonian varieties exist for nearly all the nationwide operating organisa-
tions – e.g. parties, unions and employer associations.
 As in many other countries, the past forty years have been marked by 
deindustrialisation and an increased openness to international trade. Fig-
ure 5.1 illustrates these developments and shows that deindustrialisation 
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flattened somewhat after the mid-1980s, particularly in Belgium, while 
trade accelerated after the mid-1990s. The service sector did not compen-
sate for the job losses in industry. As a result, structural unemployment 
rose, particularly in Belgium which was hit from time to time by sudden 
massive layoffs in the automobile industry (Renault, Opel and VW closed 
factories). However, industry still accounts for a significant part of Bel-
gian exports (CRB 2008: 192-5) while the Dutch economy is mainly based 
on transportation and logistics, international finance, business services 
and agro-industry. 
 Both Belgium and the Netherlands have an industrial relations system 
with a strong role for the so-called ‘social partners’ in various corporat-
ist institutions at the national, regional, sectoral and company level. The 
central Association of Belgian Employers (VBO/FEB) represents private 
sector companies, notably the medium-sized and larger ones, both na-
tionally and across sectors. Its organisation rate is traditionally high and 
complements the relatively high union density rate. Small companies have 
(Flemish and Wallonian) associations of their own. The regionalisation 
is pronounced by the existence of purely regional associations that gain 
influence and increasingly act as a strong competitor to the national but 
fragmented VBO/FEB.
 Th e merged Dutch Business Association/Dutch Christian Entrepreneurs 
(VNO-NCW) is the main employers’ organisation in the Netherlands. 
Worth mentioning is also the association of SMEs known as MKB (the lit-
eral translation of SME). Th e overall organisation rate of the employers is 
about 85. Th e main players on the union side are the socialist Federation 
of Dutch Unions (FNV), the Dutch Christian Unions (CNV) and the small-
er union for medium- and higher-skilled employees (De Unie/MHP). Col-
lective bargaining coverage is about 80. Dutch union density dropped to 
22 in 2006, while it rose to about 55 in Belgium (cf. introduction, Table 
1.2) where the coverage rate is about 90 (Bocksteins 2006: 77-80).
 In Belgium there are Catholic (ACV/CSC) and socialist (ABVV/FGTB) 
union federations that, following the general pattern, are regionally divid-
ed. The former is the largest and particularly strong in Flanders. While the 
Netherlands has a rather weak system of workers’ representation through 
works councils, in Belgium only union members can be a member of these 
councils. Union involvement in social security management, the so-called 
‘Ghent system’, further explains Belgium’s relatively high union density. 
 The main corporatist institutions in the Netherlands are the bipartite 
Labour Foundation and the tripartite Social and Economic Council. Both 
institutions give advice to the government on socio-economic policymak-
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ing and legislation. These institutions and the 1982 Wassenaar Agree-
ment, whereby social partners agreed on wage moderation in exchange 
for the reduction of working hours, reflect the Dutch tradition of con-
sensualism, often denoted by the term ‘polder model’. Trying to radiate a 
similar formula, the Flemish political-economic elite promoted the ‘belfry 
model’ at the end of the 1990s in a reference to the consensual character 
of industrial relations at the Flemish level (Arnoldus et al. 2004: 77).1 But 
its use has hardly been taken up in the discourse. One of the reasons has 
probably been that in Belgium, industrial relations tend to be more adver-
sarial than in the Netherlands (Table 5.1).
In contrast to the Netherlands, economic and social matters in Belgium 
were for a long time institutionally separated, because unions were wor-
ried that macroeconomic criteria would condition social demands. The 
1996 law on the Promotion of Employment and the Preventive Safeguard-
ing of Competitiveness marked a turning point, since it institutionalised 
wage moderation and calculated social benefits and employment condi-
tions on the basis of macroeconomic criteria. The corporatist institu-
tion for negotiations between capital labour and the state is the Central 
Economic Council (Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven/Conseil Central de 
l’Économie, CRB/CCE).
 Corporate governance: shareholder infl uence becomes 
strengthened
The large share of foreign companies in Belgium is not much lower than 
that in the Netherlands, but foreign companies determine the economic 
Table 5.1 Days not worked due to strikes per 1000 employees in the Low Countries (six-
year averages), 1990-2007
1990-95 1996-01 2002-07
Belgium* 132** 71 63
Netherlands 33 5 9
Source: Days not worked: for Belgium, Vandaele (2007) and Brochure (RSZ/ONEM); for the 
Netherlands, CBS. Employees in employment: stats.OECD.org.
*Strikes in the public sector are not included. 
**Year 1990 is missing. 
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picture much more in Belgium because of the near absence of ‘national 
champions’. The Belgian holding-type ownership pattern explains this. 
Despite Belgian businesses performing well financially, firms seem to 
have insufficient strategic dynamics to develop into multinationals. Man-
agement strategies tend to focus on profit rather than on growth through 
diversification and expansion (Daems 1998). Since the late 1980s, when 
multinationals increasingly pursued international expansion through 
acquisitions and takeovers, a considerable number of Belgian industrial 
companies owned by holdings were sold to foreign investors, purely be-
cause it was profitable. This weakened the Belgian business networks and 
gave rise to the ‘anchoring debate’ on the best strategy to maintain eco-
nomic decision-making power in Belgium (Oosterlynck 2006).
 Leaving apart foreign-owned companies, only a small but shrinking 
number of families still controls the largest Belgian companies, with busi-
ness networks reproduced by elite clubs, elite management schools and 
‘inside’ marriages (Puype 2004). As a result, the shareholders of family-
based but listed companies lost their majority voting blocs to institutional 
investors and international competitors such as Anglo-Saxon investment 
funds. This decline came to a halt in 2007, however, when a new takeover 
law was implemented establishing a threshold of 30 to launch a manda-
tory takeover offer. In this new context, family shareholders quickly in-
creased their share to a level just exceeding the threshold in order to keep 
de facto control over ‘their’ companies. 
 The financial crisis of 2008 caused a further weakening of Belgium’s 
industrial-financial structure. Fortis, the largest Belgian bank, was split 
into a Dutch, nationalised part and a larger Belgian part that was sold to 
the French BNP Paribas. Other banks and insurance companies (Dexia, 
Ethias and KBC Bank) that were trading so-called ‘toxic derivatives’ also 
applied for regional and federal government bailouts.
 In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Economic Affairs implemented 
a series of measures in the early 1990s aimed at privatising, liberalis-
ing and deregulating certain segments of the economy. Given the large 
Dutch banking sector and the huge pension funds, these developments 
led to the doubling of market capitalisation. Indeed, as a ratio of GDP, 
the market capitalisation of the Netherlands in the 2000s ranked among 
the highest in the OECD countries (see Table 1.5b in the introduction to 
this volume and Engelen et al. 2008: 17). This implied a shift of corpo-
rate governance to (institutional) shareholders (Delsen 2002: 20). FDI 
flows in and out of the Netherlands also more than doubled during this 
period. Additionally, large Dutch banks strove to increase their role in 
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global financial markets and to make Amsterdam a financial hub via 
takeovers and mergers. The financial-economic crisis since the fall of 
2008, which hit large Dutch banks very hard, has put these aims into 
question, however. 
 The corporate governance code in both countries is based on the flex-
ible ‘comply or explain’ rule: the code has the character of a recommenda-
tion but companies have to explain when they fail to comply to any of the 
code’s principles. In Belgium, the debate on corporate governance was 
already begun in the mid-1990s, but it was only in 2004, after the financial 
scandals in the US and Europe (with Enron as the best known example; 
speech-recognition technology company Lernout & Hauspie was a Bel-
gian case), that the government installed a Corporate Governance Com-
mittee for preparing a comprehensive code. The Committee advocated 
acknowledging the ‘Belgian context’ – i.e. the typical owner structure 
with holdings and preferential shareholders. This code pays particular at-
tention to an appropriate disclosure of a company’s corporate governance 
framework, including the board’s composition. This was in line with the 
2003 European Commission’s Action Plan on Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union and 
intended as a framework for all Belgian listed companies. Furthermore, 
in 2005 another less detailed code was put into practice which set recom-
mendations for non-listed companies.
 Most of the listed companies have a corporate governance charter in-
cluding the required information in their annual report. But information 
identifying the most important shareholders and the shareholder struc-
ture is notably missing (Van der Elst 2008: 29). Since only listed com-
panies are expected to adhere to the code, its application is rather lim-
ited and most of the listed companies complying to the code do not meet 
all of its requirements (ibid.: 12, 30). The centrality of the principle of 
self-regulation allows for this (Corporate Governance Committee 2009). 
Nonetheless, with the code Belgium has developed in the direction of the 
Anglo-Saxon model, and its corporate governance rating (by rating agen-
cies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poors) has improved. At 47, how-
ever, it is still below the European average (56) and significantly lower 
than the Dutch rating (71; Heidrick & Struggles 2009). The higher the 
rating, the better shareholder rights are served.
 In the Netherlands, a commission was installed in December 2004 to 
further the usefulness and to secure the observance of the Dutch corpo-
rate governance code. The commission drafted a code in accordance with 
existing legislation governing firm-firm and intra-firm relations of listed 
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companies (Corporate Governance Committee 2003). The code positions 
the rights of ‘financial stakeholders’ – i.e. shareholders and banks (in their 
roles other than shareholders) – at the centre, does not set aside a role for 
labour (co-determination) in corporate governance, and is based on the 
principle of self-regulation (Poutsma & Braam 2005: 171f ), which makes 
it liberal. One non-liberal regulatory element is that in the case of hostile 
takeovers, the influence of shareholders is curbed. This is done by: a) the 
issuing of special priority shares and preference shares, and b) the use of a 
two-tier board system with a supervisory board and a management board 
ensuring the separation between shareholders and management decision-
making (ibid: 157). 
 The legitimacy of priority and preference shares is increasingly disput-
ed (e.g. by the European Commission), as was highlighted in 2007 when 
a private equity firm tried to take over Dutch toolmaker Stork but was 
blocked by the preference shares controlled by the supervisory board. A 
court forbade Stork to issue preference shares because this would pre-
vent an agreement between corporate management and the sharehold-
ers. Also, the raison d’être of the two-tier regime has increasingly been 
disputed: a new law expected to become effective in 2010 or 2011 will 
permit a one-tier board system in large companies. Such a system would 
integrate direction and supervision, in line with the Anglo-Saxon practice 
and would strengthen the liberal component. The absence of legislation 
to hamper activist investors such as private equity funds is another illus-
tration of this. And until mid-2010, the government parties did not intend 
to enact such legislation (Engelen et al. 2008: 12). 
 Corporatism and competitiveness: centralised wage coordination 
versus indirect decentralisation
Since the end of the 1970s, Dutch corporatism has been relatively stable. 
This can be explained by the commitment of employers, the institution-
alised routine of dialogue, and the broad acceptance of wage restraint as 
key to enhancing competitiveness (Hendriks 2005). The unions’ legiti-
macy is sometimes questioned because of their low organisation level, 
but peak-level negotiation on wage guidelines with union federations still 
provides valuable outcomes for employers, particularly in terms of social 
peace. The unions also strengthened their position when they mobilised 
a large number of people in 2004 to demonstrate against policy propos-
als to abolish the early retirement scheme (Mujagic & Zweers 2004) – a 
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scheme employers used to replace older and expensive employees with 
younger and cheaper ones.
 The Dutch social dialogue is facilitated by dense, small and often per-
sonal networks enabling trust (Hendriks 2005: 55). The Social and Eco-
nomic Council and the Labour Foundation also play an important role in 
these networks. However, the policy of wage moderation did not occur 
solely in a context of trust and deliberated consensus. It was also a matter 
of ideological dominance of the wage restraint formula since the 1950s, fa-
cilitated by the eminent role of the Central Planning Bureau (an advisory 
agency of the government) in Dutch economic policy. And it was due to 
the position of the unions which deteriorated when membership since the 
1970s decreased and power relations turned to the advantage of capital 
that, in the context of accelerating globalisation, became increasingly mo-
bile. Against this background, more than moderate wage demands quickly 
became stigmatised as ‘irresponsible’ (Becker & Hendriks 2008).
 In the 1980s and 1990s, the role of the central corporatist institutions 
gradually changed. The legal obligation of the government to seek the 
advice of the Social and Economic Council in economic and social policy 
matters was formally abolished in 1994, though in practice the advisory 
role of the social partners did not disappear. A more important change 
therefore was the decentralisation (and ‘flexibilisation’) process of wage 
bargaining that had already started in the late 1970s and that became em-
bodied in the 1993 document “A New Course” by the Labour Foundation 
(Visser & Van der Meer 1998). This process was, however, accompanied 
by a turn to indirect centralisation: the ‘wage space’ became a topic of 
an annual government-induced discussion that results in non-binding 
but strongly recommended guidelines of the Social and Economic Coun-
cil and the Labour Foundation for wage bargaining at the branch- and 
sometimes company-level. For example, during the 2002-2004 economic 
downturn, the guideline was a ‘zero line’, while in November 2008 the 
emphasis was on the need to stabilise wages to retain a reasonable level of 
consumer spending.
 The government recognises collective agreements by using the instru-
ment of general extension – i.e. the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employ-
ment declares an agreement is binding for an entire sector, whether or not 
firms are members of the sector’s employers’ association. This extension 
procedure was the subject of a heated debate in 2004, when the govern-
ment urged the social partners to agree on a wage freeze to combat unem-
ployment in a period of economic downturn. When they could not reach 
an agreement, the government threatened to no longer extend collective 
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agreements containing wage increases. Although the government eventu-
ally withdrew this threat, it was an obvious attempt to regain some of its 
power in the collective bargaining process. In the literature, this type of 
state involvement is sometimes referred to as ‘shadow of the state’ (intro-
duced by Scharpf 1993).
 Belgium differs from the Netherlands in the way it has maintained cen-
tralised wage setting in the entire period under consideration (see the 
overview in Table 5.2). Remarkable is the salient role the state plays in 
this process, which since 1996 has shifted back and forth between govern-
ment-sponsored and government-imposed solutions. Because of regional 
divisions, capital-labour negotiations have failed to realise agreements 
at the national level in these years. Based on a comparison of the wage 
costs per hour worked in three reference states (France, Germany and the 
Netherlands), a small expert group in the Central Economic Council is 
responsible for proposing an ex ante wage norm for the two-year duration 
of the next inter-sectoral agreement. If the social partners reach no agree-
ment about the precise norm, the federal government proposes a compro-
mise or corrects for this coordination deficit by unilaterally setting the 
wage norm. In this process, the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB/BFB) has 
an advisory task. From 1998 onwards, the wage norm has been interpreted 
as indicative instead of imperative but, all in all, by stipulating the biennial 
bargaining length, the competitiveness law contributed to a stronger hier-
archical sequence at the lower collective bargaining levels. At these lower 
Table 5.2 Wage setting in the Low Countries since the mid-1990s
Belgium Netherlands
Involved 
institutions 
Central Economic Council proposes 
wage norm; advisory role for the 
Federal Planning Bureau; sectoral 
associations of capital and labour as 
bargaining agents
Labour Foundation and Social and 
Economic Council propose wage 
guidelines; strong advisory role 
for the Central Planning Bureau; 
bargaining agents are sectoral unions 
and employers’ associations
Role of the state Initiates discussion on wage norms 
and, if required, sets norms as 
framework for sectoral bargaining
Initiates discussion on guidelines; 
sporadic intervention threats 
(‘shadow of the state’)
Contextual target International competitiveness 
(France, Germany and the 
Netherlands as reference states)
International competitiveness
Periodicity Every two years Twice a year (spring and fall)
Overall 
characterisation 
Centralised Indirectly centralised
LIBERAL CONVERGENCE, GROWING OUTCOME DIVERGENCE?
levels, sectors and even companies have a bigger say in issues other than 
wages or employment terms such as lower pay and employment standards 
(Bocksteins 2006: 81-84; Van Ruysseveldt 2000: 208-212)
 Business did not try to dismantle the centralised bargaining system in 
Belgium, not even in times when, as was the case recently, it effectively 
ceased to work. Business no longer passively complies with union demands 
as in the 1960s and makes use of the judicial system in case of strikes with 
increasing frequency (Vandaele 2007: 198-199). The overarching business 
association VBO/FEB conducts a pro-active media strategy by putting de-
regulation, flexibility and wage moderation on the agenda of public dis-
cussion. But corporatist collective bargaining has a long tradition and the 
social partners frequently meet formally and informally in various forums 
in the socio-economic policy field (Luyten 2006: 392). Moreover, a good 
understanding between capital and labour has always been appreciated 
by employers. The initiative to weaken corporatism and enhance statism 
came from the government, particularly the so-called ‘purple-green’ co-
alition (1999-2003) consisting of the liberal, socialist and green political 
parties. This coalition emphasised the ‘primacy of politics’ – though it 
did not intend to abolish corporatism. This would have caused upheaval 
and would not have been smart because without corporatist negotiations 
a politics of blame avoidance in socio-economic affairs would no longer 
have been an option for the government. 
 Towards more fl exible labour markets
With an overall employment rate of just above 60 in 2007, the Belgian 
rate is significantly behind the Dutch rate and among the lowest in the 
OECD countries (see Table 7.2 in the final chapter). In Flanders, the rate 
is about 66, while in Wallonia with its old industrial base it is 10 per-
centage points lower. As a consequence, unemployment is twice as high 
there. A specific problem is youth unemployment, though this is even 
higher in the Brussels region (Van Rie 2008: 7; this author presents much 
data on Belgium – Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels – and the Netherlands). 
At 74 in 2007, the Dutch employment rate is similar to the Scandinavian 
level. Looking at full-time equivalents (FTEs), however, the gap between 
Belgium and the Netherlands disappears. This can be explained by the 
much higher rate of part-time employment in the Netherlands, particu-
larly among women (60 in the Netherlands versus 33 in Belgium in 
2007) and juveniles 15-24 years of age (65 in the Netherlands versus 27 
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in Belgium). Those in the latter group – largely consisting of pupils and 
students earning some additional income – often have jobs of only a few 
hours a week and for a limited time. The percentage of temporary jobs, 
although increasing in both countries, is also almost twice as high in the 
Netherlands than in Belgium (cf. Van Rie 2008 and Table 7.3 in the final 
chapter).
 These differences need to be put into their specific institutional con-
texts. In the Netherlands, part-time and temporary work started to grow 
in the early 1980s, while in Belgium this development only became worth 
mentioning from around the mid-1990s. This was the time of the deregu-
lation of work agencies, of the liberalisation of fixed-term contracts in 
1994 as well as of the effective promotion of a career break scheme since 
1996 (Vander Steene et al. 2002a). This scheme, already existing some-
what unnoticed since 1985, provided employees with the possibility to 
leave their jobs temporarily – full-time or on a part-time basis and for 
a number of reasons: parental, medical, educative – while maintaining 
some income out of the unemployment benefits fund. The conditions at-
tached to this were that the employees had to have occupied their jobs for 
at least six months prior to applying for the career break scheme and that 
they could temporarily be replaced by unemployed people. Only in the 
latter case would the measure have an employment effect.
 Th e late 1990s generally were a period of socio-economic change and 
change in the ideologies accompanying it. In 1999, the government adjust-
ed its policy discourse and put socio-economic policy measures in the con-
text of the ‘active welfare state’, i.e. a political economy based on the active 
individual responsibility of labour market participants, but also providing 
for adequate social protection. Employment growth was emphasised as the 
key issue of welfare state reform. At the same time it was acknowledged 
that workers would need a tool to adapt working time to their needs, in 
particular to be able to reconcile work, family and private life.
 The social partners went along with the new discourse by introduc-
ing the so-called ‘time credit scheme’ in the inter-sectoral agreement of 
2000. In this scheme, which had to improve on the older career break 
scheme and which was enacted into law in early 2002, taking leave was 
no longer dependent on the employer’s permission but became a right 
for (almost) every worker. It brought about flexicurity ‘made in Belgium’ 
– labour market flexibility at a relatively low employment rate. Contrary 
to most existing leave schemes, one does not need a specific reason to 
take up time credit. Minimal standards of the system – such as the pay-
ment of 400 when uninterrupted work experience was less than five 
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years and 500 when it was more – are stipulated by federal law. Specific 
modalities are filled in by collective labour agreements negotiated at the 
sectoral level or sometimes the firm level. In addition to possible inter-
sectoral variations with respect to the maximum duration of the time 
credit (one year), various policy levels promote the time credit system in 
specific cases (e.g. called ‘care credit’ or ‘study credit’) through supple-
mental benefits in addition to the benefit paid out by the unemployment 
insurance. 
 The time credit scheme has become the most important leave scheme 
within the Belgian welfare regime (Debacker et al. 2004). Repeatedly, it 
was criticised by the employers’ organisations which argued that it results 
in a loss of productivity and which accused certain workers on the scheme 
of misusing the system. As a concession to the employers’ demands, the 
possibilities to modulate working time over an employee’s life course have 
been restricted. Because time credits first had to be earned for employ-
ers, the scheme should primarily be seen as an incentive for employees to 
work longer in order to stimulate the employment rate (Vanderweyden 
2002). Or the scheme should be understood, as in the view of notably 
larger service firms, as a temporary measure in times of economic diffi-
culty – a measure that has, for example, been used to prevent dismissals in 
the economic downturn since 2008. On balance, the time credit scheme 
indicates a shift from the redistribution of labour within the full employ-
ment framework to the improvement of the work-life balance in addition 
to an employment enhancing tool and the flexibilisation of the labour 
market.
 The Netherlands does not have a comparable leave scheme. But its de-
velopmental trend in the years under consideration resembles the Bel-
gian one. In accordance with the general Western trend, Dutch employers 
asked for more labour market flexibility in the early 1990s to better align 
the supply and demand for labour and to remain competitive in the global 
market. Furthermore, the labour market participation of women, which 
had strongly risen since the early 1980s, led to a demand to combine 
working time with time to care for the family. While these new employ-
ees requested flexibility in the form of flexible hours, employers mostly 
requested flexibility by means of temporary contracts and a decrease in 
dismissal protection. 
 Dismissal protection has for decades been an issue in the Dutch debate 
on labour market flexibility. The score of the Dutch employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) was 2.1 in 2003 (down from 2.7 in 1990 on a scale of 
0 to 5, with higher scores indicating stricter regulation), which is close to 
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the European average and also to the Belgium level of 2.2 (down from 3.2; 
see Table 1.5a in the introduction of this volume) and is still considered 
rigid by employers and liberal critics. For regular employment ,the score 
is even somewhat higher, while it is lower for temporary jobs – a differ-
ence that doesn’t exist in Belgium.
 When they want to fire regular employees, Dutch employers need a 
permit from the semi-governmental employment centre (the name of 
which recently changed from the Centre for Work and Income, or CWI, 
to Administrative Authority for Employee Insurances, or UWV Werkbed-
rijf ). In 85-90 of all cases, the permit is given, whereas special clauses for 
older workers and in case of sickness may create considerable delay. Since 
the 1990s, the permit system has been increasingly criticised and circum-
vented by means of a route via the lower district courts, which established 
the practice of dissolving contracts quicker by imposing a severance pay-
ment on employers. While in 1986 the ratio of permits filed compared 
with court settlements was 14 to 1 (Wilthagen 1998: 9), both ‘routes’ are 
currently used to a more or less equal extent (WRR 2007a: 125). However, 
during recessions the permit route is more popular as it is cheaper and 
most requests are honoured due to economic necessity.
 Attempts to abolish the permit system have been undertaken since 
1993, when the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment announced 
he would do so. However, responding to union pressure, his successor 
withdrew the proposal and instead wrote a memorandum in 1995 titled 
Flexibility and Security, calling for a new balance between flexible and 
regular employment and asking the social partners to find a compromise. 
They responded by negotiating an agreement in 1996 that became the 
basis for the Flexibility and Security Law, implemented in 1999. The 1996 
Agreement was a package deal. The unions wanted to preserve the sys-
tem of preventive checks on dismissals of regular contracts by the gov-
ernmental employment centre. The employers accepted this in exchange 
for greater flexibility in fixed-term contracts. Also, dismissal procedures 
were simplified and somewhat shortened (mainly for older workers). The 
modification of dismissal procedures and the flexibilisation of temporary 
employment entailed a loosening of employment protection legislation. 
At the same time, social security increased for people on small, flexible, 
on-call contracts, mainly consisting of temporary agency workers. Here, 
a Dutch variety of flexicurity emerged. Worth mentioning is moreover 
that the Flexibility and Security Law contains many provisions that are 
‘3/4 mandatory law’. This means that derogation from the law is possible 
within a collective labour agreement. At the sectoral level, this regularly 
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turns into more emphasis on flexibility rather than security as the more 
immediate day-to-day concerns of the workfloor become more promi-
nent (Houwing 2010). 
 Many economists, lawyers and employers still argue that the Dutch 
system for dismissal based on two routes is unnecessarily complicated 
(Houwing et al. 2007) and discussions again culminated in the fall of 
2007, when Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in the centre-left 
coalition failed to reach an agreement. To prevent a cabinet crisis, a com-
mission was installed which presented its advice in June 2008. It stated 
that in the case of dismissal, employers should continue payment to the 
worker and assist him or her in finding a new job. The social partners 
swept the commission’s advice aside, however, in their 2008 autumn ne-
gotiations. New proposals to render the labour market more flexible by 
reforming the dismissal law and the duration of unemployment benefits 
have been launched by almost all political parties in the light of the re-
cent elections in June 2010. We will have to wait and see what will happen 
next.
 Two measures on working hours meant to enhance flexibility have 
been introduced recently: the 2000 Law to Adjust Working Hours, giv-
ing employees more rights to work longer or shorter hours and the 2007 
Law on Working Hours (a new adjustment) that enables employers to 
extend, within specific limits, working times. This move is intended to 
affect wage costs, as the extension of working time entails less overtime 
premiums to be paid by employers. A time saving system, whereby work-
ers can save up overtime and holidays or a part of their wages to take 
time off at a later moment in their career, has also been introduced in 
recent years. A similar individualised system has not (yet) been intro-
duced in Belgium. As with the time-credit system, the Belgian debate 
focuses more on internal forms of flexible labour through shift work and 
the deregulation of overtime work (CRB 2008: 92-6). In the car industry, 
however, an agreement on working time flexibility was reached in 2006, 
whereby working hours may be varied over a six-year reference period. 
In order to cope with production fluctuations, flexible working time ar-
rangements have been further promoted in the inter-sectoral agreement 
of 2004 as well as follow-up agreements, cutting the cost of overtime 
work or reducing the employers’ payroll taxes in case of shift and night 
work (ibid: 153). 
 Nevertheless, whereas at the end of the 1990s Belgium was still making 
significantly more use of shift work and overtime work than the Nether-
lands, this situation has now altered. Another specifically Belgian form 
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of flexibility is the scheme of temporary unemployment, introduced in 
1978, whereby blue-collar workers are entitled to unemployment bene-
fits for a certain period of time during which the employment contract 
(and thus the payment of wages) is not terminated but partly or wholly 
suspended on a temporary basis. This temporary unemployment scheme 
might partially explain why temporary employment is less well developed 
in Belgium: the scheme reduces the need for temporary (agency) work 
and might therefore be considered as important as dismissal regulation 
for influencing job security – at least for blue-collar workers (Sels & Van 
Hootegem 2001: 340-343).
 Its use shows a strong correlation with the business cycle and adds a 
particular dimension of flexibility, especially in the construction sector 
and industrial sectors. In response to the economic downturn since 2008, 
the scope of the system of temporary unemployment has been extended 
to agency workers and workers on fixed-term employment contracts, i.e. 
providing them with more job security; a related, albeit temporary, ar-
rangement has also been put in place for white-collar workers since 2009 
(Vandaele 2009: 589-592). A similar but far less popular temporary un-
employment scheme in the Netherlands was abolished in 2006, though a 
temporary crisis-related scheme has been introduced in 2009 in the light 
of the crisis.
 The main developments of the Belgian and Dutch labour markets are 
summarised in Table 5.3:
Table 5.3 Main features and trends of the labour market, 1990s-2000s
Belgium Netherlands
Relative level of part-time 
work
About EU average; increasing Twice as high as the EU average; 
increasing
Relative level of temporary 
work
About EU average; increased by 
> 50%
High level; increased by c. 30%
Peculiarities of the labour 
market
Leave schemes (“time credit 
schemes”)
-
Overall level of 
employment protection 
(EPL)
High; has decreased Moderate; has decreased, 
particularly EPL temporary work
Peculiarities dismissal 
jurisdiction
- Regular dismissal procedure 
often circumvented via court 
and severance payment
General trend Flexibilisation/liberalisation Flexibilisation/liberalisation
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 Dynamics in the welfare regime: from passive to active
In recent decades, Belgium and the Netherlands have both shifted away 
from passive income-protection measures, have embarked on more sup-
ply-side activation programmes on the labour market, and have tight-
ened the eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits (De Beer & 
Schils 2009: 215). Originally targeted at the male breadwinner, the Bel-
gian and Dutch welfare regimes are rooted in the principle of industrial 
insurance against occupational risks, financed by social contributions 
from workers and employers and much less through taxation. As is the 
case with many other welfare states across Europe, they have both been 
experiencing internal and external pressures up until the present day. 
Internal pressures include an ageing population, increasing (long-term) 
unemployment, and the shift to a service economy, while external pres-
sures include increasing international competition through economic 
globalisation. Private social expenditure has been rising in both coun-
tries, but in contrast to the Netherlands, public expenditure (as a per-
centage of GDP) in Belgium has increased as well since the mid-1990s. 
While the Dutch poverty rate (7.7 in the mid-2000s) is well below the 
European average, Belgium (8.8; see Table 7.3 in the final chapter of this 
volume) is around the average, with the poverty rate in Flanders at the 
same level as in the Netherlands but with a significantly higher rate in 
Wallonia (Hemerijck & Marx 2010). 
 In the Netherlands, several changes were implemented in the field of 
social policy after the country underwent a deep economic and public 
finance crisis as a result of the two oil crises in the 1970s. From the late 
1970s to 1982, the unemployment rate rose to 15, and in the 1980s and 
1990s more than 10 of the labour force were recipients of the disability 
scheme; in the early 1990s almost a million people. The number of unem-
ployed persons sextupled between 1980 and 1994. Between 1970 and 1985, 
the total number of welfare beneficiaries had doubled from 1.6 million to 
3.2 million (Visser & Hemerijck 1997: 128), though this was also due to the 
large groups of (married) women that had entered the labour market for 
part-time work since the late 1970s, causing the female employment rate 
to rise. To fight the budget deficit and to curb employment eligibility, the 
criteria for unemployment and disability benefits were tightened in the 
course of the 1980s, minimum wages were frozen for several years and in 
the late 1980s unemployment benefits were lowered from 80 to 70 of 
previous earnings (see the detailed overview in Van Gestel et al. 2009). 
Starting in the second half of the 1980s, the labour market and the econ-
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omy recovered but it is difficult (and not part of our remit) to estimate to 
what extent this was caused by the reforms in preceding years.
 These reforms have been part of a general shift in emphasis from wel-
fare and income to work – from welfare to workfare, as it is sometimes 
called. The incentives to go for jobs had to be strengthened, and activation 
measures for those receiving benefits had to be intensified. Since then, 
activating policies particularly aimed at the prevention of unemployment 
and inactivity and at the reintegration of people into the labour market 
have become central (Van Gerven 2008). Today, this is still the key focus 
of the Dutch system of social security; only when claimants seriously fail 
to obtain income through work does the system provide income security.
 Workers of 55 or more years of age are a second group towards whom 
measures to increase participation are targeted. These measures focus on 
the ‘pay-as-you-go’ scheme, which is the basic, tax-financed tier of the 
Dutch pension system. Every Dutch citizen (as well as permanent foreign 
inhabitants in proportion to their years of residence) has the right to ob-
tain a pension from this tier. The second tier is a contribution-financed 
pension that is organised by branch-related funds that invest in the capi-
tal markets. With the rise in life expectancy of recent decades, the entire 
scheme has become more costly. As elsewhere, the preferred remedy is to 
require people to work longer and/or to cut or freeze pension benefits. 
Reform plans for the state-sponsored first-tier pension therefore entail a 
rise in the retirement age from 65 to 67 to be implemented in two steps: 
in 2020 from 65 to 66 and five years later from 66 to 67. The second tier 
would adapt to these changes. During and after the national elections in 
June 2010, however, this plan was discussed again, and at the time of writ-
ing it is not clear whether and when the envisaged changes will indeed be 
legislated.
 In Belgium, the economic crises in the late 1970s triggered, just as in the 
Netherlands, discussions on the limitation of social expenditure and the 
search for a new financial balance within the social security system (Re-
man & Pochet 2005). Statutory social security benefits are automatically 
linked to the level of the cost of living, but during the 1980s and 1990s the 
link was broken under pressure of a worsening of the public finances. And 
the principle that social security benefits have to follow wage increases 
was abandoned in 1982. In order to reduce the gap between benefits and 
wages, however, it was restored in 2006. Generally, the insurance charac-
ter of the social security system has been eroded in the past decades, and 
emphasis has shifted to universal coverage and minimum income pro-
tection, with space for private insurers to organise an additional benefit 
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system. This has caused a growing duality between those solely relying on 
the social security system and those that can also afford private schemes 
(Hemerijck & Marx 2010).
 Since the 1990s, labour supply reduction policies came under pres-
sure due to their failure to counter the rise in unemployment and due 
to Belgium’s sharply rising public deficit and state debt. In order to ease 
the employers’ burden in the social security system and to make labour 
cheaper, the system has increasingly been financed via income from VAT 
and via state subsidies since then. Consequently, in 1995 the government 
restricted the responsibility of the social partners for maintaining a fi-
nancially balanced social security system and increased its own role. Fur-
thermore, governments attempted to reform welfare via social pacts with 
unions and employers in order to meet the core convergence criteria of 
the Maastricht Treaty for joining the EMU. Other aspirant EMU mem-
ber states with similar economic pressures and budgetary problems also 
started attempts to build social pacts. While these attempts in other EU 
states succeeded, their defeat in Belgium in 1993 and in 1996 illustrated 
that the consensus required for their realisation was lower in this country. 
This development gave way to a stronger role of the state. Eased by the 
economic upturn in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, the budget deficit and public debt was finally reduced, until the 
financial crisis caused them to rise again. 
 The liberal-left government of 1999-2003 redefined the welfare state 
without dismantling it. The Belgian interpretation of the Third Way – in 
vogue in those years of the social democratic Blair and Schröder govern-
ments in Britain and Germany – was synthesised into the Active Welfare 
State as a consensus between liberals and socialists. It did not entail a 
clear rupture with the past. The role of institutional veto players such 
as labour and capital remained unchanged but social security policy was 
launched under the heading of individual responsibility and became ori-
ented towards increasing the employment rate and guaranteeing social 
protection for everybody (Reman & Pochet 2005).
 In the field of pensions, in 2001 the government created the Silver Fund 
in order to save for future public pension expenditures looming as a result 
of the coming retirement of the baby boom generation. On the condi-
tion that government debt is less than 60 of GDP by 2015, the fund is 
intended to cushion expenditure increases in the period between 2010 
and 2030. The year 2015 is still ahead of us but the silver fund strategy has 
already run into trouble in the first decade of the new millennium when 
government debt increased instead of shrinking. As an alternative, and 
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consistent with the emphasis on individual responsibility, individual life 
insurance and pensions schemes are stimulated through tax advantages 
for workers. This is in addition to the sectoral pension plans, legally sup-
ported since 2004, which covered more than two million workers in the 
private sector in 2007.
 In order to deal with the ageing of the population, the liberal-left gov-
ernment put the issue of early retirement on the political agenda in 2004. 
In Belgium, early exit and leave arrangements, sometimes with individual 
firms offering additional supplements, became a widely adopted mea-
sure from the mid-1970s onwards. Rising productivity in Belgian indus-
try resulted in a decline of adult men in employment, as was the case in 
other advanced capitalist economies. In the passive welfare systems on 
the European continent, of which Belgium was one, early exit was cho-
sen as a way out. In the 1990s, however, with costs rising immeasurably 
and the growing dominance of market-conform strategies, passive welfare 
systems tended to become active ones and to withdraw from early exit 
schemes. The Belgian government also tried to scale down early retire-
ment schemes. In 2005, after numerous formal and informal tripartite 
negotiations between the government and social partners, and large-scale 
protests of the unions but no agreement, the government imposed the 
Solidarity Pact between the Generations on the social partners (Vandaele 
2007: 215). The word ‘pact’ is a euphemism in this context; it reflects the 
difficulty of reaching agreement in the political climate in Belgium during 
the 1990s and 2000s. Employment among elderly people has, by the way, 
been rising in the last decade, although it remains low from a European 
perspective (see Table 7.2).
 The trend towards more market conformity and the emphasis on em-
ployment is also visible in tax policy. In Belgium, personal income taxes 
were raised in the early 1990s by the suspension of the indexation of tax 
brackets to inflation and the introduction of a variety of supplementary 
contributions. Fiscal consolidation was needed to reduce the budget defi-
cit to below the threshold of 3 by 1997 for EMU entry. Facilitated by the 
beneficial economic environment, the full indexation of tax brackets was 
restored after 1999 by the liberal-left government, and the crisis surcharge 
was also phased out between 1999 and 2002 (OECD 2004). Until now, 
the overall impact of these reforms on the redistributive effect has been 
rather ambiguous.
 As part of the tax reform and inspired by similar measures in the UK 
and the US, a low-wage tax credit was introduced in 2002 as a measure 
against the only small gap between income from work and social security 
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benefits. The tax credit was intended to make accepting a job more attrac-
tive than benefit dependency. The Belgian tax credit did not take family 
income as a frame of reference but rather low-earning individuals (Verbist 
et al. 2007). Due to this universal character, the credit was less beneficial 
to one-breadwinner families such as single parents and couples, particu-
larly those who had children. Since the financial advantage of low-paid 
jobs remained small, the tax credits contributed very little to employment 
growth. As a consequence, the tax credit was abolished in 2005. It was 
replaced by a so-called ‘work bonus’ in the form of a bigger reduction on 
social security contributions of low wage earners. The activation policy 
was further elaborated in 2004 when vouchers aimed to create jobs were 
introduced for unemployed people performing labour in the black mar-
ket. The vouchers, given to potential private ‘employers’, made it possible 
to combine unemployment benefits with a low-paid job in the care sector 
(child, elderly or household care). Because of the tax relief on the wage 
costs incurred by the employer, this voucher system has been a success.
 Despite all reforms of the tax system to enhance employment and eco-
nomic activity – including tax reductions on employers’ social security 
contributions – Belgium has still the highest tax wedge in the OECD area 
(OECD 2009).
 In the Netherlands, several measures have been introduced in recent 
years to reduce tax wedges on labour. The effective tax rate on labour has 
decreased gradually since 1995, with a significant reduction occurring as 
a result of the reform of the personal income tax in 2001. In the same pe-
riod, the effective tax rate on capital increased significantly (from 17.2 
to 22.3). Among other things, this was due to taxes levied on dividends. 
The major tax reform of 2001 was intended to stimulate employment and 
to improve the country’s international competitiveness – which, it was 
supposed, would also raise employment. Another aim of the reform was 
to reduce the tax burden on labour, notably on low incomes, in part by the 
introduction of a work tax credit. High incomes also benefitted consider-
ably, while for average incomes the net increase has been quite moderate 
(Visser & Yerkes 2008: 222).
 Overall, the biggest share of social security contributions has shifted 
from employees to employers, and in general the contributions have de-
creased somewhat since 1990. To combat unemployment, tax incentives 
for people employed in low-paid jobs had already been implemented in 
the 1990s. And after the 2001 tax reform, a new tax plan was approved 
for 2002. To tackle labour market problems, the government introduced 
a number of tax measures to encourage job seekers and promote labour 
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market participation such as tax credits for certain benefit claimants tak-
ing a job and for other people re-entering the labour force. Employers 
employing these people also received tax advantages. Reducing long-term 
poverty by enhancing employment has been an essential aspect of Dutch 
social policy in the broad sense (including economic and tax policy) in the 
1990s and 2000s (OECD 2004: 95). 
 In recent years, the idea of a flat tax (i.e. one identical bracket for 
 everyone) has been the subject of serious discussion in Dutch social pol-
icy circles. Nonetheless, and despite the general movement in a liberal 
direction, the social security and tax system is still based on the notion 
that ‘the strongest shoulders carry the heaviest load’.
 Schematically presented in Table 5.4, we can identify the overall devel-
opments and trends in our two countries.
 Going liberal along diff erent lines?
Belgium and the Netherlands have similar positions in the global econ-
omy, a shared assumption of economic vulnerability among the politi-
cal-economic elite and a tradition of corporatist industrial relations. The 
trend of development during the 1990s and 2000s is also similar – and not 
fundamentally different from that in surrounding countries: both political 
Table 5.4 Overall trends in welfare state development
Belgium The Netherlands
Ideological orientation Increased emphasis on 
individual responsibility and 
on activation (from welfare to 
‘workfare’)
Increased emphasis on 
individual responsibility and 
on activation (from welfare to 
‘workfare’)
Benefi t cuts Nearly no cuts Modest cuts
Eligibility criteria for 
benefi ts
Tightened Tightened
Early exit Phased out Phased out
Tax incentives Tax credits for low-wage jobs, 
after 2005 work bonuses; tax 
relief for households employing 
unemployed people for caring 
tasks
Tax credits for low-wage 
jobs; also for fi rms employing 
unemployed low-skilled workers
Peculiarities Flexicurity for temporary work
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economies have liberalised but corporatist relations and the redistributive 
welfare system have shown a notable institutional resilience. How ever, 
one has to add that Belgian corporatism has suffered from the tension 
between the Flemish and Wallonian parts of the country, which has made 
it more difficult to reach agreement. Where institutional changes took 
place, it remarkably happened almost irrespective of the political par-
ties in power. This points to the ideological dominance of neo-liberalism. 
Whether neo-liberalism has been weakened by the global financial crisis 
and economic downturn after 2008 and whether alternative discourses 
will gain influence remains to be seen.
 In corporate governance one can observe in both countries a trend – 
influenced by the EU and in particular the European Court of Justice – 
towards the Anglo-Saxon shareholder formula, although the market for 
companies is still far from fully liberalised. Sharing in the general trend 
of emphasising competitiveness and the importance of attracting foreign 
direct investment, the standard employment relationship has been erod-
ed, the strictness of overall employment protection legislation has been 
somewhat weakened and the tax regime has been partially adjusted to 
these goals. In order to raise employment, guarantee the sustainability of 
the welfare state and cope with the financial effects of demographic age-
ing, both countries have also embarked on more supply-side activation 
programmes on the labour market. Regarding employees older than 55 
years, developments in both countries have been similar too: early retire-
ment schemes have been curbed.
 The overall trend is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, there 
seems to be more path continuity in Belgium: its wage bargaining is still 
largely centralised, welfare cuts have been limited, and family-controlled 
holdings are still pivotal financial stakeholders in business. In the Neth-
erlands, by contrast, wage bargaining has the form of guided decentrali-
sation (or indirect centralisation), cuts to welfare have taken place, and 
shareholder capitalism has grown stronger in this country with many 
– some large – multinational companies. On the other hand, in relative 
terms liberalisation in Belgium appears to have been somewhat stronger 
than in the Netherlands (see Table 1.6 and Figure 1.5 in chapter 1).
 Most importantly, in effective terms Belgian corporatism has eroded 
considerably – to a lower level than Siaroff calculated in 1999 on the basis 
of data from the 1980s and early 1990s (see Table 1.1 in the introductory 
chapter) – and statism has increased. Primarily, this change seems not to 
be the result of global competition, neoliberal dominance and an autono-
mous radicalisation of the still strong unions, but to the tensions between 
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Flanders and Wallonia, the federal character of the polity since 1994 and 
the accompanying fragmentation of corporatist negotiations. Reaching 
consensus has become very difficult in this context. In the unitary Neth-
erlands, unionisation has declined, neoliberal thinking is relatively strong, 
and perhaps some acquiescence of the weaker Dutch unions is involved, 
but reforms took place in a policy environment still largely characterised 
by high trust, coupled with a discourse on vulnerability to global pres-
sures and the unavoidability of adjusting the Dutch political economy in 
line with these pressures.
 Even though both countries share a tradition of social partnership, 
Dutch industrial relations have historically evolved towards the ‘institu-
tionalisation of cooperation’, while Belgian industrial relations took the 
trajectory of an ‘institutionalisation of conflict’ (Therborn 1992). Cur-
rently, this difference seems to be truer than ever.
 Note
 The Belfry model is referring to the characteristic belfries in the Flemish ur-
ban landscape (and Brussels), which are added to the UNESCO’s list of World 
Heritage Sites and that represented the power of the merchants in medieval 
times.
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6 Small Countries, Big Countries under Conditions of 
 Europeanisation and Globalisation
 Vivien A. Schmidt
Small countries, we know, are small. Big countries are big. The Euro-
pean Union has had a significant impact on both, as has globalisation. 
The question is: does size make any difference as to how these countries 
adjusted their political economies and policies in response to European 
integration as well as globalisation?
 In recent years, the smaller countries of Western Europe – consisting 
of all Nordic EU member states plus non-member Norway, the Conti-
nental countries of Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, plus 
non-member Switzerland – appear to have adjusted their political econo-
mies more quickly and more effectively to the new globalised and Euro-
peanised environment than the bigger EU member states of Continental 
Europe like Germany, France and Italy. The smaller countries have higher 
GDP per capita, similar if not higher rates of productivity and lower rates 
of unemployment than these bigger states. And they accomplished this 
with more cooperative and better-coordinated relations between firms, 
labour and the state through corporatist concertation. Moreover, the 
small countries’ political economic adjustment has not been accompa-
nied by any serious undermining of their welfare states. The Nordic and 
Continental small states have all largely avoided both the problems of 
poverty, inequality and lack of job security plaguing Anglophone Europe 
and, in many cases, also the insider-outsider division of the labour market 
of the bigger Continental and Mediterranean countries (see Table 7.3 in 
the concluding chapter). In addition, they have introduced flexibility into 
labour markets without jeopardising security, increased the sustainability 
of pension systems without seriously affecting pensioners’ income, and 
reduced the generosity of social assistance programmes without reneg-
ing on commitments to equality, universality and/or solidarity. Among 
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Anglophone countries, however, Ireland as a small state with a more re-
cently open economy has also managed to address problems of poverty 
and inequality (at least until the current economic crisis) while improving 
labour relations through a move to a kind of state-led corporatism. 
 The smaller Nordic and Continental countries of Western Europe also 
have had a better scorecard with regard to EU-related policies (see the 
statistical data presented in chapter 7). In the Single Market, they tend to 
have higher rates of compliance with EU economic policy directives, in 
particular the Scandinavian member countries. Their performance with 
regard to the Open Method of Coordination has also been generally bet-
ter than that of the bigger countries, with their ‘best practices’ seen as 
models for the larger member states. Moreover, smaller countries that 
have participated in the European Monetary Union (EMU), including the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Belgium, have been quicker and more 
successful in putting their macroeconomic houses in order and in meet-
ing the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) criteria than bigger countries like 
(again) Germany, France and Italy. Equally signiﬁ cantly, however, those 
smaller member states that have stayed out of EMU – Sweden and Den-
mark – have nonetheless consistently met the SGP criteria without any 
warnings from the Commission, in contrast with the other West European 
non-member, Britain, which has received warnings on its deﬁ cit spending. 
And those smaller countries that have stayed out of Europe – Switzerland 
and Norway – could have joined EMU without much diﬃ  culty.
 So what is it about the smaller states that might explain their better 
performance in Europe? Scholars have suggested any number of possible 
generalisations, many of which apply to many of the smaller states, but 
none of which covers all cases. These include small countries’ very small-
ness and economic openness; their better-coordinated political economic 
institutions; their more generous and supportive socio-economic provi-
sions; their stronger state institutions; their better policy responses; their 
cultural homogeneity, more innovative ideas and/or more inclusive com-
municative interactions. We could add that they all share a clear percep-
tion of what they are – small states in the open world economy – and 
therefore what they must do in response to outside pressures: that is, to 
do all that is necessary to promote economic competitiveness while main-
taining public acceptance.
 In addition, Europeanisation itself – whether understood as the in-
direct pressures of increasing competition from market integration, the 
more direct pressures of macroeconomic adjustment resulting from Eu-
ropean monetary integration, the very direct pressures of European direc-
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tives and European Court of Justice decisions related to the development 
of the Single Market (see Becker in the introductory chapter to this vol-
ume) – has had a differential impact on the small West European coun-
tries. In response to such pressures, whether direct or indirect, the small 
countries – much like the larger ones – have responded differently, with 
major, minor or no transformation, depending upon a host of factors re-
lated to the institutional ‘fit’ with policies and preferences, and the capac-
ity to respond institutionally and politically, where politics is understood 
not only in terms of interests and power but also of ideas and discourse.
 In what follows, I consider all of the above generalisations, in terms 
of openness, institutions, culture, discourse and the direct and indirect 
effects of Europeanisation in order to show that they neither apply to all 
small West European countries nor do they exclude ex ante the bigger 
countries. I illustrate throughout with cases of small countries in contrast 
to big countries. I conclude with some preliminary suggestions about 
what ideal-typically makes small West European countries not just small 
but successful, despite the empirical differences. 
 Small West European countries in a globalising world
Does smallness matter for West European small states’ successful adjust-
ment patterns in an increasingly internationalised world, from the post-
war period forward? And if it does, what are the characteristics of small 
states that account for this success? Some scholars emphasise economic 
openness tied to coordinated action within political economic institu-
tions, others the nature of political institutions, and yet others cultural 
homogeneity, common ideas or discursive interactions. As we shall see, 
these all offer clues to the success of small states, but none are entirely 
satisfactory on their own.
 Economic openness and political economic institutions
Economic openness has been one of the longest-standing explanations for 
small countries’ economic success. Peter Katzenstein (1985) was one of 
the first to show that one of the main characteristics of small West Euro-
pean states was their openness to international markets. Small countries 
as different in their cultures and political institutions as Sweden, Austria, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands all experienced sig-
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nificant growth throughout the postwar period despite – or is it because 
– they were small countries open to the world economy. One could even 
argue that Ireland joined this group more recently, having gone from one 
of the poorest and least developed of West European countries to one of 
the richest (at least until the financial crisis beginning in 2008) and most 
developed, with a major factor being its economic openness to global 
forces plus massive structural funds from the EU that helped promote 
economic development.
 Economic openness alone, however, is no guarantee of performance. If 
it were, then how would we explain the poor performance of small states 
at various junctures in time – e.g., the Netherlands in the 1970s, Den-
mark and Ireland in the 1980s, Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s, 
and Ireland again today? Moreover, if it is economic openness on its own 
that counts, what makes small states any different from big ones that are 
equally if not more open, like the UK beginning with the Thatcher era 
which, according to Hirst and Thompson (2000), has been the only truly 
globalised economy among advanced industrialised countries? Equally 
importantly, European economic integration has increased the openness 
of all member states to one another as well as to the global economy, 
thereby diminishing the importance of openness per se as a distinguishing 
characteristic.
 For Katzenstein (1985: ch. 1), economic openness was only one of a bun-
dle of factors that together made small states competitive globally. Politi-
cal economic institutions, in particular those of corporatism, as fostered 
in small states, was the most important among these factors. Corporatism 
was characterised by centralised systems of business interests and unions, 
voluntary coordination of conflicting interests through political bargain-
ing by management, labour and (often) the state, plus an ideology of social 
partnership. This system enabled the social partners and government of 
small states with open economies in the post-war years to cooperate and 
to coordinate their responses to the adjustments required by external eco-
nomic pressures – in monetary policy, as the social partners responded 
to the signals of central monetary authorities and moderated their wage 
rises in response; in industrial relations, wages and work conditions; and 
in pensions and social policy. The result, as Katzenstein found, was highly 
generous welfare states, highly stable labour relations and highly com-
petitive economies.
 Since the early 1980s when Katzenstein wrote Small States, much has 
changed, as all European countries have opened up their economies to 
globalisation and some non-corporatist countries have become quasi-
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corporatist (e.g. Italy, Spain as well as Ireland) while others have altered 
their form of corporatism (e.g. Sweden). In the mainstream, the theoreti-
cal categories for capitalism, moreover, have moved from a tripartite di-
vision of capitalism consisting of liberal, corporatist and statist market 
economies into a binary division, as elaborated by the Varieties of Capital-
ism school (Hall & Soskice 2001).
 The Varieties of Capitalism school identifies a binary division of 
capitalism split between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ market economies. 
Whereas in liberal market economies, business and labour relations are 
competitive, market-based and arbitrated by a liberal state, in coordinat-
ed market economies, cooperative management-labour relations appear 
alongside non-market managed business relations, all of which may be 
facilitated by an ‘enabling’ state (Hall & Soskice 2001). In the VoC classi-
fication, Ireland along with the US, UK and other Anglophone countries 
belong to the liberal type, whereas all the smaller West European coun-
tries identified by Katzenstein plus Germany are labelled as coordinated 
market economies.
 But at the point at which all European economies are now open to glo-
balisation and many more became more corporatist, we have to reopen 
our question about the factors that make small states special. Moreover, 
if we look closely at the small states across time, we can see that in some 
small states, even corporatism is not what it was, if it ever was what it was 
ideal-typically supposed to be. This raises a number of questions with re-
gard to our original discussion of small states as successful because they 
are corporatist open economies.
 For example, what do we do with Belgium which, as a result of the weak 
coordinating capacity of the social partners (Hemerjick et al. 2000), has 
never been as highly corporatist as the Netherlands or Sweden? More-
over, how do we account for the diverse ways in which coordination has 
changed even among the traditionally corporatist countries, given the in-
creasing differentiation in wage-bargaining systems, some of which main-
tained their centralism (e.g. Finland and Norway), some of which have 
decentralised yet indirectly centralised (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Sweden; see the respective country chapters and Table 1.7 in the in-
troductory chapter to this volume)? The way Becker has dealt with these 
changes in the introductory chapter is an option, but the discussion of the 
questions posed here has just started.
 A related question is what do we do with the general shift in relative 
power from labour to business in bargaining relations, or the growing role 
of the state in influencing the bargains (e.g. Austria, the Netherlands) or 
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even in setting them (i.e. Belgium) (Hemerjick et al. 2000)? And how do 
we distinguish small states from big ones, given that Germany is also a 
highly corporatist market economy?
 Equally importantly, how do we deal with Ireland, which is more of 
a liberal market economy with market-driven business relations but 
which, nonetheless, has since the late 1980s developed cooperative man-
agement-labour relations led by the state in something akin to corporat-
ism (Hardiman 2004; Teague & Doneaghy 2004)? And where do we place 
other countries that have recently managed to institute a form of state-
led corporatism, like Italy and Spain (Royo 2002, 2008; Molina & Rhodes 
2007)? These bigger Mediterranean countries do not fit the binary divi-
sion of the Varieties of Capitalism school; nor does France which, unlike 
its other Mediterranean counterparts, has instead radically decentralised 
its labour markets. Rather than consigning these countries to a mixed 
category of uncertain coordination called mixed market economies 
(MMEs) by the Varieties of Capitalism school, I see them as approxi-
mating a third type of capitalism: ‘state-influenced market economies’ 
(SMEs). Characterised by hierarchically-based business and labour re-
lations enhanced or hindered by an ‘influencing’ state (Schmidt 2002a: 
ch. 3, 2008b), it resembles the statist capitalist variety as presented by 
Becker in the introduction to this volume. Greece, arguably a small state, 
along with Portugal as well as most of the small Central and East Eu-
ropean countries, could also be categorised as cases approximating the 
SME type (Pagoulatos 2003). And to what degree the SME type applies 
to the small West European states considered herein is a task for future 
research.
 Does the configuration of socio-economic institutions also play a role, 
since all such countries, with the exception of Ireland, have high levels of 
welfare provision and security? Even here, though, no single generalisa-
tion works, since the smaller states are divided between the traditionally 
social democratic Scandinavian countries, which have maintained simi-
lar systems despite cost-cutting and rationalisation, and the traditionally 
conservative Continental small states, which have changed (or not) in 
very different ways (e.g. the Netherlands vs. Austria). Notably, the Neth-
erlands is now often categorised with the Scandinavian countries when 
considered in terms of measures of redistribution and equality (via the 
Gini coefficient) (see Table 7.3 in the next chapter).
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 Political institutions
But what can we say of political institutions, and the role of the state more 
specifically, with regard to the small West European states? One of the 
problems of the Varieties of Capitalism school is its scant attention to 
state action, defined as government policies and practices that emerge 
out of the political interactions among public and private actors in given 
political institutional contexts (Schmidt 2009). There is in fact a grow-
ing literature in political economy that has increasingly paid attention 
to the role of the state in structuring markets, developing new missions 
and making critical choices that are the ‘product of power and politics, 
not just path-dependence and employer “coordination”’ (Levy 2006). The 
state is significant, moreover, not only for its political economic institu-
tions and its policies but also its political institutional configuration (pol-
ity) as well as politics, understood not only in terms of power and interest 
but also in terms of the power of ideas and discourse (Schmidt 2009). In 
this, smaller West European countries are no different.
 Significantly, in fact, political economic success is sometimes attrib-
uted to the unitary nature of the state. Having a unitary state with autono-
mous decision-making capacity makes a difference in cases where the so-
cial partners are unwilling or unable to play their role in negotiating social 
policy change, which was true in the 1990s for both the Netherlands and 
Sweden with regard to reforms of the welfare state (Schmidt 2003). This 
said, having a weaker unitary state, due to minority-led governments, may 
also promote reform. In Denmark, for example, beginning in the early 
1980s, minority governments were able to reform not despite but rather 
because of governmental disunity, which enabled reform after reform to 
be negotiated by ad hoc government coalitions that engaged in ‘policy and 
party shopping’ (Vad & Benner 2000).
 Moreover, centralised corporatism combined with a unitary state, how-
ever weak, also seems to be a key to success. Whereas in Sweden, the state 
had to go it alone with regard to welfare state reform in the 1990s once 
the social partners had pulled out of centralised national level corporatist 
mechanisms of negotiation, in Denmark the reform process was facili-
tated by the continuation of centralised coordination, enabling the state 
to negotiate far-reaching reforms cooperatively with the social partners 
(see the respective country chapters in this volume). The Danish state’s 
success in actively promoting policy change through national level coor-
dination mechanisms, using firms in order to achieve its goals of bring-
ing the long-term unemployed into the economy, contrasts markedly with 
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the lack of success in Germany, in which the state was unable to mobilise 
the social partners for solidaristic purposes, and instead German firms 
worked through the state to achieve their goals of shedding unproductive 
labour (Martin & Thelen 2007). This said, if Denmark were compared 
with the German states of Baden-Württemberg or Bavaria – both with 
more than twice as many inhabitants as Denmark – the contrasts would 
not be striking. This helps explain Becker’s cautiousness on comparing 
small and big states (see Becker 2009: 141)
 But if it were all about political institutions and the contrast between 
unitary and federalised states or ongoing centralised and decentralised 
coordination systems, how do we explain Switzerland and Belgium, both 
highly federalised systems with weak states and weak corporatist rela-
tions in which the state nevertheless managed to achieve significant re-
form success? In Belgium in the 1990s, for example, the incapacity of the 
social partners to reach agreement in wage bargaining or of the state to 
impose a negotiated solution led to the system of wage setting by govern-
ment decree. Moreover, we still know little about why countries reformed 
in the ways they did, which raises questions regarding culture, ideas and 
discourse.
 Political culture
Political culture has for a long time been out of favour with political sci-
entists as an explanation for why countries or people are what they are or 
do what they do, mainly because in the past it was used as a heavily value-
laden catch-all explanandum, as notably in Banfield’s study of Italy, The 
Moral Basis of a Backward Society (1958/1970). For the small countries, 
it was sometimes used by scholars as a way of pointing to their success 
while denying the replicability of that success. These explanations were 
often tautological, such as: Sweden is social democratic because it has 
an egalitarian culture; Switzerland manages the complexities of a highly 
federalised society cooperatively because it has long had a consensual cul-
ture. These kinds of explanations deny the difficulties involved in creating 
and maintaining such ‘cultures’, while culture itself remains unexplained.
 More recently, however, culture has been reintroduced to the field of 
political science. Among the three traditional ‘new institutionalisms’ in 
political science (see Hall & Taylor 1996), it serves as an active concept 
in ‘sociological institutionalism’. In rational choice and historical insti-
tutionalism, by contrast, culture has remained a residual category, often 
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used as part of the background characteristics of path-dependent (his-
torical) institutions or ‘nested’ (rational choice) incentive structures, and 
generally serving as unexamined claims about institutions rather than as 
something to be studied. In sociological institutionalism, by contrast, cul-
ture plays an important role in framing action and (social) institutions. 
Barbier (2008) melds this with a more dynamic ideational approach to ex-
plore the political cultures within which normative frameworks based on 
common sets of values and norms are institutionalised for given periods 
in policies and practices in particular countries, as in the case of notions 
of precariousness in Denmark and the Netherlands.
 Culture, however, is not always congruent with given countries, since 
some countries are culturally homogeneous and some culturally hetero-
geneous, with small countries more often the former and big countries the 
latter. John Campbell and John A. Hall (2006), for example, show quanti-
tatively that small countries that are culturally homogeneous have stron-
ger economic performance than bigger homogeneous countries, and that 
even smaller countries that are culturally heterogeneous do at least as well 
as the bigger homogenous countries, let alone the bigger heterogenous 
ones. In a qualitative case study of Denmark, moreover, they demonstrate 
that the cultural origins of homogeneity go a long way back, and that such 
homogeneity has contributed to other qualities, such as effective coordi-
nation. But if successful adjustment is the result of their cultural homo-
geneity, what then do we do with culturally heterogeneous countries like 
Switzerland or Belgium, which have also been successful?
 Moreover, cultural homogeneity has also been linked to outcomes that 
are not always positive. These include the rise of anti-immigrant right 
wing extremist parties, whether in Denmark, where extremist discourse 
has focused on outsiders (read Muslims) exploiting the generosity of the 
welfare state, or in the Netherlands, where Pim Fortuyn’s discourse (per-
versely) in the 2002 election campaign built on Dutch values of tolerance 
to argue that they had to be intolerant of the intolerant (read Muslims) in 
order to protect their tolerant society (Schmidt 2006: ch. 4). Intolerance, 
however, is not a characteristic linked exclusively to homogeneous cul-
tures – witness the rise of the extreme right in Switzerland and in Belgium 
– or of small states, given the Le Pen phenomenon in France. The fact that 
the extreme right in France has more recently been losing its appeal in 
response to President Sarkozy’s construction of a discourse that appealed 
to Le Pen voters on security and immigration issues, suggests another dif-
ferentiating factor related to the politics of ideas and discourse.
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 Political ideas and discourse
‘Discursive institutionalism’ – the term I use as an umbrella concept to 
describe the wide range of approaches that focus on the substantive con-
tent of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse – also deals with 
culture. But culture is not always the main object of study for discursive 
institutionalists. Although it is primary for those discursive institutional-
ists who come out of the sociological institutionalist tradition (e.g. Bar-
bier 2008), it is not for discursive institutionalists who engage with ratio-
nal choice and historical institutionalist traditions and therefore concern 
themselves with ideas about interests and (historical) institutions instead. 
This said, culture naturally frames the ideas and discourse studied by all 
discursive institutionalists, giving the ‘ideational structures’ of meaning 
that underpin agents’ ‘background ideational abilities’ to make sense of 
the world, which are based in language and culture, as well as agents’ 
‘foreground discursive abilities’, which enable them to articulate, commu-
nicate and criticise those ideas in order to take collective action to change 
(or maintain) them even while they use them (Schmidt 2008). But most 
importantly for discursive institutionalists, and not always for sociologi-
cal institutionalists, what is important is how ideas and discourse serve to 
(re)frame culture.
 Thus, for example, Bo Rothstein, a ‘discursive institutionalist’ who en-
gages with the rational choice institutionalist tradition, emphasises the 
importance of collective memories in Sweden to explain the long-term 
survival of cooperative collective bargaining – as opposed to the neutral 
incentive structures of rational choice institutionalism. Thus, he explains 
the history of institutions as the carriers of ideas or ‘collective memories’ 
about the trustworthiness of collective-bargaining institutions that were 
generated at certain critical junctures (Rothstein 2005). In Sweden, the 
decade of the 1930s was the moment at which Swedish collective bargain-
ing evolved into a trusted ‘public institution’ based on peaceful and col-
laborative industrial relations. The defining moments came first in the 
early 1930s when, in response to a violent strike in which five people were 
killed, a successful coordinative discourse among policy actors was joined 
by a persuasive, cooperation-oriented communicative discourse by the 
prime minister who evenhandedly condemned the violence of the military 
while also chiding the strikers. This then became the basis for a collective 
memory that in the late 1930s, at the time of agreements on collective bar-
gaining institutions, served to remind all parties to the discussions that 
cooperation was both possible and desirable. This collective memory con-
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tinues to underpin the collective bargaining system today, even though 
the bargaining system has changed greatly, in particular since the employ-
ers pulled out of the national central system, but continue to participate in 
sectoral bargaining (Rothstein 2005: 168-98).
 Discursive institutionalism also lends insight into the dynamics of 
change in the 1990s in Sweden, which were discussed above primarily 
in historical institutionalist terms. What is described by historical insti-
tutionalists as a shift from social partner coordination to state action as 
a result of the failure of social concertation in the reform of the welfare 
state – without any account of why and how the state then acted in the 
way it did – is explained by discursive institutionalists in terms of ideas 
and discourse. The generation of the policy ideas can be attributed to the 
epistemic communities of policy experts and specialised politicians that 
informed the coordinative discourse of the policy sphere (Marier 2008). 
The subsequent successful communication and legitimation of those 
ideas to the general public, by contrast, can be attributed to the social 
democratic party in power at the time which, in the absence of the social 
partners, engaged in a communicative discourse with the public in the po-
litical sphere by creating public forums through which to inform, discuss 
and revise the policies before they were implemented (Schmidt 2000).
 The Netherlands offers yet another example of the usefulness of turn-
ing to the interactive processes of discourse to explain the dynamics 
of change in welfare states. While our earlier historical institutionalist 
discussion of the welfare reforms of the 1990s described the significant 
changes that came about, it did little to explain the dynamics of change 
endogenously. Discursive institutionalism can help, by pointing to the 
‘crisis narrative’ developed by the government in power and articulated 
by Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers that the Netherlands was a ‘sick coun-
try’ given that one in seven workers were on disability benefits (Kuiper 
2004; Schmidt 2000). But while cognitive arguments about the necessity 
of reform enabled the government to push through major changes in the 
disability and pensions systems, the lack of normative legitimisation led 
to the government’s massive defeat in 1994. It was only when a new gov-
ernment was able to argue credibly that it had not only ensured a better 
economy with ‘jobs, jobs and more jobs’ but that it safeguarded social eq-
uity even as it produced liberalising efficiency, that reform gained public 
acceptance, as confirmed by the government’s landslide electoral victory 
in 1998 (Levy 1999; Schmidt 2000). As the economy turned around, the 
‘Dutch miracle’ became the talk of the world, and its origins were traced 
back to the Waasenaar Agreement of the 1980s.
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 The Dutch miracle, however, may be less about the success of particu-
lar policies than it is about the success of a ‘miracle’ discourse beginning 
in the mid to late 1990s that led people to believe that success was tied 
primarily to wage restraint, as Becker (2005) argues. In fact, whatever 
the contribution of wage restraint to export-led growth, it has also con-
tributed to making the labour market one in which more jobs are divided 
among more people, with fewer working hours for everyone and lower 
incomes, in particular for the ‘outsiders’ with part-time jobs – mainly 
women, youth and immigrants (Becker 2005; Salverda 2005). This said, 
however misguided the discourse may have been and however problem-
atic its policy prescriptions turned out for the long term, it involved the 
creation of a ‘collective memory’ that contributed to labour peace and the 
successful negotiation of major reforms of the work and welfare regimes.
 Since the mid 1990s, moreover, Dutch governments have continued 
broad-scale liberalisation programmes, ensuring that the Netherlands, 
once categorised as a conservative welfare state, is seen as somewhere 
between the British liberal paradigm – given pension privatisation and 
high labour-market flexibility – and the Scandinavian social-democratic 
paradigm – given a high basic pension and labour market ‘security’ for 
part-time and temporary jobs (regular social benefits and a top-up in 
pension if necessary at the end of work life; see the contribution of Hou-
wing and Vandaele in this volume). Moreover, it has managed to liberalise 
without jeopardising commitments to social equality, as is evident from 
its low measure of inequality (see Table 7.3 in the next chapter). As a con-
sequence, the public has come to see economic success as linked to neo-
liberal reform and, despite economic stagnation in recent years, continues 
to support it as well as to maintain a positive attitude toward globalisa-
tion. Attitudes toward Europeanisation have also been largely positive, 
at least until the negative vote in the referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty which reflected concerns about immigration and the inflationary 
impact of the euro as well as the desire to punish an unpopular govern-
ment unable to articulate the case for Europe (WRR 2007b).
 Ideas and discourse about economic openness, or globalisation, rep-
resent another differentiating factor for small states, accompanying the 
(historical) institutional facts of economic openness plus corporatism and 
generous welfare states that served to distinguish small states in the early 
postwar years until the 1980s. Because globalisation has been a sine qua 
non of economic life for small West European states throughout the post-
war period, it has become such a part of the background assumptions that 
national leaders have not even felt it necessary to address the issue. By 
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contrast, political leaders in Ireland as well as Britain have felt the need 
to articulate a specifically pro-global discourse, whereas in countries like 
France, they have been decidedly anti-global in their discourse, and the 
public has been the most negative (Schmidt 2007). This is illustrated in 
Figure 6.1, which shows the responses to a range of Eurobarometer ques-
tions about attitudes toward globalisation. The smaller states generally 
have more pro-globlisation views than the bigger countries, and France is 
off the charts.
 For example, in Sweden, even at moments of major economic crisis 
and reform, in the early 1990s when the country’s real estate bubble burst, 
public attitudes toward globalisation have not been affected. This is be-
cause such reforms resulted in some liberalisation but did little to funda-
mentally jeopardise the basic postwar paradigm of the social-democratic 
welfare state, with its commitment to equality and universality of access 
(see the contribution of Lindgren in this volume). The reforms managed 
to maintain a very high level of benefits and services despite moderate 
Figure 6.1 Views of national, EU and global economies as a measure of ‘regulationism’
Source: Eurobarometer 2003 (Flash EB no. 151b pp. 9-11, 33)
The questions include:
Q3. Currently, do you consider that our country’s economy is too open, too closed or is suited 
to the development of the worldwide economy?
Q4. And generally speaking, would you say that the European Union is too protectionist or on 
the contrary too liberal or neither too protectionist nor too liberal?
Q5. Would you say that more regulation or less regulation is needed, or that the current 
regulation is suffi  cient in order to monitor the development of globalisation?
26
19
21
19
11
29
15
25
18
34
16
12
34
20
53
56
47
35
31
66
72
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
UK
Ger
Sw
It
The national economy is too open, the EU economy too liberal, 
and the global economy needs more rules 
too open too liberal more rules
Fr
Nl
Ir
 VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT
cuts and the introduction of modest user fees (Benner & Vad 2000). Thus, 
in their communicative discourse, social democratic governments con-
sistently presented themselves as defending basic welfare state values 
of equality, even as they cut benefits in order to ‘save the welfare state’ 
(Schmidt 2000). For the Swedish public, Europeanisation has been much 
more in question than globalisation, mainly because of fears of the nega-
tive impact of the European Monetary Union on the welfare state, as evi-
denced by the fact that referenda on EMU membership have repeatedly 
failed. Even the eastward enlargement of the EU related to the insourcing 
of workers has not been much of an issue (Sweden was only one of three 
countries, along with the UK and Ireland, to open its doors to the 2004 
accession countries; see Schmidt 2007). But immigration more generally, 
in particular as it relates to third-country nationals, has become an issue, 
with anti-immigrant feeling growing with regard to immigrants’ potential 
demands on the welfare state if they are jobless and without skills. Swe-
den, however, has been much less xenophobic in this regard than Den-
mark (as noted above), which recently instituted the most draconian im-
migration rules in all of Europe.
 The Europeanisation of small West European countries
For further insights, we now turn to how small countries have responded 
to the pressures of Europeanisation.
 In response to the pressures of globalisation, small countries with open 
economies and corporatist institutions have fared reasonably well from 
the early postwar years to today, but it is impossible to say why exactly, 
other than to cite the range of characteristics related to openness, social 
concertation, political institutions, cultures and ideas and discourse that 
have played a role in small countries’ adjustment. Much the same could be 
said for the pressures of Europeanisation.
 Europeanisation, defined here as the top-down impact of the EU on 
national policies (following Ladrech 1994; Héritier 2001; Radaelli 2003; 
Börzel & Risse 2000; Schmidt 2002a), has had a differential impact on 
the smaller West European countries. Although the process of European 
integration, defined as the bottom-up influence of the member states on 
Europe, along with the feedback loop from Europeanisation, is equally 
important to the smaller European countries’ experience in the EU, the 
formulation I use here is most suited for the study of how the smaller 
countries have adjusted to Europe. It enables us to consider the differ-
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ent kinds of impact that EU policies and policymaking have on national 
policy, including the indirect pressures from EU economic integration, 
the more direct pressures from EU institutional rules and rulings, and 
the indirect pressures of EU ‘new governance’ methods of ‘policymaking 
without policies’.
 Theorising the impact of Europeanisation on small states
To provide a systematic analysis for why the smaller countries responded 
in the way they have to EU policies requires a diﬀ erentiation of the kinds of 
pressures exerted by the EU rules as well as the identiﬁ cation of the range 
of national mediating factors aﬀ ecting countries’ responses. First of all, it 
is important to take note of the kinds of decision rules which frame the EU 
policy. Th ese include highly speciﬁ ed rules that impose certain policies, 
as in the Maastricht criteria in the run-up to EMU; less speciﬁ ed rules 
that allow a certain amount of leeway in the transposition of EU policies, 
as with the deregulation of the telecommunications or electricity sectors; 
suggested rules such as in the Open Method of Coordination, in which 
compliance is voluntary and there are no sanctions other than ‘naming and 
shaming’; or no rules at all, as when the Directorate General for Competi-
tion demands only an opening up to competition (Schmidt 2002a: ch. 2).
 Secondly, we need to consider the range of nationally specific factors 
that may affect country responses to European policies. While goodness 
of fit or misfit of EU policies with national policy legacies may set the 
stage (see Börzel & Risse 2000; Héritier et al. 1996; Cowles et al. 2001), 
policy preferences based on national actors’ ideas about interests or val-
ues dictate whether misfit is seen as a problem or an opportunity, political 
institutional capacity reflects the institutional arrangements and the po-
litical interactions that affect state and societal actors’ ability to respond 
more or less effectively, and the quality of national actors’ ideas and the 
persuasiveness of their discourse enhances the capacity to respond by al-
tering perceptions of legacies and by influencing preferences (Schmidt 
2002a: ch. 2). As a result, while in some sectors, the interaction effects of 
the EU and national policies may be significant, entailing the transforma-
tion of national practices, in others the EU may have only a minor impact, 
with the absorption by national practices of any EU-related changes, and 
in yet others the EU may have almost no impact at all, as national prac-
tices show inertia with regard to the EU (see Héritier et al. 1996; Héritier 
2001; Schmidt 2002a: ch. 2).
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 Market and monetary pressures of Europeanisation
Europeanisation as a driving force for change can be highly varied, in par-
ticular where it is understood as the indirect pressures of increasing com-
petition resulting from market integration. These hit early on, beginning 
with the elimination of European tariff barriers (from 1969), continuing 
with the Single Market Act, with 1992 as the target date for the elimina-
tion of non-tariff barriers, as well as with the increasing harmonisation 
of those products that could not circulate EU-wide on the basis of mutual 
recognition alone. All of this was intensified by the first and second oil 
shocks, which added globalisation alongside Europeanisation as a form of 
competitive pressure bearing down on all European countries.
 For the small West European countries, these pressures were arguably 
more intense than for the bigger countries, since they have all had very 
open economies since the early postwar years. But this did not mean that 
they all responded well or quickly. The Netherlands was a basket case in 
the 1970s, both in terms of economic performance and corporatist rela-
tions, but began its recovery in the 1980s. Denmark had current account 
difficulties in the 1970s which only worsened in the 1980s. Belgium was in 
even worse shape than either of these two countries in terms of both per-
formance and corporatism, and did not recover nearly as rapidly (Hemeri-
jck et al. 2000). None, however, were in as parlous a state as the UK, which 
had to request an IMF loan in 1976.
 By contrast, some smaller countries did reasonably well in macroeco-
nomic terms for quite a while, like Sweden and Austria, both of which 
were outside the EU as well as the European Monetary System (EMS) 
until 1995. Sweden performed well economically while remaining the last 
of the neo-Keynesians until the real estate bubble burst in the late 1980s, 
producing an economic meltdown in the early 1990s that ultimately led 
to their request for entry into the EU. Sweden’s labour relations, however, 
experienced a major crisis already in the early 1980s when the employers’ 
association withdrew from the centralised bargaining process, although 
sectoral bargaining continued without difficulty (Vad & Benner 2000). 
Austria managed the transition from Austro-Keynesian monetary policy 
reasonably smoothly and with no significant problems in its labour rela-
tions, albeit relatively late (mid-1980s) (see Afonso & Mach in this volume 
as well as Hemerijck et al. 2000).
 Europeanisation may secondly be seen to include the more direct pres-
sures of macroeconomic adjustment resulting from European monetary 
integration through the EMS and the EMU (see the discussion in Becker’s 
LIBERAL CONVERGENCE, GROWING OUTCOME DIVERGENCE?
introduction, this volume). Here, the small countries that have joined 
EMU have generally responded well, but not always without difficulty. In 
the run-up to EMU, although the Netherlands and Austria had little prob-
lem meeting the Maastricht criteria for membership, Belgium, like Italy, 
had a very high public debt. This would have excluded it from member-
ship in the eurozone had the member states in their wisdom not decided 
to reinterpret the 60 public debt criterion of the Maastricht Treaty to 
mean moving in the direction of 60 (mainly to ensure Belgium’s partici-
pation). This said, meeting the deficit criterion was not so easy at the last 
minute not only for Italy, which was castigated by Germany for fiddling 
with the figures, but even for France and then Germany, both of which 
were also caught moving money from one account into another in order 
to make their books look right.
 Moreover, once EMU was established along with the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), Ireland was in trouble early on because of a rate of in-
flation (around 4) higher than the 3 required at the time. The Nether-
lands struggled with a slow economy in the early to mid-2000s, engaging 
in significant belt-tightening in order to stay within the SGP criteria. This 
helps to explain the irascibility of Dutch politicians (along with that of the 
Dutch president of the European Central Bank) in response to German 
and French lack of adherence to the SGP criterion on deficit for a number 
of years running as a result of recessionary pressures in their economies. 
It also explains Dutch unwillingness to accommodate their demands for a 
more flexible interpretation of the criteria, although the two bigger coun-
tries ultimately won out since punishing France and Germany made no 
ultimate sense given that these are the two largest economies in the Euro-
zone and the motors of growth.
 Not all smaller European countries, of course, are in EMU. Denmark 
obtained an opt-out from EMU in its second referendum on the Maas-
tricht Treaty, after the first failed in part as a result of fears of the impact 
of monetary integration on the welfare state along with concerns about 
sovereignty and identity. And yet Denmark could easily be part of the 
euro, given its imported ‘hard money’ policy, which began in the early 
1970s when it stayed in the EMS ‘currency snake’ (a band within which 
currencies were permitted to fluctuate) and shadowed the Deutschmark. 
Sweden, unlike Austria and Finland, did not join EMU when it entered 
the EU in 1995. But although this de facto opt-out was never specified 
in writing, as Commission officials sometimes remind its leaders, Swe-
den continues to resist joining because of public fear of the euro’s impact 
on the welfare state and the economy more generally. Since Norway and 
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Switzerland are not part of the EU, they have no need to follow the re-
quirements of EMU. And yet both have also largely shadowed the euro in 
order to protect their currencies from excessive volatility.
 In the light of the current financial market crisis, membership in EMU 
has also represented a kind of insurance policy against excessive currency 
volatility and speculative pressure. The experience of another very small 
Nordic state, Iceland, which found its currency near collapse once its ma-
jor banks had failed, is a case in point. The plans of its newly elected 
government to join the EU and EMU, although still in their preliminary 
stages, suggest that at least one very small Nordic ‘outsider’ has revised 
its views of the costs and benefits of joining the EU. Norway, by contrast, 
has not considered revising either its stance on membership in the EU 
or EMU for the moment; but it does not have the economic problems of 
Iceland, given its oil revenues.
 Institutional pressures of Europeanisation
Europeanisation also encompasses the very direct pressures of European 
directives and European Court of Justice decisions meant to promote the 
completion of the Single Market. Here, harmonisation of the rules related 
to the freedom of movement of goods began in earnest in the mid-1980s 
with the push to complete the Single Market. At the same time that the 
principle of ‘mutual recognition’ ensured that most goods that met the 
standards of one member state could be sold across the EU, those prod-
ucts that affected health or safety standards would still have to be har-
monised. And it is in the industrial standards committees that we find 
that smaller countries have much less influence than the bigger countries, 
if judged by their control of the secretariats (see Table 6.1).
 The pressures of Europeanisation intensified in the 1990s as the Com-
mission moved from focusing on harmonising the rules of free movement 
of goods to freedom of movement of services and people, and as it pro-
moted deregulation in public utilities services and the liberalisation of 
public and private services. This meant that areas such as telecommunica-
tions, postal services, electricity and energy were deregulated while pub-
lic procurement markets and services more generally were to be opened 
up. Significantly here, smaller states with more liberalising tendencies in 
recent years, including Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, were less 
affected by the regulations than countries like Austria and Belgium, which 
had been slower to deregulate in these industries, as the country chap-
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ters in this volume tell us. Importantly, however, the countries with the 
most significant influence on the content of the reforms were the bigger 
member states, and in particular Germany and France in all of these areas 
(Thatcher 2002; Eising & Jabko 2001).
 Implementation and compliance patterns also differ with regard to so-
cial policy. In gender-related and parent-related social policies, for ex-
ample, Gerda Falkner and her associates (Falkner et al. 2005: ch. 15) show 
that across a number of specific policy directives, member states exhibit 
patterns of reactions that suggest that there are three ‘worlds of compli-
ance’. Nordic countries are the only ones that fit the ‘world of law’ in which 
whatever the misfit with policy legacies or preferences, the directives are 
transposed and implemented in a timely fashion. Austria, the Netherlands 
and Belgium fit the ‘world of domestic politics’ in which delays are related 
Table 6.1 Small states’ control of secretariats of standardisation committees
Countries CEN
(279 secretaries)
CENELEC
(108 secretariats)
ETSI
(17 chairs)
# (%) # (%) # (%)
Germany 77 (27.6%) 28 (26%) 3 (18%)
UK 55 (19.8%) 38 (35%) 4 (23.5%)
France 52 (18.6%) 13 (12%) 4 (23.5%)
Italy 30 (10.8%) 13 (12%) 2 (12%)
NL 21 (7.5%) 2 (~2%) 1 (6%)
Belgium 10 (3.6%) 2 (~2%)
Sweden 10 (3.6%) 1 (~1)
Spain 7 (2.5%) 7 (6.4%) 1 (6%)
Switzerland 4 (1.4%) 1 (~1)
Finland 3 (1%)
Norway 1 (0.4%) 3 (2.7%)
Greece 1 (0.4%)
Portugal 1 (0.4%) 1 (6%)
Ireland 1 (0.4%)
Austria 1 (6%)
1 CEN: European Committee for Standardisation
2 CENELEC: European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
3 ETSI: European Telecommunications Standards Institute
Source: CEN Technical Committee List, 03/03/2005; CENELEC Directory 2005, Issue 1; ETSI 
website, Organisational Chart
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to partisan politics, much as in the UK, Germany and Spain. The ‘world of 
neglect’ is made up of Ireland – which although in the ‘world of politics’ 
with regard to transposition, scores poorly in terms of the implementa-
tion of directives, much like Italy – and Luxemburg, which although an ef-
fective enforcer is a bad transposer, as is France, because of its consistent 
unwillingness to comply, regardless of the politics. Greece and Portugal, 
by contrast, are bad at both transposition and enforcement (Falkner et al. 
2005: ch. 15).
 In addition, we should not forget that Norway and Switzerland, al-
though not part of the EU, have nonetheless had to sign up to the full 
range of Single Market rules without having a vote on those rules. In the 
case of Switzerland, for example, whereas its officially stated policy is 
‘participation without integration,’ the reality has been much more one of 
‘integration without participation’ (Kux & Sverdrup 2000: 254). Its laws 
are largely harmonised with the EU, with 85 of Swiss market legislation 
EU-compatible. EU directives on competition law, for example, are copied 
verbatim into Swiss law, while EU technical annexes form an integral part 
of Swiss laws and decrees. Moreover, in order to gain access to the Euro-
pean clearing system TARGET, Swiss banks have also established a Swiss 
euro clearing bank in Frankfurt (Kux & Sverdrup 2000: 251-252). In addi-
tion, in its bilateral agreements with the EU, access to markets and/or to 
other policy areas generally come with a quid pro quo. For example, Swiss 
participation in the Schengen/Dublin system came with concessions on 
banking secrecy – including imposing a withholding tax on citizens with 
tax residency in EU member states. The result is that bilateral negotiated 
agreement takes the place of institutional voice and vote, which would 
come from sitting around the table in Brussels.
 Institutional voice and vote, however, mean little when it comes to ac-
tion by the Commission or the ECJ that follows from their autonomous 
treaty-based powers. And for some small states, the impact of EU deci-
sions has been very significant indeed. One such set of decisions involves 
those that run counter to the country’s moral values. For example, the 
EU’s decision that the restrictive alcohol policies of Finland and Sweden 
violated rules regarding competition policy and the free movement of 
goods challenged Nordic values that saw such restrictions as necessary 
‘for the good of society’ – to curb the excessive drinking which was ste-
reotypically assumed to be the product of citizens’ attempts to overcome 
‘communication anxiety.’ Similarly, the EU’s opposition to the tolerant 
drug policy of the Netherlands – problematic within the context of the 
Schengen agreement because it clashed with other countries’ drug laws 
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– ran counter to deeply-held Dutch convictions that moral decisions in 
areas of so-called ‘victimless crimes’ are a private affair. In these cases, the 
driver of change was less the EU imposing change from the outside than 
the opportunities the EU created on the inside, serving more to empower 
groups from the inside supportive of change (Kurzer 2002). 
 EU moves to liberalise the provision of social services, moreover, have 
also had a significant impact on the Scandinavian countries generally, 
given their tradition of high paid, high quality public services, especially 
in contrast to, say, Belgium, Austria or Ireland, which have comparatively 
little in the way of public sector caring services. The recent services direc-
tive, that allows for competition between private and public caring ser-
vices, is a challenge to the Scandinavian countries and has some worried 
about the development of a two-tiered system in which the rich go private 
and the public system therefore loses the kind of universal support neces-
sary for its continued existence.
 But whereas directives at least give small countries an opportunity to 
have a say in the decisions, given their seat at the Council table, in the 
COREPER, and in comitology, ECJ decisions do not. And recent cases have 
hit the smaller countries very hard, in particular where they jeopardise 
national industrial relations systems by limiting social rights such as the 
right to strike or national education and health systems by upholding mar-
ket-based rights of free movement. Th e Laval case – which pitted labour’s 
right to strike against businesses that pay and protect posted workers less 
against businesses’ freedom of movement – directly aﬀ ects Denmark and 
Sweden. Th is is because the ruling mainly applies to countries without laws 
governing all business pay and protection, and thus it hits the long-stan-
ding practice of autonomous business-labour negotiations in Denmark 
and Sweden, but not Finland or Norway (Dolvik 2008). Th is decision is a 
problem for Germany as well, however, which also has autonomous wage-
bargaining, and no minimum wage in certain sectors, e.g. the construction 
industry. Other ECJ decisions like the Viking case – which eﬀ ectively cur-
tailed unions’ right to strike in areas where it aﬀ ects the free movement of 
business – have also been of greatest concern to Scandinavian countries 
(Höpner & Schäfer 2007). However, the ECJ’s decisions, which uphold 
market-based rights of free movement, also undermine national education 
and health systems by imposing undue costs – e.g. Austria’s resistance to 
the voiding of its admission restrictions on German medical students and 
Luxemburg’s concerns about reimbursement for medical products pur-
chased in Belgium in the eyeglasses case – and could threaten the very 
sustainability of small states’ welfare states (Scharpf 2009).
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 New modes of governance
Finally, Europeanisation consists of ‘softer’ modes of governance – the 
so-called ‘new governance’ – and in particular the Open Method of Coor-
dination (OMC) in social and employment policy based on self-set targets 
and voluntary compliance (De la Porte & Pochet 2002; Mosher & Tru-
bek 2003). This can be seen as ‘policymaking without policies’ (Schmidt 
2002a: ch. 2) given the vague language in which reform goals are set, such 
as ‘flexibility’ and ‘employability’, which allow for very different interpre-
tations and policy programmes from one country to the next (Barbier 
2008). Although the OMC has great potential in areas where national di-
vergence makes EU-level decision-making difficult if not impossible, the 
very vagueness of the targets and the self-reporting nature of the exercise 
could mean that much of it may just be smoke and mirrors – as countries 
set National Action Plans (NAPs) that reflect what they are already doing. 
This is especially true for those countries such as Sweden or Denmark 
that are seen as models for the other countries on such things as labour 
market activation policy, female workforce participation, investment in 
education and/or in research and development. 
 Here, too, however, there are big differences among the smaller coun-
tries in terms of their scores, with the Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands high up there, even though Sweden has been cited for gender 
imbalance in certain sectors (mainly women in the public caring services), 
and the Netherlands for its low number of working hours per year. The 
problem with the OMC generally, however, is that it is often simply a gov-
ernment exercise, although some countries, like Belgium, have reportedly 
used it quite effectively to promote reform, in contrast with Germany, for 
example (De La Porte & Pochet 2005; Zeitlin & Pochet 2005). And yet, 
the possibility of ‘naming and shaming’ countries that don’t make prog-
ress can be very potent, and possibly more in smaller countries where the 
media is likely to pay more attention to it.
 Conclusion
Thus, while generalisations related to institutional, cultural and discursive 
characteristics are very important in trying to make sense of what makes 
small states successful, these take us only so far. Small West European 
countries are indeed smaller than bigger countries, which makes it easier 
for those that are culturally homogeneous to reach agreements among so-
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cial partners when they are being cooperative, especially when the state, if 
unitary, can facilitate such cooperation or take action in its absence, and 
when ideas and discourse can be more reinforcing of the positive char-
acteristics over time. But the identification of such characteristics is not 
on its own enough to enable us to explain small states’ success. And it is 
certainly not enough to explain responses to the EU. Europeanisation has 
led to different responses from small countries, depending upon policy 
area and decision rules.
 But despite the fact that we are left with no easy generalisations, it is 
clear that there is still something about these small countries in particular 
that makes their responses worth studying – if only because they are too 
often neglected in favour of the larger, and dare I say it, more predictable, 
member states.
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7 The Small Corporatist Political Economies as European 
 Socio-Economic Model?*
 Uwe Becker and Kees van Kersbergen
The political economies of the small, largely corporatist countries ana-
lysed in the contributions to this volume have not been immune to the 
pressures to liberalise that have sprung up notably since the early 1990s. 
And indeed, liberalisation has taken place to differing degrees. The con-
tributions also show, however, that this process has remained limited. The 
countries still reveal a high degree of corporatism, and their welfare sys-
tems are still considerably more generous than those in countries such 
as the US in particular, which approximates the liberal type of capital-
ism. Their labour markets as well as product and company markets are 
still far removed from the liberal ideal. The exceptions are Switzerland – 
which generally combines a strong liberal stance with corporatism – and 
Denmark due to their relatively flexible labour markets, while in Belgium 
corporatism has suffered due to Flemish-Wallonian tensions. But these 
exceptions do not change the overall picture.
 The small corporatist countries have performed as well as or even bet-
ter than the strongly liberal ones. With the exception of Switzerland, they 
have all had high rates of GDP growth per capita as well as per hour; all 
of them except Belgium have medium to high employment rates; their 
inequality and poverty rates are relatively low; their concern for the en-
vironment is more serious than average (but still not serious enough); 
and half of them belong to the most innovative – and in that sense most 
competitive – countries in the world. Table 7.1 summarises these facts.1 
Moreover, measured in GDP per capita, these countries are richer than 
all the Anglo-Saxon countries except the US, and some of them roughly 
equal the US in GDP per hour. When it comes to specific aspects, other 
countries rank up there with the corporatist ‘smalls’ – the Anglo-Saxon 
economies except New Zealand with respect to economic growth; Ger-
many, Japan and the US with respect to innovation and competitiveness; 
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and with respect to employment, the Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan. 
Nonetheless, the facts clearly demonstrate that top performances are pos-
sible without strong liberalisation. This is particularly true for the Nordic 
countries (except oil-rich Norway) which belong to the top performers in 
every respect.
Against this background, we want to ask the question whether the ‘smalls’ 
(or at least some of them) qualify as an example of a corporatist European 
social model (ESM). Since the EU summit in Lisbon in 2000, the ESM 
has become a hot topic in the ongoing political discussion over the fu-
ture of work, welfare and competitiveness and whether or not European 
political economies and welfare systems should move in a liberal direc-
tion. The latter has been advised by among others the OECD to meet the 
challenges of increasing global competition. This has particularly been 
addressed to European countries that have recently had relatively low 
employment/high unemployment and low rates of GDP growth, like the 
bigger countries of France, Germany and Italy. Many European interest 
organisations and political parties do not want to make the liberal move, 
however, because of its costs in terms of poverty, material inequality and 
social insecurity. These groups have therefore launched the European So-
cial Model as an alternative. With the severe financial and economic crisis 
since 2008, the ESM has gained in importance.
 In this concluding chapter, we will briefly clarify the meaning of the 
concept of a European social model before proposing that it be replaced 
with the European socio-economic model (ESEM) in the sense of capital-
ist varieties as described in preceding chapters. Thereafter we will dis-
Table 7.1 Economic performances (GDP and productivity growth), 1992-2006; innovative 
capacity and social indicators (employment, welfare) in the mid-2000s, ordered 
by most approximated variety of capitalism
Approximately Liberal
H                              M                           L
Approximately Corporatist
H                             M                             L
- CAN, CH, 
UK, US
AUS, IRL, 
NZ
DK, FIN, 
SE
A, GER, 
NL, N
B
Approximately Statist
H                              M                            L
Approximately Meso-communitarian
H                              M                             L
- - F, ESP; 
very low: I
- J -
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cuss whether and in what respects the small, largely corporatist political 
economies fulfil the role as example of the ESEM. Finally, we look for the 
conditions necessary for realising such a model. These are not new ques-
tions but we want to bring them together and ask them in the context of 
the analysis of recent socio-economic performances (most previous stud-
ies were published around the turn of the millennium). Moreover, we not 
only want to stress the importance of the competitiveness of a socio-eco-
nomic model, we genuinely want to consider it. This aspect, generally the 
broader varieties of capitalism perspective and the decidedly comparative 
character of our argument are the differentia specifica of this contribu-
tion.
 The European social model and the European socio-economic 
model
Very early ideas of a sort of social model for Europe had already been 
formulated by Guy Mollet back in 1956 (Scharpf 2002: 646) – in a context 
still considerably determined by the post-Great Depression and post-war 
ideological climate of that time and before the current national welfare 
states had taken shape. The theme only returned to the agenda when, in 
the 1980s and 1990s, the process of European integration had reached the 
stage where the Single European Market (SEM) was to be realised. Against 
this background, Jacques Delors, the chairman of the European Commis-
sion, launched the idea of a European social model, the main feature of 
which would have to be its difference with the American model (Jespen & 
Serrano Pascual 2005: 234) – an aspect that has remained central to the 
concept ever since. The European Commission’s 1994 White Paper on So-
cial Policy was also important in this regard, as it defined the ESM as a set 
of common values including equal opportunities for all, social dialogue, 
social security and solidarity, in addition to the commitment to democ-
racy and personal freedom.
 In the Lisbon Treaty of 2000, then, the scope of the ESM was broad-
ened by stressing research and education and by integrating innovation 
and competitiveness. European economies would have to be social as well 
as competitive and provide for sustained economic growth and employ-
ment in accordance with environmental objectives. This broader concept 
– which was, in fact, already a move in the direction of the ESEM – is also 
reflected in the relevant literature at that time (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Ferrera et al. 2001; Black 2002; Scharpf 2002; Whitehead 2003). Also 
 UWE BECKER AND KEES VAN KERSBERGEN
worth mentioning is Anthony Giddens (2006) who, in line with the New 
Labour philosophy, pleaded for a reformed European social model where 
individual responsibility and flexibility also have an important place. In 
sum, what a European socio-economic model achieves, apart from demo-
cratic goals, is the combination of:
– high employment;
– generous but conditional benefits for those who have lost their jobs or 
are unable to work;
– limited material inequality (also between the sexes) and a reasonable 
equality of condition;
– competitiveness and sustained economic growth;
– protection of the natural environment.
The discussion on the ESM is sometimes somewhat elusive because it is 
not always clear whether the authors are arguing about empirical reality 
or a normative model. Empirically, the ESM does not exist. Compared 
with the Anglo-Saxon world, particularly the United States, the common 
features of continental European political economies might be their high-
er degree of reliance on the state and less emphasis on individual respon-
sibility. For the rest, however, it is diversity that is colouring the picture.
 Geographically, this empirical diversity is somewhat patterned. Rough-
ly, one can distinguish five groups of countries with similar political econ-
omies:
– The UK and Ireland, which have already been considerably liberalised, 
particularly the former (see Tables 1.5a and 1.5b in the introduction to 
this volume), and approximate the liberal type as defined in the Intro-
duction.
– The Scandinavian countries, with their large public sectors and rela-
tively generous benefits, which approximate the social democratic 
sub-variety of the corporatist type.
– The ‘Rhineland’ group (bordering the Rhine including the entire Be-
nelux) plus (also relatively corporatist) Germany and rather statist 
France. These countries, except Switzerland, combine medium-high 
employment with relatively generous welfare benefits.
– The Mediterranean countries, which approximate clientelist sub-va-
rieties of statism, with lower but rising welfare benefits and, except in 
Portugal, a low employment rate.
– The Eastern Europe political economies, which are less consolidated 
and currently can be sub-divided into two groups: one, including the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, that is mov-
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ing in the direction of the ‘Rhineland’ countries and another group 
(the Baltic states) that is taking the liberal world as their example.
Since the ESEM is not an empirical reality, it must be a normative entity – 
a model in the proper sense; something we highly value and that ought to 
be realised because it meets our goals. Here, the relevant goals are those 
formulated in the Lisbon Treaty and similar ones. Such a model might be 
constructed by mixing elements from several empirical political econo-
mies with newly invented ones, but it can also be established by attach-
ing normative status to one of the empirically given political economies/
welfare systems.
 In this paper we do not want to go that far. We want to analyse the small 
countries’ political economies and their accomplishments and ask to what 
extent they can serve as examples of a normative model for Europe. We 
would hesitate to answer this question positively with respect to all of the 
small, largely corporatist, political economies. All of them have a good 
system of social security, and their corporatist arrangements enable them 
mutually to adjust economic and social goals, but they are too diverse and 
not all of them perform economically well. Some of them – Austria, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and particularly oil-producing Norway – are con-
siderably less innovative than others. Belgium is a low-employment coun-
try, the Netherlands only has a high employment rate because of its very 
large number of often tiny part-time jobs (although in principle, part-time 
work is a viable way of allocating scarce jobs), Austria has an extremely 
low employment rate of persons older than 55 years, and Switzerland has 
been a low-growth country during the period since 1990 and is a special 
case because of its protection of regional Swiss markets (cf. Schulte 2004). 
Finally, Norway’s oil revenues give it special status and render it unsuitable 
for comparison or discussions of models. 
 What remains as a potential cohesive case for constructing the ESEM is 
Scandinavia (largely excluding Norway). Any perfect model case does not 
exist, but the Scandinavian political economies come closest to the goals 
mentioned above. Related to their still highly developed corporatism, 
they feature a form of stakeholder capitalism in which a comparatively re-
markable level of co-determination is a sort of natural thing. In Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden it is most pronounced (as in Austria and Germany), 
and in Finland (as in the Netherlands) it is somewhat less developed (cf. 
Jackson 2005: 4). And more than any other region, Scandinavia combines 
competitiveness and social welfare with high employment for all demo-
graphic groups – in spite of the changes described in this volume – and 
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also undertakes more-than-average efforts to protect the environment 
(which is also true for Austria and Switzerland).
 In the past, Scandinavian political economies have more than once 
been assigned the status of model. In the 1970s and 1980s, Sweden and 
Denmark enjoyed considerable attention as models of a third way be-
tween capitalism and socialism. Because of its ‘flexicurity’, Denmark has 
been the model country since the mid-1990s, Finland (which together with 
Sweden experienced a severe economic crisis in the early 1990s) joined 
the models’ club in the late 1990s at the same time that Sweden made a 
strong comeback. And while other countries fell into a period of stagna-
tion in the years up to 2006, Scandinavia showed robust growth, moved 
up into the leading group of innovative countries, maintained its welfare 
state, and found its way back to high employment – although Finland and 
Sweden never returned to their 1980s levels. In the global financial and 
economic crisis that started in 2008, the Scandinavian economies have 
been hit as hard as or even harder than other Western economies (on an 
annual basis, Swedish GDP declined by 6.5 in the first quarter of 2009 
– press release of Statistics Sweden on May 29) but these developments 
were not homemade and at the time of writing (late 2009) it is too early to 
evaluate them in comparative perspective.
 Liberals are right in stressing that welfare benefits or income taxation 
should neither undermine employment nor competitiveness and that 
benefits should not be unconditional. They assume a trade-off between 
generous welfare systems, employment protection and progressive redis-
tributive taxation on the one hand and the employment rate and com-
petitiveness on the other. However, the Scandinavian political economies 
(and to a lesser degree those of the other countries studied in this book) 
appear to demonstrate that this assumption is not generally true, and 
show that economic and social targets are conciliable. We will have to see 
to what extent this also holds for economic and environment objectives.
 Employment and social performance in international comparison
The high employment level is the most remarkable aspect of the Scandi-
navian political economies. With the exception of Finland, it is running at 
around 75 (see Table 7.2) of the working-age population (15 to 64 years 
of age). The only other countries to reach anything like this level are the 
Netherlands – although this is qualified by the very high number of part-
time jobs – Switzerland and the Anglo-Saxon countries (Iceland, which is 
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also Scandinavian but very small, has the highest level). France, Italy and 
Belgium stand in strong contrast (although the percentage for Flanders 
is considerably higher than that for Wallonia), while Austria and recently 
Germany have established themselves in the upper middle band, reach-
ing Finnish levels. The picture is similar with respect to unemployment, 
and here too Finland performs slightly worse than the other Scandinavian 
countries. Finland is still dealing with its economic collapse at the be-
ginning of the 1990s when not only house prices and demand collapsed, 
as in Sweden, but also the immensely important Soviet market was for 
the most part lost. GDP fell and unemployment rose rapidly to over 20. 
Since around 1995, Finland has improved continuously on all fronts (cf. 
Kiander 2005).
 If one goes more into detail, it turns out that Scandinavian long-term 
unemployment is also much lower than in most European countries. 
Austria is an exception here, but many potential long-term unem-
ployed are probably hidden due to the very high rates of early retire-
ment there. This suggests that employment rates are more important 
indicators than unemployment rates, because in cases of high employ-
ment hidden unemployment in the form of early retirement and dis-
ability is naturally lower, as is the number of those discouraged from 
seeking employment. Furthermore, it turns out that the employment of 
women and of persons between 55 and 64 is also very high in Scandina-
via – the latter nearly 50 higher than in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Germany and about twice as high as in Austria, France and Italy (coun-
tries which were called ‘pensioners states’ by Esping-Andersen [1990] 
for this reason). As a consequence, problems with pension financing 
and unemployment among older workers in the Scandinavian countries 
are less severe than in the rest of Europe. Also, apart from Norway, the 
female part-time employment rate is relatively low, above all in Finland, 
thereby qualifying that country’s somewhat lower employment rate. 
Given that the difference between women’s and men’s wages is smaller 
than the European average (cf. European Commission 2003), one may 
conclude that women have attained economic independence at least to 
some extent.
 With respect to part-time work, the Netherlands and Switzerland are 
contrasting cases. Part-time jobs are often related to a lack of child care, 
and perhaps they might be part of an employer’s strategy to create flex-
ibility without changing the law. In a less work-centred society – a clas-
sification particularly true for the Netherlands; in Switzerland the work-
ing week is considerably longer – it could also be the basis for a focus on 
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other objectives, provided that this society is able to stay productive and 
competitive. Perhaps less emphasis on work and GDP growth could be 
another feature of a future ESEM.
 Alongside and in connection with high rates of female employment, the 
employment of almost one third of all working people in the public sector 
(in Finland one quarter) is the most characteristic feature of the Scan-
dinavian political economies. Most women are employed in this sector, 
particularly in labour-intensive health care, social services and education 
(one occasionally hears the expression ‘state feminism’ in this connec-
tion). While in the US low-paid service jobs are at the basis of the high 
employment rate and while in the Netherlands it is part-time work, high 
employment rates in Scandinavia stem from the large number of public 
jobs. 
 The data in Table 7.3 show that the percentage of limited employment 
contracts (temporary work) in Scandinavia is not lower than the conti-
nental European average (leaving apart the extremely high Spanish per-
centage). One could however add that this has, together with the percent-
age of part-time work, gone down during the past decade in Denmark, 
Finland and Norway. This is also true for Switzerland. In most other West 
European countries, the percentage has risen – this was also the case in 
Sweden – while it has remained low in the Anglo-Saxon world (Canada is 
the exception). It seems that employers regard flexwork as less necessary 
when dismissal rules are flexible. By contrast, the low-wage sector is big 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries and small, even if it has slightly increased, in 
Scandinavia. One could add that a small low-wage sector is of course part 
of the ‘Nordic model’.
 The employment-centred welfare state is supported by social ben-
efits and a tax policy based on the principle of equality of condition. For 
‘social citizenship’, this equality of condition is more important than the 
equality of opportunity as stressed by liberalism. The Scandinavian po-
litical economy and welfare philosophy imply the approval of the mar-
ket – with the exception of Norway in the 1920s, revolutionary social-
ism has always been weak – but it is also critical of it. Corrections in 
accordance with the equality principle are considered essential (Esping-
Andersen 1985). Social benefits are therefore high, income taxes pro-
gressive, and both together have a greater redistributive effect than the 
social systems of almost all other countries (cf. the first two columns in 
Table 7.3).
 Denmark is the most egalitarian country in social terms, followed by 
Sweden and, trailing at some distance, Finland and Norway. Outside the 
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Nordic region, Austria and the Netherlands are at a level comparable to 
that of the latter two Nordic countries. The situation concerning poverty 
is similar, although in the Netherlands as well as in Belgium and Switzer-
land the rates are higher. Poverty in Denmark, Finland and Sweden has, 
however, followed the international trend and, accompanied by modest 
cuts in social benefits (Korpi & Palme 2003), has increased since the mid-
1990s. Importantly, however, child poverty has constantly remained low, a 
feature that according to Esping-Andersen (2007: 643f ) is causally related 
to female employment. 
 Table 7.3 lists the wage replacement rates of social benefits. These are 
no longer significantly higher than in some other countries in Europe, al-
though the Danish top rate of 90 for lower incomes is achieved nowhere 
else. However, it is the whole package of social benefits and services that 
is important. This includes the extensive public childcare facilities such as 
day-care centres, after-school day-care and other possibilities to remain 
in school after hours, available to almost half of all children. In a broader 
sense, the school and training system also belongs to social services. The 
international PISA studies, comparatively testing intellectual capacities of 
fifteen year old pupils, regularly report on the high quality of these sys-
tems. Finally, employment protection belongs to social services, since it 
indicates the extent to which labour has become a commodity. With the 
exception of Denmark and, with qualifications, Finland, the figures for 
Nordic countries (the data in the table are compiled from several com-
ponents) are not much different from the continental European average, 
which is described by liberal critics as both rigid and an obstacle to growth 
and employment.
 Danish ‘flexicurity’, more extensively described in Mailand’s contribu-
tion to this volume, deserves special attention again. It is a system that 
combines relaxed employment protection, high wage replacement rates 
in the case of unemployment, and the obligation of the unemployed to 
participate in retraining. In 2004 the Danish prime minister proudly an-
nounced that ‘by international standards, we have a very flexible labour 
market. It is actually highly praised abroad and the envy of many other 
countries (…). It is, however, only possible because we have a high level of 
social security’ (Bredgaard et al. 2005: 21). Indeed, in a broad internation-
al comparison of the connection between labour market structure, social 
security and employment, Denmark came out as the ‘best case’ (Bradley 
& Stephens 2007: 1505).
 The basic form of this system has existed since 1994 and has been modi-
fied several times. A further element of this system comprises special leave 
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of up to one year for educational or parental purposes (up to 1999 there was 
also a sabbatical year in the strict sense of the term), with job retention and 
payment of (currently no more than) 60 of the wage replacement given in 
the case of unemployment. Eligibility requirements are a minimum age of 
25 years and several years of employment experience. In the international 
discussion on flexicurity, leave schemes are barely mentioned – perhaps 
because in contrast to the looser employment protection it is costly and 
does not fit in the dominant paradigm. However, it is a central element 
because many unemployed take up jobs left temporarily vacant by those 
on special leave (on this set of issues as a whole, see Compston & Madsen 
2001; Abrahamson 2006).
 The last relatively positive performance – with the emphasis on rela-
tive – of the Nordic countries to be mentioned regards the environment. 
Possible indicators we can use are the ‘ecological footprint’ (GFN 2006), 
which is a measure of human demand on the Earth’s ecosystems (ex-
pressed in hectares per capita), and the Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI 2008) which includes indicators such as biodiversity and the use of 
forests. The EPI favours countries with a low population density. Thus 
the densely populated, geographically monotonous Netherlands, while 
boasting a small ecological footprint, is a laggard in terms of its EPI score 
(ranked number 55 with a score of 78.4, while much bigger polluters such 
as the US and Australia are ranked 39 and 41 respectively with scores of 
81.0 and 79.8; Switzerland, ahead of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Austria, 
is ranked 1 with a score of 95.5). Alternative indicators are data on emis-
sions of pollutants such as CO2, sulphur and nitrogen oxides (cf. Becker 
2009: 165). They do not take into account, however, what a country is spe-
cialised in in the international division of labour. Because of its speciali-
sation in minerals, sparsely populated Australia is polluter number one, 
but its ecological footprint and its value in the EPI makes it comparable 
to the Nordic countries. Table 7.4 (ibid: 131) which summarises pollution 
data therefore has to be taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, it is not 
Table 7.4 Summarised ranking of polluters
Very High AUS, CAN, US
High NZ, ESP
Medium B, FIN, GER, IRE, I, NL
Relatively Low A, DK, F, J, N, SE, UK
Lowest CH
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far-fetched to say that Switzerland and the Nordic countries (with Finland 
as slight exception) are environmentally speaking the cleanest in the eco-
nomically developed world. Britain, France and Japan also belong to the 
group of relatively low polluters (leaving aside nuclear energy). The big-
gest polluters are the strongly liberal countries (except Britain).
 Criticisms
One of the most criticised aspects of the Nordic political economies is 
their high public sector employment and the costs related to this. High 
public spending and taxes are generally a thorn in the side of liberals, but 
high public sector employment in Scandinavia is perceived as a particu-
larly egregious example of inefficiency. According to recent ECB data, the 
Swedish public sector was half as efficient as that of the US, and the Dan-
ish public sector is not much better (The Economist, 9 September 2006: 
27). Even if this is the case, one might ask whether public sector employ-
ment could be justified for the sake of employment – at least as long as 
the market sector remains in a position to pay for it. After all, unemploy-
ment is not cost-free, and public employment of the Scandinavian sort 
also guarantees poorly qualified workers an honest income. Efficiency is 
a necessary economic criterion, but not the only one. And the ideological 
dominance of social democracy – even if social democrats currently are 
not in power – means that considerable weight is given to social criteria. 
 A further point of criticism is the high level of sick leave in Scandina-
via, particularly in Sweden, which is also said to illustrate inefficiency and 
to distort employment levels. In fact, Sweden loses 26 days due to sick 
leave per year and employee, Norway 21, and Finland 15. Not far behind 
these frontrunners are Belgium and France with 16 days, the Netherlands 
with 14 and the UK with 13 days, while Denmark, with an average of ‘only’ 
10 days, is at the same level as Austria. Sick leave is even lower in the US (9 
days), Germany (8), Switzerland (7), Italy (7) and Ireland (6) (Rae 2005a: 
5). Looking for reasons for the high sick leave in notably Sweden, the 
cause must probably be sought in lax regulation. ‘Getting sickness ben-
efit appears to be much easier in Sweden than in other countries’, writes 
Rae (2005a: 13). And perhaps a culture has grown in which sick leave is 
considered ‘normal’. It does not appear to have much connection with the 
health of the Swedish people because, with an average of only three visits 
to the doctor a year (Rae 2005b: 13), they are among the most healthy in 
the world.
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 Above-average sick leave points to hidden unemployment and an inflat-
ed employment rate. For example, the Swedish total of registered unem-
ployment and sick leave of a week or more is as high as the corresponding 
total in Germany, a much larger country in terms of population (Hesselius 
2006: 28). Some form of hidden unemployment exists in virtually all coun-
tries, however. Often, early retirement takes large segments of people out 
of unemployment. Sometimes (as in the Netherlands and Italy) a disability 
scheme is doing this job, while in Sweden (where the number of persons 
unable to work due to disability has recently even been growing; cf. Hes-
selius 2006: 10f ) and in Norway it is the high level of sick leave (and to a 
somewhat lesser degree also in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the 
UK). Regarding Denmark, one might point to the above-mentioned spe-
cial leaves of up to one year as a kind of hidden unemployment (purely in 
quantitative relation to employment and unemployment; apart from the 
fact that these leaves can be classified as socially desirable), while in the US 
it is the high number of persons incarcerated – 762 persons per 100,000 
inhabitants, which is 1.4 of the labour force (Schmitt 2007: 3) and eight to 
twelve times higher than in Japan and the continental European countries 
(ICPS 2008). So, alongside the special case of Switzerland, only Finland re-
mains as a country with a relatively high employment rate in which there is 
no category of hidden unemployment worth mentioning. Finnish employ-
ment, however, is somewhat lower than in the other Nordic countries, and 
overt unemployment is higher.
 A final criticism concerns Sweden’s overall economic performance. 
Thanks to its oil reserves, Norway is very rich, while Denmark belongs 
to the countries with the highest per capita income in the world. In the 
meantime, the former model country Sweden has been overtaken not only 
by some German Länder but also, if only slightly, by the UK, Ireland, Bel-
gium, Austria and the Netherlands (The Economist, 9 September 2006: 
26). And Finland, which never belonged to the richest countries, has al-
most caught up with Sweden. The criticism is justified, but the long pro-
cess of Sweden’s alignment to the average up to the beginning of the 1990s 
is less a sign of that country’s decline and more a sign of the other coun-
tries catching up. The following years indeed illustrate a period of crisis 
– in 1992 alone, 600,000 jobs were lost (Plougmann & Madsen 2002: 6). 
Since about 1995, Sweden has, however, like Denmark and Finland, expe-
rienced an upswing that was only broken when a global crisis emerged in 
2008. And in terms of competitiveness, it became stronger.
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 Competitive – even if with a little luck!
The Nordics are doing almost everything that, according to neo-classical 
textbooks, will lead inevitably to poor growth and reduced competitive-
ness: taxes are high, social services generous, the public sector is large 
and to some extent inefficient, wage dispersion is relatively flat, and em-
ployment protection is – apart from the special case of Danish flexicurity 
– by no means weak. Moreover, wage development is almost classically 
Keynesian, running parallel with that of productivity (on this point the 
situation in liberal countries such as the UK and the US is similar). The 
sole exception was Finland in the second half of the 1990s. Growth, com-
petitiveness and employment have not suffered due to these ‘sins’. All four 
countries are of course competitive in their own ways, although Norway, 
which is largely excluded here from our comparative analysis, is not com-
petitive at all, apart from its oil and some other, smaller branches. This 
holds at least when competitiveness in technologically advanced markets 
– where the developed economies of the West and East Asia largely have 
to operate in – is understood as a country’s capacity to: a) host and facili-
tate a relatively large number of innovative companies and primarily to 
export goods and services because of their quality and productivity in the 
sense of the product/price relation,2 and b) acquire comparative advan-
tages by specialising in the international division of labour.
 Obviously, a country can maintain its competitiveness without ex-
cessive wage restraint of the Austrian or German (and, in earlier years, 
Dutch) variety. Decisive for competitiveness, alongside the very impor-
tant factors of quality and specialisation, are unit wage costs as well as 
productivity development based on innovation. Disadvantages on the 
part of Denmark, Finland and Sweden are not apparent here – the two 
latter countries have even achieved particularly strong productivity gains. 
In addition, demand – both foreign and domestic – is important for eco-
nomic growth and, as a consequence, for employment.
 If one looks closely at Table 7.5, it turns out that there appear to be 
several ways to competitiveness and growth: via increased productivity 
per hour (UK, Sweden and the US 1995-2006), via wage restraint (Belgium 
and the Netherlands 1995-2000; Spain 1997-2006; Austria 2002-2006), 
and a combination of the two factors (Finland and Austria 1995-2001; Ire-
land 1995-2006; Japan 2002-2006). There are, of course, cases in which 
neither wage restraint (Germany and Italy 2002-2006), nor a combination 
of wage restraint and a strong increase in productivity (Japan 1995-2000) 
meet with success. The simple cause of this phenomenon could be that 
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additional factors, e.g. the costs of German reunification, have played a 
role and that in relation to growth, all ways have advantages and disadvan-
tages which balance out in the final analysis.
 The sole unambiguous (though by economic theory underrated) factor 
has been private consumption. When it is high, growth is also high. Some 
qualifications in relation to Denmark in the 1997-2001 period are needed, 
but French, Dutch, Austrian, Swedish, US, UK, Finnish, Irish and Spanish 
data verify this causal nexus. In all these cases – except for the UK, the 
US and Sweden – the increase in consumption is clearly higher than wage 
growth. Conversely, where private consumption increases only modestly, 
as in Germany and the Netherlands, economic growth is very low. Since 
wages and consumption are often disconnected, in the light of the above-
mentioned thesis that several ways lead to economic growth, this is not 
necessarily a call for a Keynesian wage policy, but rather for paying atten-
tion to demand as an independent factor in macroeconomic processes.
 The decoupling of wages and consumption since the mid-1990s means 
that consumers have been breaking into their savings or have increasingly 
been getting into debt. The latter has happened above all in those coun-
tries in which house prices have risen strongly since the mid-1990s – in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands; at the end 
of the decade also in France, Italy and above all Spain (see OECD 2006c: 
18) – and that offer the opportunity of tax relief on mortgage interest 
payments. This is the case in the US, the Netherlands (up to 100 tax re-
lief ) and to a lesser extent in the other Anglo-Saxon countries, Spain and 
Scandinavia. In this group, the sharp rises in house prices have not only 
resulted in a so-called wealth effect but also in the option of engaging in 
consumption with mortgage loans subject to tax benefits. This was taken 
up particularly in the Netherlands (see Becker 2005: 1092ff ) as well as in 
the UK, Spain and the US, but also Denmark and Sweden. 
 House price trends and related demand bubbles have of course not 
been the result of wise policies. They have simply been favourable cir-
cumstances in which the Scandinavian countries shared – at least until 
2008 when the bubble started to burst. It was also fortunate that Denmark 
found North Sea oil in the early 1990s, which accounted for a full percent-
age point added to GDP growth (Andersen 1997: 46). The image of quality 
attached to Scandinavian, particularly Danish products (‘Danish design’), 
is a further element of fortune, even if it was hard work in the past that 
achieved it. As in the case of Swiss products, this reputation makes high 
premium prices possible (one might mention such products as Carlsberg 
beer, Bang & Olufsen or Lego) and positions the producers to some extent 
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outside international competition. Finally, one can ask whether the rise of 
Nokia from an unknown TV and tire producer to global number one in 
mobile telephony is the product of the coincidence of a number of lucky 
circumstances.
 This does not mean that politics has not been uninfluential. We have 
already mentioned the Danish reform programme of 1994, which intro-
duced flexicurity with its three elements. Whether this promoted eco-
nomic dynamism or not remains an open question, but it cannot be denied 
that it had some effect on employment (cf. Green-Pedersen & Lindbom 
2005). And the fact that wages in the Scandinavian economies (apart from 
Finland 1996-2000) have risen more strongly than in the rest of the Euro-
pean continent is due not only to the higher level of unionisation but also 
to lessons learned in the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, above all in 
Sweden and Denmark.
 In these countries, too, particularly under pressure from the Maastricht 
criteria, most economists made the turn to neo-liberalism and monetar-
ism, but Keynesian approaches receded later than in other countries, and 
never to the same extent (for Sweden, see Blyth 2002: ch. 7). Therefore, 
this had some influence on the analysis of this crisis, which was inter-
preted not only as a financial and debt crisis but also as a crisis based on 
inadequate private demand (Lindvall 2004: 118ff ). The 1990 bursting of 
the house-price bubble and mortgage-induced demand in Sweden (and 
Finland and, to some extent, Denmark) had in any case demonstrated that 
demand should not be neglected. In Denmark, this led to an easing of 
interest rates in 1993, and in Sweden to debates on how demand could be 
stimulated and indirectly to the legitimation of union demands for con-
siderably higher wage increases – though employers opposed this.
 The latter was one of the reasons for continuing the break in the Swed-
ish social partnership at the central level that had been triggered in 1988 
by the trade union/social democratic plan to establish workers’ funds. 
This break led to a form of social partnership fraught with strike action. 
In this respect, Scandinavian corporatism is far less friendly than that of 
the German-speaking countries or the Benelux states (cf. Aarvaag Stokke 
& Thörnqvist 2001: 249). It represents an interplay between open conflict 
and talking to one another, a constellation that could be called the con-
sensualism of two strong partners.
 Where the social partners do talk to one another, the topic of com-
petitiveness is at the top of the agenda, above all in Finland (see Kettunen 
2004) and Sweden (see Elvander 2002). The times in which competitive-
ness could be restored by means of devaluations of the national currency 
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are over, due to the opening up of markets and accession to the EU. It is 
also clear that the expensive welfare state can be borne only by a highly 
productive private sector. These insights were translated into action and, 
as a consequence, the two countries find themselves highly ranked in the 
innovation league. R&D expenditure – at more than 4 in Sweden and 
3.5 in Finland – is about double that of the EU average and consider-
ably higher than that of the US (see Table 7.6). Denmark, which is rather 
reliant on small businesses, has less specifically designated R&D expen-
ditures and has to rely more on informal innovation in the course of the 
work process. An important aspect of this is the importance attached to 
regular re-schooling/training on the basis of a high general level of educa-
tion. In comparative perspective, Denmark – and to a lesser degree also 
Finland and Sweden – has a considerable edge in this respect (Gallie 2007: 
92).
 Denmark, not ranking at the top of the Innovation Index in the nar-
row sense, has recently been in the top five (third in 2007) of the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, together with the US, 
Switzerland, Finland and Sweden. In the Innovation Index and in terms 
of patents – more specifically, Triadic Patent Families (TPFs), i.e. patents 
registered at all of the three main patent offices: those of the EU, Japan 
and the US – it does not belong to the top, but Finland and Sweden do, 
although Finland performs less in the patent field. In what is arguably the 
most comprehensive index – the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) 
– Denmark, Sweden and Finland belong once again among the top, to-
gether with Germany, Japan, South Korea (not mentioned in Table 7.6), 
Switzerland, the UK and the US – with Sweden ranking number one. In 
the EIS, five dimensions are used to determine innovative capacity: 1) the 
structural conditions for innovation, 2) R&D investment, 3) efforts to-
wards innovation at the firm level, 4) value added in innovative sectors, 
and 5) results in terms of successful know-how.
 One ought not to exaggerate the importance of these indices. Some-
times, as in the case of the World Economic Forum rankings, they are 
partially based on interviews and have a subjective dimension with often 
neo-liberal undertones. For another part they consist of input data such 
as the expenditures for education and R&D. Input does not necessarily say 
much about output, however. Nonetheless, the high rankings do demon-
strate the attempts above all by Finland and Sweden to attain productivity 
growth by means of innovation. Real development in terms of productiv-
ity and unit wage costs (relevant data were presented in Table 7.5) attests 
to these efforts.
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 Nokia’s spectacular rise is an example of this and can be understood as 
something for which the way was paved both politically and by corporat-
ism. Traditionally, Finland’s economy has been highly dependent on the 
timber industry, and while this sector is still the strongest ICT is closing 
in on it. The ICT sector largely consists of Nokia, which only employs 
1 of Finnish workers but accounted for 3 of Finnish GDP, contributed 
20 to exports and carried out 35 of the country’s R&D in 2002. These 
percentages do not include the performance of domestic suppliers (Moen 
& Lilja 2005: 359f; Etla 2003) and illustrate how much Finland depends 
on one company. In Sweden, the diffusion of economic strengths is much 
greater.
 Nokia benefited from the European Commission’s choice of GSM as 
the standard for mobile telephones. Even more importantly, according to 
Moen and Lilja (2005), the state as well as capital and labour in the 1990s 
have pointedly banked on innovation. The establishment of the corporat-
ist Science & Technology Policy Council (STPC) in 1987 is a crucial date 
in this context, even if the concerted move towards high tech and innova-
tion only took place under the pressure of the economic crisis in the early 
1990s. Important activities started by the STPC have been the creation 
of an IT infrastructure, changes made to the education system, and the 
opening up of possibilities for international venture capital to invest in 
Finland. In the context of the general stock market euphoria in the second 
half of the 1990s, particularly regarding high-tech shares, the country be-
came very attractive for foreign capital.
 Conclusion and prospects for a European socio-economic model
With regard to competitiveness and employment, the West is currently 
confronting major challenges in the form of the rise of new economic 
powers such as China, India and Brazil, productivity increases exceeding 
GDP growth, and the relocation of simple work to low-wage countries. 
The neoliberal solution is to solve these problems by Americanisation 
– i.e. labour market flexibilisation, the extension of the low-wage sector, 
and related cuts in the social safety net. Alternatives include the Dutch 
part-time model and above all the Scandinavian or Nordic formula of high 
public employment. An important lesson from the Danish, Finnish and 
Swedish experiences is that the combination of extensive public sector 
employment, a generous welfare state, workers’ rights, high employment 
protection, and wage increases tied to productivity is affordable when it 
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is tied to a highly competitive market sector. With qualifications, one can 
say that, to a greater or lesser degree, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have 
managed to combine high employment, generous but conditional welfare 
benefits, limited material class and gender inequality, a reasonable equal-
ity of conditions, competitiveness, sustained economic growth, and the 
protection of the natural environment. In other words, if there is such a 
thing as an empirical basis for a normative European Social Model meet-
ing the Lisbon criteria, for example, then its main characteristics can be 
observed in the Nordic countries.
 Institutionally, Scandinavian capitalism is embedded in a social-demo-
cratic variety of corporatism – but this should not be misunderstood as an 
arrangement of milk and honey. The Swedish tension between labour and 
capital and the high level of Danish strike activity illustrate this. Nonethe-
less, society is involved at the macro-level of corporatism by the organ-
isations representing capital and labour, and at the micro-level, employ-
ees are, with national variations, involved via co-determination, which 
provides this corporatism with a democratic flavour. This democratic 
component and its conditional character for the Nordic socio-economic 
performances make modern, pragmatic corporatism a good choice for a 
European socio-economic model, and its social democratic variety stress-
ing equality of condition an even better choice.
 Is there, however, any chance to bring strongly liberal or statist political 
economies onto the path towards corporatism, let alone social democratic 
corporatism? The installation of a formal-institutional framework would 
not be sufficient. In rudimentary form, France has such institutions (no-
tably the conseil du travail), and Britain has tried them under Labour in 
the 1970s, but this did not make them countries approximating the corpo-
ratist type. Eﬀ ective, as opposed to only formal-institutional, corporatism 
requires a high level of social trust, a discursive pattern of conﬂ ict resolu-
tion, the norm of ﬁ nding compromises and a commitment to the common 
interest on the part of its players.
 In countries such as Denmark and Sweden (Norway, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland could also be mentioned) – with the absence of deep, 
long-lasting cleavages in their history and with their evolutionary pro-
cesses of democratisation – effective corporatism could develop over 
centuries. However, Finland as well as Austria, with their repressive and 
revolutionary past, show that, under certain conditions, effective corpo-
ratism can develop within a few decades (cf. Smallcons 2003: ch. 6 and 7). 
To some degree, its emergence in these countries was also the result of 
institutional learning – learning from relevant neighbours by the politi-
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cal administration that subsequently pushed the country in a corporatist 
direction, with capital and labour accepting and then embracing this turn. 
The Finnish and Austrian cases could be important examples for politi-
cal economies where a majority of the population and a large part of the 
relevant political players feel unsatisfied with the current situation and 
would like to change the institutional structure. With a slight affinity with 
consensualism as a starting point, such change is perhaps possible – even 
if at this moment it is difficult to imagine that countries with a rather con-
frontationalist political culture, such as that of France, or with a culture of 
individual competition tending towards anti-statism, like that of the UK, 
would move this way. 
 Another condition of effective corporatism is a certain balance of pow-
er between capital and labour. When one part is structurally weaker than 
the other, the existence of corporatism is in danger. This balance is diffi-
cult to accomplish, but with strong unions critically accepting capitalism, 
the Nordic countries have demonstrated its feasibility. In recent decades, 
this balance has been under pressure. The abolition of international trade 
barriers, the creation of the Single European Market and Europeanisa-
tion (see chapters 1 and 6), the emergence of the internet and the hard-
ening of global competition have forced capital to become more mobile 
and at the same time rendered mobility possible (though it is far from 
unlimited). Capital mobility and perhaps even more the bare threat of 
investing abroad has recently tended to be a stronger power resource than 
the organisational strength of trade unions in many countries. To this re-
distribution of power resources one has to add that, because of social-
structural individualisation and the attractiveness of neo-liberalism for 
some strata of wage-earners, unions have also weakened from within. A 
partial remedy against this changing power relations could perhaps be the 
enhancement of the ‘fitness’ of the labour force in terms of general and 
specific qualification. Capital depends on this ‘fitness’.
 Th e current global economic crisis, the consequences of which will 
probably last for some years, might be a moment of change, however. For 
the time being, capital has become more dependent on the state than vice 
versa, the failure of exaggerated liberalisation might trigger some ideologi-
cal change, and unions outside the Nordic region (where they have barely 
declined in numbers) might regain some of the strength of earlier years. 
Long-term processes such as social-structural individualisation will not 
stop, however, and the same is true for capital mobility (unless countries 
become more protectionist). Factors favourable for neo-liberalism will 
therefore remain eﬀ ective. So it is difficult to render the institutional mix 
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of European capitalism more corporatist, but for a number of political 
economies (think of Germany, Ireland, perhaps Italy) it does not seem im-
possible in the years to come. Some authors (e.g. Zeitlin 2005) think that 
the European Union can play an important role in this respect, notably 
via the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) where possible options for 
socio-economic improvement are discussed at the central level and sent 
for consideration to the member states. Sovereignty in socio-economic 
affairs rests, however, at the national level and the soft decision-making 
process of the OMC has, as has been pointed out by other authors (e.g. 
Scharpf 2002; Schäfer 2004), only limited effectiveness. So, in the end, 
as Vivien Schmidt has indicated in the previous chapter, it is up to the 
member states whether or not to implement the recommendations of the 
European Commission.
 What about the chances of realising the decidedly social democratic 
sub-variety of corporatism? Will populations outside Scandinavia pay 
the bill not only for social security but also for a high degree of material 
equality as well as extensive public employment? In recent years, in Den-
mark, Finland, Sweden and Norway these features have largely become 
decoupled from social democratic dominance in parliament, implying 
that maintaining ‘social democratic corporatism’ does not require a so-
cial democratic government. Independent from party-political commit-
ments, it requires people who are willing to pay for this way, a stance one 
could call social individualism. Social individualism means that people 
are aware that they are social beings on the basis of which they would not 
only support the principles of individual responsibility and meritocracy, 
but also those of solidarity and collective responsibility for work and wel-
fare. Is this feasible? Survey data (see the introduction to this volume) 
are mixed and do not allow us to offer a clear conclusion, but this might 
change if the overall ideological climate changes.
 Whether this is going to happen is another question. In the first year 
of the Obama administration, there were indications of some movement 
away from strong neo-liberal individualism even in the US, but the dis-
tance in empirical terms between the US and social Northwest Europe is 
still enormous. In his second year Obama adapted to stronger conserva-
tive forces, however. And Europeans have recently given their vote to lib-
eral and conservative (and even outspoken rightwing) parties – for exam-
ple in the 2009 elections for the European Parliament. This can hardly be 
interpreted as support for social democratic ideas to restructure political 
economies. For its supporters, changing the ideological climate and the 
normative reference frame of macroeconomic action must be an impor-
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tant task in itself. In a context where (further) ‘corporatisation’ and ‘so-
cial democratisation’ are no real options, the discussion on the European 
socio-economic model Nordic style should perhaps first of all be seen as 
a contribution to this endeavour.
 Notes
* For critical suggestions we would like to thank Brian Burgoon and Barbara 
Vis.
 This table is taken from Becker :  and based on chapter  of that 
book.
 Regularly, productivity is simply measured as pecuniary output per hour and 
does not necessarily reflect efficiency. When the oil price increases, but the 
number of hours Norwegians work and the quantity of exported oil remain 
constant, then Norwegian productivity rises. As a rule, however, western 
countries will have to increase their productivity by improving efficiency. 
A remedy against this could perhaps be the enhancement of the ‘fitness’ of 
the labour force in terms of the general and specific qualifications capital 
depends on.
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